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Abstract!
 
Mnemophrenia [ni-mä-fr!-n!-"] 
A condition or state characterized by the coexistence of real and artificial memories, which affects the 
subject’s sense of identity 
 
“What is more real than the thoughts in your mind?” 
“Re/structure your memories, re/construct your reality, re/define yourself” 
 
 
The foundation of my research is about practising theory instead of theorising practice. My 
project begins with theory, which then leads to the science fiction film Mnemophrenia that 
constitutes the practical aspect of it. I attempt to demonstrate how theory and practice can be joined 
to create a fruitful union, each one feeding the other. In my research, I am inspired by Marshall 
McLuhan’s idea and use the medium as the message in order to depict and explore how cinema can 
affect human memory and more specifically create artificial memories and thus contribute to the 
dissolution of any boundaries between reality and fiction.  
The key research question that Mnemophrenia explores is: what would happen if in a future 
postmodern society the Bazinian myth of ‘total’ cinema becomes a reality? If ‘total cinema’ is pure 
realism and cinema can lead to artificial memories, then artificial memories and pure realism become 
one and films become artificial memories. Mnemophrenia depicts a different kind of human being or 
species, a schizophrenic ‘cyborg’ changed from within due to the advancement of virtual reality films 
which signals the end of cinema as we know it today.   
Mnemophrenia is about the future of cinema and maintains a horizon of hope that could lead 
to utopia; it does not discard technology as something evil as many previous science fiction films 
have done. I am interested in depicting through the film and examining in my thesis the possibility 
of a society where the dissolution of borders between fiction and reality does not lead to horrific 
consequences for humanity but instead promotes a potential for a new kind of identity that is an 
amalgam of real and artificial memories. 
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Preface - The beginning!
My research was originally theory-based, examining contemporary American science fiction 
films that deal with the interaction between individual memory and technology. My goal was to 
critically explore the cultural interest in this subject and analyze how these films depict the effects 
of technology on memory and the subsequent creation of artificial memories. How do their 
characters cope when they do not know which memories are based on ‘real’ events? How much of 
their ‘real’ identity remains intact? And what does ‘real’ mean in a world where the boundaries of 
reality and fiction disappear?  
The plots of these films are around memory-film products that are used as entertainment or 
means of control, or memories becoming independent of their owners due to technological 
advancements: free floating memories that affect the original owner and maybe also other 
recipients/consumers. My original research focused on film characters that show similar identity 
patterns: they all have fragmented identities and have lost the capacity to organize their pasts and 
futures into coherent experiences. I decided to categorize these characters as schizophrenics or 
cyborgs, concepts that are linked to different theories of Fredric Jameson, Jean Baudrillard, Donna 
Haraway, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (which I examine further in the following chapters). 
During the research, I realized that one of the recurring depicted technologies was cinema itself or 
its future successors. That is when I understood that my work was an indirect critique of the cinema 
of the future, which was represented as an advanced, interactive and completely immersive 
medium.  
After this realization, I decided to change my research to practice-based and explore the 
subject on different levels; and to not limit myself to the written word. Practice-based research has 
the potential to illuminate significant questions and issues. According to Tom Barone and Elliot 
Eisner, “art is [not] an ornament on a form of productive work; rather it is essential to what it 
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communicates and critically affects its reception. Arts based research is, at its deepest level, about 
artistic and aesthetic approaches to raising and addressing social issues.” (Barone and Eisner, 2012: 
57) I was researching a very dynamic and organic subject and the mere theorization of it felt 
insufficient. I thought that my research could be as dynamic as its subject since I had the privilege 
to study a discipline that has first and foremost flourished in practice. I was already in science 
fiction territory, which welcomes any hypothetical and speculative thinking about the future based 
on the past and present: thus I thought that making a film about the future of cinema and its 
ramifications on human memory would be the perfect case study. As Victor Burgin comments, “[i]t 
might be argued that if audiovisual forms are inherently discursive, then an intellectual argument 
can equally well be presented in the form of a film or video as in a more conventional written 
form.” (Burgin, 2006: 6) I had an abundance of films from which to take inspiration and combine 
them in ways that would on one hand explore aspects that have not been examined before or at least 
not from the same perspective and at the same time support a film that gives voice to my 
theorization. “The innovative and critical potential of practice-based research lies in its capacity to 
generate… knowledge and new ways of modelling and externalising such knowledge while at the 
same time, revealing philosophical, social and cultural contexts for the critical intervention and 
application of knowledge outcomes.” (Barrett, 2007: 2) Therefore, I decided that my film would be 
an amalgam of and a critical comment on all of the films that I intended to analyze in my original 
research, a film essay on how memory and film can develop together and into the future based on 
different sociocultural ideas and theories that I was interested in.  
In a few words, Mnemophrenia’s three intertwining stories explore the effects of a condition 
(the titular “Mnemophrenia”), whose main symptom is the involuntary blending of real and 
artificial memories, creating an identity crisis. The three main characters, Jeanette, Nicholas and 
Robyin live in different time periods, all set in the future. They are connected in three ways: by 
blood; by the condition itself, since they are all mnemophrenics; and by their shared interest in ways 
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that technology affects the human condition. The memories of the three protagonists are interwoven 
and their fusion creates, as a result, a new ‘artificial’ memory, which is essentially my film. All 
three stories combine to depict the different effects and aspects of mnemophrenia.  
It is important to note that I have made only one third of the film as part of my PhD 
research, that being Jeanette’s story. I am planning to finish the rest of the film after completing my 
studies. Apart from the film, I am submitting the shooting script1 for Jeanette’s story and detailed 
storylines2 for the other two periods. Although I submit only the first part, I refer to the film 
throughout the thesis as a completed whole: this should be read as a suggestion of the effect I hope 
to achieve rather than a statement of what has already been achieved. I recognise that since the film 
has not yet been completed I cannot be certain of the result, but I decided that my analysis would be 
more coherent and read better if I approached my film as a finished product. Thus, the reader needs 
to bear in mind that my analysis does not imply certainty on my part about the outcome but a 
confidence and anticipation that the suggested effect can be achieved. 
 
                                                
1 The shooting script is different from the final film due to the fact that different scenes were cut during the 
editing process. 
2 I submit storylines instead of a script because I use improvisation methods in order to build my characters 
and I develop the dialogue with the help of my actors. This is how the script of the first period was 
developed and I briefly analyze the process at Appendix I. I intend to use the same method for the script 
development of the other two periods.
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Chapter 1: Introduction - the film-essay!
 
1.1 Film essay: theory and practice!
 
The foundation of my current research is about practising theory instead of theorising 
practice. This work could be seen in light of Burgin’s student who “is interested in ideas, and turns 
concepts encountered in reading into practical projects. The research of this type of candidate 
typically has a mainly practical outcome, with academic work playing… [an] ‘instrumental’ role.” 
(Burgin, 2006: 4) In Film Studies, it is not uncommon to encounter examples of practice-based 
research that are practice-led. Hazel Smith and Roger Dean in Practice-led Research, Research-led 
Practice in the Creative Arts write,  
The term practice-led research and its affiliates… are employed to make two arguments about practice 
which are often overlapping and interlinked: firstly… that creative work in itself is a form of research 
and generates detectable research outputs; secondly, to suggest that creative practice… can lead to 
specialised research insights which can then be generalised and written up as research. (Smith and 
Dean, 2009: 5) 
 
Unusually, my project begins with theory, which then leads to a practical outcome, the film 
Mnemophrenia.3 “Research-led practice… complement[s] practice-led research, and which suggests 
more clearly than practice-led research that scholarly research can lead to creative work.” (Smith 
and Dean, 2009: 7)4 Smith and Dean argue that research-led practice is more prominent in some 
areas such as new media and music and it is still developing in other areas where its full impact is 
yet to be fully felt. I believe that in film, as in creative writing, “research-led practice is mainly 
conceptual and tends to be driven by critical and cultural theory.” (Smith and Dean, 2009: 8) 
“[C]ritical and cultural theories… can, with some effort, be adapted to the process of making an 
artwork.” (Smith and Dean, 2009: 9) This research is mostly conceptual and is driven by theory; it 
                                                
3 The film title Mnemophrenia refers to the idea of postmodern schizophrenia that I associate with the 
development of artificial memories and is explored throughout my research.
 
4 The foundation of my project is based on research-led practice, which is also combined with practice-led 
research, especially at the part where I use improvisation to develop the script and characters.
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is founded on sociocultural and philosophical work that explores ideas around memory, identity and 
technology and mostly focuses on themes of postmodern schizophrenia and cyborgization. I adapt 
these ideas and use them as the foundation for the making of my film Mnemophrenia. However, the 
relationship between the theory and the film is two-way, and the creative intervention has 
substantial ramifications since it informs the theory and complements it. My aim is to demonstrate 
how theory and practice can be joined and create a dynamic synthesis, each one feeding the other, 
not only creating a new form of research and creative work but also new knowledge about a 
creative process which can feed back into the work of future practitioners/researchers.  
Aristotle posited three kinds of knowledge: practical, theoretical and productive (2000):  
Practical knowledge is knowledge that allows one to negotiate differences in values, courses of action, 
and commitments in order to resolve a particular situation that needs attention… Theoretical knowledge 
dealt with the pursuit of certainties… Productive knowledge is the ability to put things together so that 
they work… Productive knowledge is a making of something, not simply the ability to understand what 
a person has done. Productive knowledge lives in the universe of action. (Barone and Eisner, 2012: 58) 
 
As Aristotle might also have put it, this project is productive by making a film and practical because 
it negotiates different views on the relationship between film and memory. This mix allows the co-
existence of different interpretations that affect the final film product. Barone and Eisner argue 
“[a]rts based research is a construction; in that sense it is indeed productive. And arts based research 
is also practical insofar it deals with contingencies that are temporal and not subject to certain 
answers.” (Barone and Eisner, 2012: 59) Smith usefully expands on this notion, “where the 
productive begins with a plan or design, the practical cannot have such a concrete starting point. 
Instead, we begin with a question or situation.” (Smith, 1999, 2011: 2) This research engages with 
particular questions to which this practice offers a combination of answers, thereby contributing to 
knowledge within the domain through a different lens than would be offered by a traditional thesis. 
My original theoretical hypothesis is founded on the much-discussed subject of the close 
relationship between film and memory and more specifically the possible creation of ‘artificial’ 
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memories5. Mnemophrenia showcases how film can be a memory system itself, consequently 
affecting memory, creating artificial memories for the viewers and depicting different courses of 
action.  
According to Aristotle, phronesis is linked to the practical wisdom and appropriate action to 
a particular situation, which is associated with the domain of praxis. This is in contrast to techne, 
the exercising of skill that is exploited to achieve pre-conceived ends (2000).  
In praxis there can be no prior knowledge of the right means by which we realize the end in a particular 
situation. For the end itself is only specified in deliberating about the means appropriate to a particular 
situation… There is a continual interplay between ends and means… This process involves 
interpretation, understanding and application. (Smith, 1999, 2011: 2) 
 
My role as practitioner-researcher entails the deliberation of different views on the subject and my 
awareness of, and explicit reflection on, practice as an appropriate creative response to the initial 
questions. Estelle Barrett and Barbara Bolt in Practice as Research: approaches to creative arts 
enquiry, comment that “materialising practices constitute relationships between process and text - 
of which the first iteration is necessarily the researcher’s own self-reflexive mapping of the 
emergent work as enquiry.” (Barrett, 2007: 5) The articulation of my intentions, documentation of 
the process, presentation of my practice and reflection back on the film’s relation to the initial 
questions aim to communicate the knowledge outcomes. The film itself, then, becomes one element 
in the bigger picture, a vehicle in the generation of knowledge rather than only the embodiment of 
knowledge. It is the combination of the thesis and the film that constitutes the new knowledge.  
Bell reminds us, “research-led practice demands the creative transformation of the research 
methodology, not just the reproduction of it.” (Bell, 2009: 256). Borgforff follows on from this 
notion, “[h]ence, the answer to the question of art research methodology is briefly that the research 
design incorporates both experimentation and participation in practice and the interpretation of that 
                                                
5 For the aims of this thesis, the term ‘artificial memory’ does not only mean a supplement of a person’s own 
memory but a ‘memory’ that can originate outside a person’s lived experience and then be appropriated and 
manipulated, thus becoming a part of the memory reserve of any person that has consumed it or indirectly 
experienced it through mass media. Or it can even be a memory that has no connection to reality but is 
created, promoted or consumed as such via advanced visual media.
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practice.” (Borgforff, 2006: 17-8) Without relinquishing the established application of theory 
through critique and hermeneutics, heuretics offer a new perspective on the enquiry of my project 
into the relation of film and memory. “What has been missing, perhaps, is the concept of a heuretic 
practice to set alongside interpretive and analytical work – in other words, a use of media 
technologies and forms of production in a critically inventive mode.” (Fleming, 2000: 390) 
“[H]euretics adds to [the] critical and interpretive practices a generative productivity of the sort 
practiced in the avant-garde… the artists demonstrate the consequences of the theories… by 
practicing the arts themselves, generating models of prototypes that function critically as well as 
aesthetically.” (Ulmer, 1994: xii) As a consequence I, as artist, adopt the dual roles of researcher 
and researched through the deployment of a reflexive process. “Heuretics [are] not an alternative to 
critical study but its complement, or perhaps better a component in a new articulation where 
interpretive and inventive intentions more deliberately inform each other.” (Fleming, 2000: 390-1) 
In this project, both film and thesis become exegetical through their capacity to be used in analysis 
and interpretation of each other. “By interchanging and integrating the practice with the exegesis, it 
may be possible to generate a combined and reflexive research praxis.” (Goddard, 2007: 113) This 
hybrid activity of practice demonstrates that the relationship between practice and reflective writing 
is not one of equivalence but one that promotes a dialectical, productive relationship. 
This project takes inspiration from Marshall McLuhan’s idea of the medium as the message. 
Film is used as a tool through which to depict and explore how cinema can affect human memory, 
create artificial memories and lead to the dissolution of any boundaries between reality and fiction. 
According to Gregory Ulmer, “one element of the practice is the manifesto, accounting to a 
discourse on method… for a new genre or mode of production: a program of experimentation.” 
(Ulmer, 1994: xiii) My own kind of ‘manifesto’ is to make a science fiction film taking a cue from 
Steven Shaviro (2003) who argues that science fiction is a privileged genre that provides the most 
useful social and cultural theory. Shaviro, thus, decided to write his book Connected as science 
fiction in order to discern the changes that are transforming our world and as an attempt to produce 
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a cultural theory as radical as reality itself. (2003: x-xi) I similarly use the science fiction genre to 
depict the blending of reality and fiction and investigate in theory as well as in practice images of 
human artifice that exhibit, as J. P. Telotte suggests, “our nature as artificers, constructors of the 
real, and of the self—homo faber. These images foreground our desire to wield a shaping power, to 
render all things subject to our creative hand, including the self.” (Telotte, 1995: 5) I believe that a 
science fiction film-essay can reveal more effectively than a written essay the ways in which the 
film medium can promote artificial memories. Thus, as Chris Marker has previously shown the 
importance of images in relation to memory in his science fiction film La Jetée (1962) and his film-
essay Sans Soleil (1983), I use the film medium itself in order to explore my thesis around film and 
artificial memories. The key research question that both the film and the theoretical writing explore 
is: what would happen if in a future postmodern society the Bazinian myth of ‘total cinema’ 
becomes a reality? If ‘total cinema’ is pure realism and cinema can lead to artificial memories, then 
artificial memories and pure realism become one. In Mnemophrenia reality and fiction are 
integrated, mutually negating each other, since the established reality depicted in the film is proven 
to be ‘artificial’, based fully on different Virtual Reality films. Ultimately the film and this thesis 
aim to explore the future of cinema that leads to the blurring of real and artificial memories. 
Together they attempt to demonstrate the dissolution of these boundaries, to display the two-way 
relationship of reality and fiction and to showcase how theory fuels practice and practice enlivens 
theory.  
Donna Haraway, in an interview with Nicholas Gane, claims that fact and fiction “have [an] 
interesting etymological connection and fact is [the] past participle – already done, and fiction is 
still in the making.” (Gane, 2006: 153) The theories I use comment on reality or fact but also discuss 
different aspects that are “still in the making”. The premise of my film starts from the expectation, 
as Annette Kuhn writes, “that films which appeal to our imaginings of future or alternative worlds 
will, intentionally or otherwise, also address contemporary concerns.” (Kuhn, 1990: 15) However, 
the main focus of my film is to envision possible new worlds, expanding some of the theoretical 
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ideas that are “still in the making”, as Haraway says. The genre of science fiction offers the right 
ground for the testing and fruition of these kinds of ideas. Sue Short comments in Cyborg Cinema 
and Contemporary Subjectivity that the “impact of new technologies on human identity is a key 
issue for cultural theorists, one that has frequently been speculated on in SF cinema and which has 
consequently led to increased academic interest in the genre.” (Short, 2005: 45) In addition, 
Bukatman notes in his article “Who Programs You?” that science fiction film with its semantics of 
technology, artifice, and spectacle “has obtained such a lately privileged position” in the area of 
cultural commentary precisely because it speaks the language of a technological, artificial, and 
spectacular world, because its technical concerns so closely parallel and thus help trace out the 
“methodological terrain” of this new world6. (Bukatman, 1990: 204) 
Short observes that there is a two-way dialogue between critics and cultural forms like 
science fiction, referring to the genre’s reflection of societal and cultural concerns as well as critics 
such as Jean Baudrillard that have taken examples from science fiction in order to justify their 
claims. Baudrillard is one of several cultural theorists who embrace science fictional rhetoric in 
order to explore high-tech alienation caused by technology. “Baudrillard’s text aspires to the 
condition of science fiction, and ultimately becomes performative of the process he once merely 
described… Baudrillard’s essays… bear rhetorical resemblances to the fictions of Dick and William 
Gibson, resemblances which are hardly coincidental.” (Bukatman, 1990: 199-200) According to 
Short, science fiction has in many ways prefigured the dominant issues of contemporary culture. 
                                                
6 Science fiction, however, not only comments on and questions our technologised world, influencing and 
stimulating sociocultural discussions but as Geoff King and Tanya Krzywinska argue it might even lead to 
the development of ‘real’ science. “Popular interest in virtual reality technologies has been fuelled by films 
such as The Lawnmower Man (1992), Strange Days (1995), eXistenZ (1999) and The Matrix (1999).” (King 
and Krzywinska, 2000: 7) This important part that science fiction plays in shaping the ways technology 
impacts on our lives is echoed in Telotte’s writing where he prophesies that 
the capacity for a computer-generated photorealism, probably combined in the not-too-distant future with virtual-
reality technology, could well eventuate in the ultimate science fiction machine: a “cinema” – and here we must 
begin to use the word quite loosely – in which we can easily move into another time and place, a realm 
substantially like the very stories we typically tell in the genre. In fact, our films are already anticipating this move 
with the wave of films about virtual-reality experiences that have appeared in the 1990s, works like The 
Lawnmower Man (1992), Virtuosity (1995), Strange Days (1995), Dark City, and The Matrix (1999) (Telotte, 
2001: 28) 
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“Yet while it is easy to understand how the two have become interrelated, it should also be noted 
that SF had been asking what impact an increasingly technologized world will have upon identity, 
social relations, and our concept of the real long before academics named such issues.” (Short, 
2005: 185)  
In contrast, for the aims of my research, I reverse Short’s assertion, and in my project the 
theory predates the practice. Previous science fiction films that depicted the relationship between 
memory and different technologies have subsequently led to the development of ideas and theories 
on the subject. On the contrary, my research begins with different sociocultural theories, from 
Fredric Jameson and Jean Baudrillard to Donna Haraway, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari that 
eventually lead to the development of Mnemophrenia, which actualizes these theories and 
demonstrates their full potential. All these ideas and theories become the basis of the plot and 
represent different themes around film and memory. Barone and Eisner argue that organizing 
theories in themes helps to bring them together and makes the artwork, and in this case the film, 
work as a whole. “In doing art, or arts based research… theoretical knowledge may be better 
thought of as thematic, insofar as themes (and subthemes) within a work of art provide a kind of 
qualitative control that allows for all parts of the work to cohere into a ‘whole.’” (Barone and 
Eisner, 2012: 59) I combine various contemporary ideas and theories about memory and time that 
might have been written many years ago, even at the end of the 19th century, and I aspire for their 
meaningful fusion based on the themes they represent. In addition, the use of themes allows the 
theories to take a different life and purpose within the construct of the film as well as informing the 
practice. Barone and Eisner demonstrate the value of this approach, 
Themes [as mentioned above] also have the advantage of inviting discussion regarding their “fit” and 
significance and may avoid the suggestion of final interpretations. For indeed, if theoretical – or 
thematic- knowledge is part of arts based research, it will not necessarily be explicit in the work itself; 
rather, it may be found in the reflections, interrogations, conversations, deliberations, and debates that 
effective arts based research generates. (Barone and Eisner, 2012: 59) 
 
Therefore the depiction of Virtual Reality technology and its development and the coexistence of 
different themes around its representation and its various meanings enables these theories to subtly 
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obtain form, and in return shape and reflect the experience of the three main characters and their 
relationship to mnemophrenia, thus contributing to the dialogue between theory and practice.  
Mnemophrenia explores an idea that has been thematized in several science fiction films that 
depict either the blurring of the dividing line between reality and fiction7, or the difference between 
human/inhuman8. I argue that these films constitute a kind of a sub-genre, emerging from a thematic 
shift in the science fiction genre, creating in its turn an evolving dialogue on the influence of 
technology on individual memory. As José van Dijck argues, “[t]he function of these movies is to 
‘imagineer’ what memory may look like in the future. A projected collapse of the brain with 
sophisticated chip technology, far from an incidental concept, is a recurring trope in science fiction 
films.” (van Dijck, 2008: 81-2) According to Bukatman much science fiction is “concerned with the 
status and commodification of memory, which seems to produce an ersatz humanity.” (Bukatman, 
1993: 248) Total Recall (Paul Verhoeven, 1990), Johnny Mnemonic (Robert Longo, 1995) and Dark 
City (Alex Proyas, 1998) are some such films that have been made during a period that is labelled 
by many different theorists as postmodernist. “‘[P]ostmodernism’ pervades the contemporary SF 
film – its deep structural logic symbolized by the genre’s new figures and aesthetic values, and 
dramatized by its new attitudes and thematics.” (Sobchack, 2001: 246) They explore issues, 
anxieties and fears that arise from the development of new technologies such as the advancements 
in artificial intelligence, the fast growth of computers and cyberspace as well as innovations in 
Virtual Reality and the consequent effect on human memory and identity.  
Mnemophrenia is a blend of the aforementioned films and offers an organic and dynamic 
analysis of them in a creative way by taking advantage of the qualities of film itself and its self-
referential attributes - therefore, as Fleming wrote, “[r]econstructing the material of media practice 
as a way of investigating that material.” (Fleming, 2000: 390) The science fiction films from which 
                                                
7 Some examples are: Total Recall (Paul Verhoeven, 1990) and The Truman Show (Peter Weir, 1998)
 
8 Such as Blade Runner (Ridley Scott, 1982) or The Thirteenth Floor (Josef Rusnak, 1999)
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I take inspiration ask similar questions to Mnemophrenia, such as “[w]hat if the human imagination, 
including the tracks and stray traces of its memory effects, were itself fictive, an invention? Or, 
even if real, nonetheless drastically renarratable at will, just like a fiction – its chronologies 
suddenly reversible?” (Stewart, 2007: 209) In contrast to my approach, Garrett Stewart comments 
that this ‘postrealist’ cinema “likes to indulge in the hypothesis as fantasy, safe in the ‘unreality’ of 
its premises.” (Stewart, 2007: 209) As well as this theoretical analysis, the film does not approach 
the subject as mere fantasy, but instead attempts to look into it from a more critical angle. I want to 
offer a critique about the position of memory in postmodernism and its link to visual technologies, 
taking as my starting point the development of film to a point that achieves complete simulation of 
reality. Telotte writes characteristically that movies about the future tend to be about the future of 
movies, and this is the main objective of Mnemophrenia. Telotte’s ideas describe precisely the 
fundamental premise of my research. According to him, “[w]hen we watch a science fiction film, 
we see as well a narrative about the movies themselves – about how our technology can impact on 
our humanity, how our technology (and, indeed, our very rationality) impinges on our world, how 
our technology might point beyond our normal sense of reality.” (Telotte, 2001, 24-5) 
Stewart writes that several science fiction films are “not parables of enablement but escapist 
games...  It is in this light that one is tempted to see such films as vehicles for little more – yet 
nothing less – than killing time.” (Stewart, 2007: 214) In the same vein, Geoff King and Tanya 
Krzywinska write in Science Fiction Cinema, “[r]eal issues are raised and difficulties are sometimes 
tackled quite seriously, but in mainstream films they are more likely to be evaded in the pursuit of 
more reassuring narrative closure.” (King and Krzywinska, 2000: 12) I endeavor to show that my 
film, although creatively citing many films, offers a more in-depth commentary around the issue of 
artificial memories and the social ramifications of a future Virtual Reality cinema.  
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1.2 Myth of Total Cinema realized: Mnemophrenia, a critical dystopia !
 
Half a century ago André Bazin engaged in a thought exercise that he called “the myth of 
total cinema.” He described total cinema as a “total and complete representation of reality… the 
reconstruction of a perfect illusion of the outside world in sound, color, and relief.” (Bazin, 1967: 
21) He also claimed that “the guiding myth… inspiring the invention of cinema…[is] namely an 
integral realism, a recreation of the world in its own image, an image unburdened by the freedom of 
interpretation of the artist or the irreversibility of time.” (Bazin, 1967: 20) Bazin did not believe that 
cinema will eventually achieve a perfect simulation of reality, but claimed that the ideal of total 
cinema drove the technology of film, which aimed to offer as perfect an illusion of reality as 
possible. “Bazin argued that the particular aesthetic of the cinema lay in the contradiction between 
its goal of perfect illusion and the inevitable failure of its achievement… technical developments 
simultaneously added to and disturbed cinema’s realism.” (Maltby, 2003: 231) For example Bazin, 
referring to stereoscopic filming in 3-D, wrote, “[t]he internal contradiction of this depth which one 
cannot touch gives an impression of irreality that is even more perceptible than that of flat cinema 
in black and white.” (Bazin, 1985: 13) In my film, I pursue the further thought experiment, 
attempting to show a progression towards the actual achievement of total cinema. Richard Maltby 
argues, “[t]he goal of realism is an illusion. Art cannot ‘show things as they really are,’ because the 
‘real’ in realism is understood to be exactly that which is unmediated by representation. Since it is 
outside representation, the ‘real’ cannot be represented: representations can be only more or less 
inadequate imitations or substitutions for it.” (Maltby, 2003: 233) But the important element of the 
technology that I am introducing is that it does not only ‘represent’ reality but actually ‘re/creates’ 
it. As Maltby comments about recent technological developments,  
[t]he computerized revision of the image – literally a re-vision – makes the distinction between reality 
and the image ever more difficult to maintain… the digital image is ambiguous [and is not]… 
authorized by reference to anything external to itself… Since the early 1980s, computer graphics artists 
have been attempting to create ‘imaginary people.’… the ambition underlying this project involves 
conquering reality. (Maltby, 236-7) 
 
 20 
 
In Mnemophrenia, I envision a world where this ambition has been reached, especially since all of 
the different versions of the depicted VR technology interact directly with the way in which the 
human brain perceives reality leading to the subsequent condition of mnemophrenia. From the first 
VR films in Jeanette’s time to Nicholas’s creation of all-sensory Total Cinema experience and 
finally to Robyin’s brain implant that records and plays back real and artificial memories and 
experiences in the mind’s eye, it becomes evident that the myth of total cinema is not an illusion but 
part of the characters’ reality. As Scott Bukatman argues, “virtual reality becomes the fulfilment of 
that drive toward Bazin’s ‘myth of total cinema,’ a cinema without boundaries. All the senses are 
engaged by a perfect simulacrum of reality which denies its own technological origins.” (Bukatman, 
1993: 239) Rephrasing Maltby’s ideas, I argue that the representational conventions used by the 
depicted VR technology are transparent. In contrast to the special effects of Total Recall that 
according to Maltby enhance the image, the VR technology used by my characters reveals reality, 
or a new kind of reality and human experience, and thus leads to the confusion between actually 
lived and VR experienced memories. 
Mnemophrenia explores the ways that VR technology affects humanity but does not offer 
clear guidelines on how to distinguish between what is real and what is not and does not celebrate 
the superiority of reality, as we perceive it today. Claudia Springer comments that although science 
fiction films of the 90s experiment with the idea of electronic embodiment, they all eventually 
establish the supremacy of the ‘real’. “Not unlike the hard-bodied cyborg films of the 1980s, the 
1990s cyberthrillers work to ward off the instability made possible by electronic existence. An 
analysis of the cyberthrillers reveals that cyberspace is constructed as an instigator of wild 
instability, and simultaneously as a therapeutic device used to restore conventional order.” 
(Springer, 1999: 206) In addition, Sue Short comments on many science fiction films’ tendency to 
depict a recoverable reality:    
The interrogation of memory and reality has become a discernible motif in recent SF, questioning the 
individual’s ability to withstand manipulation... They consequently infer that no matter how 
manipulative and confusing reality becomes, an intrinsic identity is recoverable, yet while such a 
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conclusion is undoubtedly optimistic, the fact that metaphysical speculation almost completely obscures 
any political ideas is worrying indeed. (Short, 2005: 191) 
 
Moreover, Sobchack, with characteristic directness, locates the genre’s conservative and 
conventional tendencies in the bottom line:  
Although the SF film ostensibly strives to transcend the conventional and, perhaps, reach toward the 
avant-garde “and beyond” to the radical, the demands of the genre’s commodification also compel it to 
inscribe itself as familiar, unthreatening, unrevolutionary, and easily understood. True in the 1950s, and 
truer yet today, an axiom emerges: the more a film costs, the fewer risks it is likely to take. (Sobchack, 
2001: 303)  
 
In contrast, Mnemophrenia attempts to challenge the conventional Hollywood ending that usually 
venerates the human and deplores the loss of authenticity and the proliferation of artificiality. I am 
interested in discussing and visually depicting the possibility of a society where the dissolution of 
borders between fiction and reality and the blend of real and artificial memories do not lead to 
horrific consequences for humanity but instead promote a potential for a new kind of identity and a 
new state of being where difference can be embraced.  
Therefore, Mnemophrenia could be considered a critical dystopia, which as Tom Moylan 
and Raffaella Baccolini write in Dark horizons: science fiction and the dystopian imagination “is 
distinct from its nemesis, the anti-utopia, and its generic sibling, the literary eutopia.” (Baccolini 
and Moylan, 2003: 4) Mnemophrenia does not discard technology as something evil as other 
science fiction films have done in the past, but embraces and accepts it as part of everyday life, thus 
maintaining a horizon of hope that could lead to utopia. By the end of the film it becomes evident 
that “the process of taking control over the means of … representation, memory, and interpellation 
is a crucial weapon and strategy in moving dystopian resistance from an initial consciousness to an 
action that leads to a climactic event that attempts to change the society.” (Baccolini and Moylan, 
2003: 6) With Mnemophrenia I want to create a different kind of representation, which, using 
Fredric Jameson’s ideas, will show how the characters might begin to “grasp [their] positioning as 
individual and collective subjects and regain a capacity to act and struggle which is… neutralized 
by [their] spatial as well as [their] social confusion.” (Jameson, 1991: 62) Thus, I attempt to offer a 
futuristic representation that neither longs for the past nor merely re-presents a capitalist society 
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deeply affected by technological changes. 
 
1.3 Low budget aesthetics and absence of special effects!
 
Most of the films that I refer to in the thesis are spectacle-oriented and absorbed in their 
artificiality. Special effects are used to differentiate the now from the future, making a clear difference 
between reality and fiction and celebrating or reaffirming the humanness of their characters – such as 
in Johnny Mnemonic or Robocop (Paul Verhoeven, 1987). Alternatively, according to film theorists 
Julia Hallam and Margaret Marshment, several blockbuster ‘spectacle’ films have relied heavily on 
special effects in order to make ‘unreal’ images actually appear ‘real.’ (Hallam and Marshment, 
2000) For example, Brian De Palma, director of Mission to Mars (2000), claims:  
What we’ve tried to do is to make Mission To Mars as authentic as possible, and it’s what we’ve 
realized. The film is all the more exciting because you feel like it’s extremely real. The various things 
that happen to the Mars One and Two crews in this film all come out of the physics of what could 
happen in the situations presented in the story. So, it is realistic and extremely authentic. (Quoted in 
Production Notes, 2000) 
 
In addition, in several of the films that Mnemophrenia refers to, reality is grounded in more 
indexical examples such as photographs, contrasting with the digitalized, constructed environment 
that their characters live in, such as in Robocop and Minority Report (Steven Spielberg, 2002).  
Narrative conflict with the digital reasserts the aesthetic value of analog images as somehow more real 
than digital simulations... the photographic basis of cinema is coded as “real”, the locus of truthful 
representation and the authentic aesthetic experience of cinema. Photography becomes the sign of the 
vanishing referent, which is a way of camouflaging its own imaginary status. (Rodowick, 2007: 5) 
 
Even though there are several narratives that undermine the evidential indexicality of photographs 
or even home movies by showing them as constructs themselves (as in Dark City), these films still 
extensively use special effects in order to create a fantastical world exploring future anxieties about 
one’s relation to technology. As Stewart says, they show “such an extreme and hypertrophic form 
of this vexing ontological nervousness that the outside world would have to seem real again by 
contrast.” (Stewart, 2007: 213)  
However, I do not want to create such an extreme version of the future world, but offer a 
quite familiar view of the future where any kind of distinction between reality and fiction is really 
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imperceptible. This aesthetic decision echoes Sobchack’s views about several contemporary science 
fiction films that focus “on mapping not the fearsome and wondrous ‘newness’ of the new 
technology, but rather its awesome and wondrous familiarity.” (Sobchack , 2001: 252) My project 
focuses on a society where reality and fiction merge; and it deals with soft technology that is so 
thoroughly integrated, and where the ‘real’ does not have any supremacy over fiction, that there is 
no need for special effects. I embrace the lack of resources and use experimental filmmaking as a 
virtue in order to explore this subject. I believe that the low budget demands inventive solutions and 
pushes for a naturalistic look that has the potential to successfully depict the reality/fiction fusion 
that I am interested in.  
My project follows the example of other low budget science fiction films such as: La Jetée, 
Alphaville (Jean-Luc Godard, 1965), Brother from Another Planet (John Sayles, 1984), Repo Man 
(Alex Cox, 1984) and Teknolust (Lynn Hershman-Leeson, 2002), since “it is the low-budget SF 
movie... which tends to embrace its inadequacies as a defensive maneuver, and is often aesthetically 
and narratively energized toward invention precisely by the low budgets constraining it.” 
(Sobchack, 2001: 303) Thus, I do not use special effects to differentiate between reality and fiction, 
an aesthetic choice imposed by budget constraints but at the same time suitable for the project. 
Compared to big budget science fiction films I am more interested in the relationship between 
humanity and technology and not mainly in the technology as such. Stewart analyzes in Framed 
Time the connection between European films that explore the psychological implications of 
virtuality and their Hollywood counterparts that depict the technological side of it. He offers 
Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (Michel Gondry, 2004) as an example of the mixture of both, 
“a film where electronic brain technology is mostly an allegorical prosthesis of the psychic drive to 
forget.” (Stewart, 2007: 172) I intend as part of my low budget sensibilities, to combine European 
psyche and American techne, as Stewart refers to them, focusing not only on the technological 
aspect or the psychological ramifications for the characters, but exploring how the technological 
affects the human psyche, memory and identity.  
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1.4 Thesis structure!
 
Throughout the thesis, I examine how various theories contributed to the development of 
Mnemophrenia and discuss the science fiction films that influenced it. In the following chapter, I 
introduce the film texts and theories that constitute the basis of Mnemophrenia. My film brings 
practice and theory together; form and content together: the practice is influenced by every film that 
has inspired it and the theory revolves around the idea of memory. In this chapter, I discuss the link 
between film and memory from the perspectives of form and content, which are both explored in 
my film and examined throughout the thesis. First I explore how the film medium can replicate 
memory’s features – visuality and malleability – in order to successfully depict memory, and I offer 
various examples of science fiction films to demonstrate this. I also examine the concept of artificial 
memories and the views of different current theorists around the subject and show how their ideas 
are reflected in Total Recall, which I use as a representative film example.  
In the next three chapters, I analyse the form and narrative of each period within my film, in 
order to explain how I represent the fusion of reality and fiction and ultimately how the film itself 
constitutes an artificial memory. These chapters demonstrate how form and content, practice and 
theory become one. On one hand, I examine the way memory is represented in each period, since a 
different film form is used each time (mockumentary film style in the first period, CCTV/ 
surveillance aesthetic in the second and POV/ subjective camera in the last: film forms that are 
commonly perceived as documenting reality and actual experience). I use these forms in order to 
emphasize the self-referentiality of the medium and remind the viewer of the status of the depicted 
memories as videorecorded that are then appropriated and become someone else’s artificial 
memories.  
On the other hand, I analyse the narrative of each period, which has been influenced by 
different theories and deals with the impact of mnemophrenia on the main characters. 
Mnemophrenia is the name that the experts give to what they consider a medical condition during 
Jeanette’s period, which is when it appears for the first time. This name bears similar negative 
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connotations to Jameson’s schizophrenia. However, with the passing of time the meaning of 
mnemophrenia changes. If we look at mnemophrenia from a Baudrillardian perspective and apply 
the last three successive phases of the image that, as he suggests are characteristic of the era of 
simulation, we could say that the image and artificial memories of Jeanette’s time mask and 
denature “a profound reality”; those of Nicholas’s time mask “the absence of a profound reality”; 
and those of Robyin’s time bear “no relation to any reality whatsoever: [they are their] own pure 
simulacrum.” (Baudrillard, 1994: 6) In each successive time period, mnemophrenia is seen 
respectively as a mental condition; then a variation of social behaviour; and finally the norm. 
Jeanette’s segment, with which the film begins, depicts the ramifications of mnemophrenia in the 
personal realm; Nicholas’s segment discusses the societal repercussions; and Robyin’s explores the 
possibility of transcendence. I identify the three characters as schizophrenics or cyborgs (as I had 
originally planned for the characters of the science fiction films that influenced Mnemophrenia) and 
the main theoretical arch is comprised of different postmodern theories on schizophrenia or 
cyborgization, from Jameson and Baudrillard to Haraway and finally Deleuze and Guattari.  
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Chapter 2: Artificial memories in science-fiction films: from theory to practice!
 
 
In the Phaedrus, Socrates tells a story in which the god Thamus talks to another god, 
Theuth, about his invention of letters and tells him, “this discovery of yours will create 
forgetfulness in the learners’ souls, because they will not use their memories; they will trust to the 
external written characters and not remember of themselves… [It] is an aid not to memory, but to 
reminiscence, and you give your disciples not truth, but only the semblance of truth.” (Plato, 2011) 
Anxiety and fears about the weakening and even subversion of human memory by the media that 
support its representation were first expressed in antiquity, and they continue unabated today in the 
contemporary Western world with the advances within film and digital media.  
The connection between memory and forgetting is clearly manifested since the end of the 
20th century not only as a result of traumatic socio-historical events but also because of the advent 
and intense infiltration of media in everyday life. As Andreas Huyssen writes in his article “Present 
pasts: Media, politics, amnesia”, “[e]ver more frequently, critics accuse this very contemporary 
memory culture of amnesia-anesthesia or numbing... Could it be that the surfeit of memory in this 
media-saturated culture creates such overload that the memory system itself is in constant danger of 
imploding, thus triggering the fear of forgetting?” (Huyssen, 2000: 27-8) With the advent of 
photography, cinema and advanced technologies the idea of artificial memory has been further 
discussed and led to the development of many different related theories. Under these circumstances, 
there is a shift in the meaning of memory catalyzed by technological innovations and the 
proliferation of an image-dominated culture. 
From the 1980s onwards, a number of science fiction films9 were made that explored this 
subject, depicting the relationship of technology and memory and the subsequent creation of 
                                                
9 Some of the films that deal with this subject are: Blade Runner, Total Recall, The Truman Show, The 
Thirteenth Floor, Brainstorm (Douglas Trumbull, 1983), Strange Days (Kathryn Bigelow, 1995), Dark City 
(Alex Proyas, 1998) and The Final Cut (Omar Naim, 2004).
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artificial memories, their connection with real memories as well as the ramifications for personal 
identity. Films such as Total Recall, Strange Days (Kathryn Bigelow, 1995) or The Final Cut (Omar 
Naim, 2004) are self-referential and examine the direct link between film and artificial memories. For 
example, in Johnny Mnemonic artificial memories completely override real memories: Johnny, a 
mnemonic data courier, has erased all his childhood memories in order to have enough capacity in 
his brain to carry large data packages, which is possible due to wet-wired brain implants. Therefore, 
Johnny is identified by his profession as a mnemonic courier and not by his true last name that 
would indicate his roots. His human memory has been replaced by implanted electronic memory 
that does not have any link with his personal experiences.  
These films take advantage of their medium, which is formally linked to the way memory is 
believed to function, and attempt to depict a future when artificial memory substituting for real 
memory becomes an everyday reality, either through manipulation, technological erasure or 
implantation. As Susannah Radstone has argued in Memory and Methodology, “[i]n science fiction 
cinema… the subject of memory has become a recurrent narrative theme... science’s potential 
challenge to memory’s place in the constitution of identity’s essence has been raised.” (Radstone, 
2000a: 82) The main concept that is explored in all these films is the blurring of reality and fiction due 
to artificial memories. They depict different technologies that lead to artificial memories, emphasizing 
the constructed ness of memory. They explore the ways their characters cope when they do not know 
which memories are based on ‘real’ events, and question the meaning of ‘real’ memories in a world 
where the boundaries between reality and fiction disappear.  
This chapter offers the textual and theoretical background to Mnemophrenia, introducing the 
science fiction films that constitute the starting point of this research as well as its central theme of 
artificial memories. I briefly establish the link between memory and visual media and then turn my 
focus on the complex relationship between memory and film, in both form and content. Mnemophrenia 
is based on the visuality and manipulability of memory: thus, the definition of memory I offer focuses 
on both of them. I examine how the film medium replicates these aspects in an effort to represent 
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memory, and I then show how they are depicted in selected science fiction films, revealing their self-
referential stance. The manipulation of these aspects becomes the foundation for the creative 
development of Mnemophrenia. In addition, Mnemophrenia builds upon the idea of artificial 
memories, which carry both negative and positive connotations. Both nuances are presented in the 
film, although as I mentioned before the film attempts to conclude with a positive and optimistic note 
suggesting an alternative to the dystopian fear that pervades most films on this theme. In order to 
demonstrate how I use the idea of artificial memories in my film I refer to its significance, various 
meanings and possible ramifications during the current time period. I use Total Recall as a 
representative example to introduce different theories – negative as well as positive – around the 
subject of artificial memories, which constitute the starting point for my film. 
 
2.1 Artificial memories and media technologies 
Memory is a way of defining who we are in relation to the world. “When we remember, we 
represent ourselves to ourselves and to those around us. To the extent that our ‘nature’ – that which we 
truly are – can be revealed in articulation, we are what we remember... A study of the way we 
remember ... is a study of the way we are.” (Fentress, 1992: 7) Just as people rely on their memories 
to validate their experiences, they refer to them to structure their subjectivity. Memory is closely 
linked to identity, the idea of the self and its continuity as body and mind over time and space. 
Memory is an important element in shaping continuity in people’s lives.  
We can accept that a powerful sense of, and interest in, his own identity, continuous through time, is a 
normal feature of the species man. This interest is necessarily and inextricably bound up with man’s 
capacity for memory, and the pleasure in remembering that the species as a whole displays. (Warnock, 
1989: 74)  
 
Memories play an important role in the sense of self; the concepts of personhood and past are 
intertwined and a person’s past experiences and memories define him or her. 
Furthermore, memory is structured by the interaction of individual subjectivity with cultural 
and social conditions. It is a personal matter but also a social construction: society influences the way it 
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is perceived and experienced in different time periods. As Maurice Halbwachs has argued, “[t]he 
succession of our remembrances, of even our most personal ones, is always explained by changes 
occurring in our relationships to various collective milieus – in short, by the transformations these 
milieus undergo separately and as a whole.” (Halbwachs, 1980: 49) “Human memory may well be an 
anthropological given, but closely tied as it is to the ways a culture constructs and lives its temporality, 
the forms memory will take are invariably contingent and subject to change.” (Huyssen, 1995: 3) Our 
most personal feelings and thoughts originate in a definite social context and since most social 
influences we obey remain unperceived we believe that we act and think independently. Halbwachs 
adds, “Since the remembrance reappears, owing to the interweaving of several series of collective 
thoughts, and since we cannot attribute it to any single one, we imagine it independent and contrast its 
unity to their multiplicity.” (Halbwachs, 1980: 49) Thus, it is evident that memory needs to be 
apprehended as a socially embedded action and its ownership becomes an increasingly fluid concept 
due to its mediation and manipulation by different media and technologies. In antiquity memories were 
conceived as something private and personal; however throughout the years, with the advent of 
different techniques and technologies and memory’s increasing mediation, personal memory has 
become shared and comprehended by other people and not only by the person to whom the memory 
belongs.  
Today, privately experienced “interiority” appears less and less a necessary condition of the human 
being. Intrasubjective “personal” vision once invisible to others has become publicly visible and 
commodified through media imagery. Our private “memory” has been increasingly constituted from 
previously mediated “spectacle” rather than from “direct” experience. (Sobchack, 2001: 235) 
 
The media imagery that Sobchack refers to offered a supplement to human memory: a kind of artificial 
memory that can be preserved and manipulated. “Increasingly, since a great deal of memory resides in 
cultural artefacts, film has become a memory bank.” (Blackmore, 2004: 17) My exploration of 
artificial memories focuses on their link to visual media and film and their representation in various 
science fiction films. Thus although it is still believed that personal memory belongs to one person and 
is closely linked to his past, an important aspect for this thesis is that memory is affected by the 
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technologies that represent it. The forms memory will take are contingent and subject to change due to 
this relationship. 
Memory as depicted in Mnemophrenia and the related science fiction films appears as the 
representation of the subject’s imaginary relationship to his or her real conditions of existence due 
to the advanced technologies that enhance this relationship. Applying Marshall McLuhan’s phrase, 
“The medium is the message”, I argue that the means, technologies, media by which memories are 
preserved, extended, communicated and mastered in different times, play an important role in the way 
memories are experienced and has a subsequent effect on human consciousness and identity. McLuhan 
commented, “[a]ll media are active metaphors in their power to translate experience into new forms. 
The spoken word was the first technology by which man was able to let go of his environment in order 
to grasp it in a new way.” (McLuhan, 1994: 57) Thus, the different techniques that make memories 
reproducible and transportable in space and time become an analogy for prosthetic memories: they are 
memory aids that translate the experience of memory into a new form. 
Memories are a sum of human experiences, events and knowledge gathered during one’s 
lifetime that are destined to fade away and disappear when the person dies. People have fought against 
this diminution for centuries; the emphasis on continuity is apparent in all cultures and societies which 
have attempted to preserve memories with the aid of various means. “We have armed ourselves against 
the transience implicitly in the mortality of memory by developing artificial memories.”  (Draaisma, 
2000: 2) In his book Metaphors of Memory: a History of Ideas About the Mind, Douwe Draaisma 
examines the different memory aids that have been used throughout the years and discusses the 
concept of artificial memories.  
These artificial memories have not only supported, relieved and occasionally replaced natural memory, but 
they have also shaped our views of remembering and forgetting. Over the centuries memory aids provided 
the terms and concepts with which we have reflected on our own memory. (Draaisma, 2000: 3)  
 
Many people in different time periods have tried to apprehend and master different cultural mental 
devices by exploring the way that memory functions, creating a technique or an art of memory that 
abided by a specific set of rules and practices and developed a kind of ‘artificial’ memory as a 
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supplement to natural memory. “From the very beginning, that is, from the wax tablet onwards, human 
remembering and forgetting has been described in terms derived from prosthetic memories.” 
(Draaisma, 2000: 24) There is a very long history to the role of memory techniques or devices from the 
ancient world to the twenty first century, serving as explanations for our internal memory records and 
attempts to control them.  
A way that people have attempted to preserve memories is with the aid of media of 
communication, from orality to writing10 and printing to electronic technology. With the invention and 
development of media, the way our life is structured, how we communicate and perceive ourselves and 
the world around us all change dramatically. Different media, including cinema, influence the concept 
of memory and the way it is comprehended and approached. They have managed to preserve, transfer 
and extend memory. For the aims of this thesis, I focus only on film and examine the reasons why I 
consider it a very successful supplement to memory – and as a result use it in Mnemophrenia as the 
source of artificial memories.  
 
2.2 Film as a memory aid  
With the advent of optical apparatuses like stereoscope, magic lanterns, zoetropes and others 
that were developed in the 19th century, the visual experience was transformed and manipulated and 
theories on visual memory started to spring up. Lev Manovich argues in his article “From the 
Externalization of the Psyche to the Implantation of Technology,”: 
[i]n order to externalize the internal, the invisible, it was first equated with the visual... One can even say 
that to a large extent it is this very desire to objectify the psyche which gave birth to modern imaging 
technologies such as photography, cinema and VR. Indeed, is not the whole idea of photography to 
objectify private memories and private mental images? (Manovich)  
 
From 1839 onwards photography developed into an important artificial memory device, storing and 
reproducing optical information. “Photography captured what was transient, gave permanence to what 
was fleeting; photography was the invention of a ‘mirror with a memory.’” (Draaisma, 2000: 119) 
                                                
10 Walter Ong has argued that a memory stilled in words, whether spoken or written, is just as 
‘technologized’ as memory packaged in electronic images. (Ong, 1982)
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Photography offered a permanent record of our visual experience. The belief in photography as a 
memory aid is also evident from the use of the concept ‘photographic memory’ to describe a perfect 
visual memory that simulates a photographic copy of past impressions. Photography filled in blanks in 
our mental pictures of the present and the past and gave us the sense that all our experiences can be 
held as an archive of images.  
Jean-Louis Comolli suggests that with the advent of photography, the human eye loses its 
“immemorial privilege” and is devalued in relation to the “mechanical eye of the photographic 
machine,” which “now sees in its place.” (Comolli, 1980: 123) Roland Barthes commented on the 
externalization of the human internal world by photography and argued that the photograph is the 
advent of ‘myself as other’ and thus the memory of a personal moment is externalised and objectified. 
“Each photograph is read as the private appearance of its referent: the age of photography corresponds 
precisely to the explosion of the private into the public, or rather into the creation of a new social value, 
which is the publicity of the private: the private is consumed as such, publicly.” (Barthes, 1993: 98) 
This meeting of the private and public has influenced the way we remember, since photographs 
became mementos of experiences, lived moments and events that can be observed by different people, 
separate from the “owners” of the memories and therefore open to different interpretations.  
  However, photography offers still images, with no motion and duration: they present, or rather 
represent, a specific lived instant. Barthes commented that the photographic image of the self is frozen 
and static, along with the memories that it entails, “‘myself’ never coincides with my image; for it is 
the image which is heavy, motionless, stubborn (which is why society sustains it), and ‘myself’ which 
is light, divided, dispersed; like a bottle-imp, ‘myself’ doesn’t hold still, giggling in my jar.” (Barthes, 
1993: 12) Film, in contrast with photography, offers temporal duration and its form and style along 
with the aid of montage ensure a more flexible and fragmented representation of the self that depicts 
more successfully the fluidity of memories. The reciprocal relationship between film and memory has 
been much discussed, film as an externalized form of memory and memory an internal process whose 
function is similar in many ways to film. One of the first people to theorize this relationship was the 
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philosopher and psychologist Hugo Münsterberg, who in 1916 in The Film: A Psychological Study 
argued that a film can act as an externalization or objectification of the internal workings of the mind. 
He imagined memory as the camera of the “mind’s eye” and strongly believed that cinema incarnated 
human memory. “The photoplay obeys the laws of the mind rather than those of the outer world.” 
(Münsterberg, 1970: 41)  
The filmic style and cinema’s representational techniques share many similarities with the way 
memory works, externalizing interior mental states and functions. Walter Benjamin claimed that the 
camera, with the help of various technologies such as enlargement, time lapse and change of focus, 
makes possible the detection of bodily motions and behavioural details that are invisible to the human 
eye. “With the close up, space expands; with slow motion, movement is extended... Evidently a 
different nature opens itself to the camera than opens to the naked eye... The camera introduces us to 
unconscious optics as does psychoanalysis to unconscious impulses.” (Benjamin, 1999: 229-30) He 
thus treats the camera like a psychoanalytic instrument and argued that it can reveal what is stored in 
the unconscious like personal memories, exposing the invisible that is present inside the visible. “The 
technology of the camera and film, its movements and its editing, substitutes increasingly for human 
gesture and interpretation. The contents of the psyche become externalized in technological effects.” 
(Leslie, 2000: 156) Film has the ability to depict flashes of memory, since linear time progression can 
be suspended and the action can jump back and forth approximating the mental function of memory 
and projecting it onto the screen. Cinema was always “fundamentally a kind of time machine, a device 
that effectively freed both its audience and its early users from a conventional sense of time and place.” 
(Telotte, 2001: 78) Its techniques include non-linear editing, the combination of fragmented and 
disjunctive images and the most common cinematic edit that links past and present, the flashback. 
Maureen Turim has analyzed the filmic use of flashbacks in her book Flashbacks in Film (1989) 
arguing that “[f]lashbacks often present images which are to be understood as memories. These films 
portray their own versions of how memories are stored, how they are repressed, how they return from 
the repressed.” (Turim, 1989: 19)  
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Even some scientists have used cinema as a metaphor to explain the way that memories are 
stored in the human brain. “[I]n order to describe memory imaging, science often has recourse to the 
most modern means of imaging and information storing available to the culture.” (Turim, 1989: 205) 
For example, in the 1950s, neurosurgeon Wilder Penfield after several experimental surgeries 
concluded that experiences were stored in the brain in a manner similar to the way a film was made, 
“when, by chance, the neurosurgeon’s electrode activates some portion of that thread, there is a 
response as though that thread were a wire recorder, or a strip of cinematographic film.” (Penfield, 
1954: 68-9) In Alison Winter’s view, the most enduring association of memory and film was the 
practice of forensic hypnosis, as a way to refresh crime victims’ memories and the practitioners 
believed that memories were like film recordings that could be replayed under the right circumstances. 
(Winter, 2006) As Turim comments, “[i]n the films themselves, as well as in the larger culture (even in 
scientific/medical paradigms), cinema becomes an operative metaphor for the brain’s imaging 
capacity.” (Turim, 1989: 206) In addition, neurobiologists, use film as a metaphor to describe the 
intricate mechanism of human consciousness and memory. For example, Neurobiologist Antonio 
Damasio speaks of a ‘movie-in-the-brain’, using the term metaphorically: as if the brain was a camera, 
a screen, a filmed production and a moviegoer. (Damasio, 1999: 11) Thus, it is evident that film has a 
close link to memory and its workings. 
 
2.3 Memory’s aspects: visuality and malleability 
My film focuses on two elements of memory: its dependence on images and its malleability. 
Both elements have been represented in previous science fiction films. Memory has often been 
described as having visual attributes that could be manipulated and organized in space, leaving traces 
behind. One of the most popular science fiction examples that emphasizes the connection between 
images and memories, introducing the importance of photographs as proof of past and memory trace, is 
Blade Runner (Ridley Scott, 1982). Another example is Dark City, wherein a recurrent visual motif 
triggers the protagonist’s presumably original memories and past, which appear as a flash. These kinds 
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of memory flashes are also used in films such as Robocop, The Manchurian Candidate (Jonathan 
Demme, 2004) and Cypher (Vincenzo Natali, 2002), where the main characters have dreams or flashes 
of incoherent and scattered shards of past memories that have been erased via various means. I now 
turn to different memory theorists in order to display the diversity of thinkers that recognize memory’s 
visuality and malleability, and examine the way that their ideas are reflected in various science fiction 
films. For the theorization of the image quality of memories, I combine ideas of the Representative 
and Realist theories of the philosophy of memory,; and I use psychoanalytic ideas to explore their 
malleability. The films to which I formally refer comment on these two aspects, which according to 
their plots are manipulated by various visual media or advanced technologies, consequently leading 
to artificial memories.  
The Representative theory of memory claims that to remember is to experience an image, and 
that image helps the person to recall a past experience. The main motif in Dark City is the image of 
Shell Beach, appearing either as a postcard, a billboard, a souvenir snowglobe or in family photos. 
They all represent a sunny beach – the only image that is full of light in contrast to the endless darkness 
of the city – referring to a condition of wakefulness, revelation and truth. The recurring image in Dark 
City successfully depicts how recollections are not the actual past events, people or things, but images 
or ideas of them: a trace that somehow represents that past experience. Bertrand Russell discussed the 
visual nature of memory in Analysis of Mind. He commented, “[m]emory demands an image... It is 
clear that insofar as the child is genuinely remembering, he has a picture of the past occurrence, and his 
words are chosen so as to describe the picture.” (Russell, 1921: 175) Russell’s thoughts are reflected in 
Johnny Mnemonic, in which Johnny’s childhood memories come to him unexpectedly, usually when 
he is asleep or during his fits. These are disjunctive images of Johnny and his mother from when he 
was a child. He calls them residual traces, but he can never hold on to them. He comments at one point, 
“I almost saw... as if it wasn’t... a memory.” These blurry, almost dreamlike memory traces are 
completely different from the ‘memories’ of data that are represented by bright, colourful computer 
graphics accompanied by electronic sounds.  
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 In contrast, in Strange Days the ‘SQUID’ recorder (Superconducting Quantum Interference 
Device) which records events directly from the wearer’s cerebral cortex offers the ability to the user 
to experience the recorded memory as if it were his or her own experience. The ability to re-
experience a past event exemplifies the Realist theory of memory that also accepts the role of 
mental imagery in remembering; but argues that the things we remember, the memory-images, are 
not present images of earlier times but actually the past events as they appear to us in our 
remembering. As philosopher and psychologist G. F. Stout wrote, “in remembering a past 
experience, I do not, normally, discriminate the memory-image from the experience remembered.” 
(Stout, 1930: 160) Thus, remembering is not linked to looking at pictures but looking at things 
themselves. Lenny Nero, the protagonist of Strange Days, is able to experience the past events, 
which as Henri Bergson comments take the shape of memory images and in this case film images. 
No doubt a recollection, as it becomes actual, tends to live in an image; however, the converse is not 
true, and the image, pure and simple, will not be referred to the past unless, indeed, it was in the past 
that I sought it, thus following the continuous progress which brought it from darkness into light. 
(Bergson, 1911: 135-6)  
 
In a similar way, The Final Cut takes place in a future society where brain implants record every 
moment of someone’s life. These moments can then be cut and edited, like a film, in order to be 
watched by loved ones after the person dies. At some point in the film, the main character Alan 
Hakman, a successful ‘cutter,’ manages to penetrate his own memories and re-experience a 
traumatic past event.  
The above theories and films offer different approaches to memory, though all recognize 
memory’s visual character: either as a present image that represents a past event or as the past event 
itself. However, if we link the image to memory an important concern arises, since it is difficult to 
know whether or not we are actually remembering; or whether an image we have is related to the 
past or just a construct of our imagination. According to Bertrand Russell the distinction between 
memory and imagination is our feeling of familiarity related to a past event or experience. “I think 
the characteristic by which we distinguish the images we trust is the feeling of familiarity that 
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accompanies them.” (Russell, 1921: 161) He suggested that memory images have an affective 
element: they carry a feeling of pastness. Our memories are considered part of reality whereas our 
imagination creates pure mental and unreal images. However, when we describe the memory-
image, we describe it as we remember it and this might actually differ from how it was. As 
philosopher H. H. Price writes “[m]emory-images are often inadequate and known to be so. If we 
can detect their inadequacy and correct it, surely we must have some ‘direct acquaintance’ with past 
events themselves.” (Price, 1953: 309) Memory and imagination are closely interrelated and I now 
turn to the second characteristic of memory: its malleability or flexibility. 
Memories are considered by many to be obscure, patchy and incomplete; and that 
imagination comes to fill in the gaps in order for us to create a coherent meaning. According to 
Annette Kuhn: 
The past is unavoidably rewritten, revised, through memory; and memory is partial: things get forgotten, 
misremembered, repressed. Memory, in any case, is always already secondary revision: even the memories 
we run and rerun inside our heads are residues of psychical processes, often unconscious ones; and their 
(re)telling—putting subjective memory-images into some communicable form—always involves ordering 
and organizing them in one way or another.  (Kuhn, 2000: 184)  
 
In Final Cut, Hakman always thought that he knew what happened during a traumatic childhood event, 
but by re-experiencing the event itself he realizes that he had invested a specific meaning into an image 
which proved not to be real. He had filled in the gaps with his imagination, and mistakenly 
remembered a spill of red paint as a pool of blood that made him believe all these years that his 
childhood friend had died.  
The internal and subjective workings of memory are discussed in depth in psychoanalysis and 
in particular Sigmund Freud believed that memory and fantasy were associated. In “A Note upon the 
‘Mystic Writing-Pad’”, he writes, “our mental apparatus… has an unlimited receptive capacity for new 
perceptions and nevertheless lays down permanent, though not unalterable, memory-traces of them.” 
(Freud, 1959: 176) Freud acknowledged the difficulty in locating something like an “authentic” or 
genuine memory. He seemed to admit that this difficulty arises from the fact that memories are 
mediated through representations. The malleability of childhood memories is intimately connected to 
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their visual character: “In my own case the earliest childhood memories are the only ones of a visual 
character: they are regular scenes worked out in plastic form comparable only to representations on the 
stage.” (Freud, 1965: 47) Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind and Inception (Christopher Nolan, 
2010) explore the surreal aspects of memory, merging dream and memory imagery. The 
dream/memory images are highly stylized to accentuate the extreme subjectivity and unreality of the 
dream/memory state. Joel Barish, the protagonist of Eternal Sunshine, decides to erase the memories of 
his ex-girlfriend and during the erasure process (which happens while he is asleep), he experiences an 
upsurge of pure memories that take the shape of dreams. As the inventor for the memory erasure 
procedure comments in the film, “By the time you wake up in the morning, all memories we’ve 
targeted will have withered and disappeared. As in a dream upon waking.” This is an example of the 
plasticity of memory, showing how experiences and events retained in our brain go through various 
kinds of reorganization and realignment.  
Moreover, the concept of nachträglichkeit, often translated as ‘afterwardness’, refers to a 
process of deferred revision, where “experiences, impressions and memory-traces may be revised at a 
later date to fit in with fresh experiences or with the attainment of a new stage of development.” 
(Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988: 111) A perception usually conserves its firm, exterior nature; while a 
memory is revised by later experiences, thoughts or fantasies. The idea of ‘afterwardness’ is 
successfully depicted in Solaris, both the original and the American remake, although here I refer to 
the American version of 2002 directed by Steven Soderbergh. Dr. Chris Kelvin, during his stay at the 
space station orbiting the planet Solaris, has regular visits from replicas of his dead wife, who 
materializes due to the memories he has of her. His encounters with the different replicas make him 
rethink his memories and reevaluate his relationship with his wife, deciding to give it one more chance. 
The suggestion that memories can be shaped by the present experiences puts the cause and effect 
structure in crisis and emphasizes the link with imagination.  
In this section, I aimed to show the importance of memory’s visuality and manipulability, and 
the way these aspects are represented in science fiction films that revolve around the subject of 
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memory. The relationship of film and memory is further enhanced by the contemporary interest in the 
latter due to its prominent mediation by various means during the last few decades. The science fiction 
films that I discuss have been made during this period: they deal with the subject of artificial memory 
and reflect different contemporary theories on this subject. 
2.4 Artificial memories in contemporary context 
 
Memory is a subject that has attracted considerable attention since the end of the 20th century. 
“Though accounts of the precise periodisation of memory’s vicissitudes may vary, what seems 
indisputable is that contemporary societies appear fascinated by… memory.” (Radstone, 2000b: 2) 
Developments in cybernetics and artificial intelligence, and the pervasive presence of technology in 
everyday life, inevitably affect the way memory is perceived and experienced. This ubiquitous 
computation based on Goodman and Parisi has meant more distributed digital storage devices being 
connected across the planet, and machines increasingly becoming receptacles for human memory. 
Computers, mobile phones, palm pilots and a host of gadgets are being promoted and used as memory 
databases supplemental to natural memory mechanisms. “This has been referred to as the sphere of 
prosthetic memory, which leads some to controversially suggest that in evolutionary terms, 
machines are currently acquiring human memory in nonhuman, technical networks.” (Goodman and 
Parisi, 2010: 345) In addition, the accelerated change of trends, combined with the surplus of 
technological and disconnected experiences, has created the need for memory building and restoration 
and has led to an increasing search for stability in a time period that is often referred to as postmodern.  
Around us is the texture of memories, real and prosthetic, produced for us, by us. We have turned our 
memory devices (in the industrialized world – television, film, video, the Web) into answering machines 
that, on demand, spool out rote solutions to the ontological, epistemological, and existential issues that 
produce life’s dread. (Blackmore, 2004:14) 
 
Furthermore, time and space compression – caused by the media, the Internet and electronic 
communications – make every place and every time instantly available. Vivian Sobchack comments 
that with the development of new electronic technologies, the event and its representation become one: 
their distance is dissolved. (Sobchack, 1996: 5) She also suggests that the cinematic and electronic 
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technologies which mediate our relationship with the world and relationships with others have 
transformed us and the way that we make sense of ourselves, arguing that we are quite different from 
the way we were before those technologies. (Sobchack, 1994: 87) “Not only are our recording, 
witnessing, archiving, distributing and re-representational practices shaped by highly affordable digital 
media devices and technologies, but a ‘long tail’ of the past is suddenly available for private and public 
consumption, re-working and remembering.” (Hoskins, 2009: 148) All these conditions create an 
unstable living environment and identity has become a sum of fragmented and dispersed experiences 
and events. 
Many historical and traumatic events have been commodified through films, photography 
books, comics or docudramas; and as George Lipsitz comments, “through electronic media people get 
memories from a past that is not connected to their own past.” (Lipsitz, 1990: 5) Several critics believe 
that the growth of this contemporary memorial practice does not have real links with history but is 
superficial and treated as an entertainment trend. The media can manufacture and market events that 
never existed and the past can be made over, replicated with or without an original. Thomas Elsaesser 
believes that the endless replaying of traumatic events by different media, mostly TV and film, 
illustrates negatively the concept of mediated memory that becomes synonymous with cultural 
memory of historical events, taking the place of “authentic” experience. Elsaesser argues that films 
have reconfigured individual and collective memories and that this continuous representation does not 
guarantee a clear understanding or a fruitful confrontation with traumatic events or experiences. It 
instead manifests the faith that “cinema can redeem the past, rescue the real, and even rescue that 
which was never real.” (Elsaesser, 1995: 166) On the other hand, he suggests that there are 
representations that are closer to reality and respect the individual experience, but because they do not 
threaten the coherence of the viewer’s identity they therefore cannot make radical otherness 
representable. (Elsaesser, 1995: 174) 
Robert Burgoyne also argues that some films can methodically create (specifically American) 
national myths, excluding the histories and experiences of minorities and counterculture in an effort to 
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disengage cultural memory from public history. Burgoyne analyzes Forrest Gump (1994) and argues 
that this film offers prosthetic memories that repurpose cultural memory in order to promote an 
improved and virtual image of the nation: it is a cinematic rewriting of history that attempts to 
rearticulate the cultural narratives that define the American nation. “In foregrounding memory as the 
connective tissue of nation, Forrest Gump appears to emphasize memory chiefly in order to construct 
an image of nation that can exist apart from, or float free of, the historical traumas of the 1960s and 
1970s.” (Burgoyne, 1997: 106) Burgoyne believes that the example of this film shows the power of 
cinema and its central role in creating false memories and producing an image of social consensus and 
collective identification built around these memories. 
Ian Hacking writes, “[t]here is no canonical way to think of our own past. In the endless quest 
for order and structure, we grasp at whatever picture is floating by and put our past into its frame.” 
(Hacking, 1995: 88) This situation is manifested by the growing need of people to have their 
experience of reality confirmed and enhanced by photographs and films – a demand that has driven a 
growing image consumerism. “[W]e live according to a generalized image-repertoire. Consider the 
United States, where everything is transformed into images: only images exist and are produced and 
are consumed.” (Barthes, 1993: 118) Vivian Sobchack also comments that,  
... we are all part of a moving-image culture and we live cinematic and electronic lives. Indeed, it is not an 
exaggeration to claim that none of us can escape daily encounters - both direct and indirect - with the 
objective phenomena of motion picture, televisual, and computer technologies and the networks of 
communication and texts they produce. Nor is it an extravagance to suggest that, in the most profound, 
socially pervasive, and yet personal way, these objective encounters transform us as subjects. (Sobchack, 
1994: 83)  
 
Unprecedented mediation and recycling of the past by visual media has led people to consume 
illusions of the past without, most of the time, being able to confirm the realness and authenticity of 
these memories. “Our memory is never fully ‘ours,’ nor are the pictures ever unmediated 
representations of our past.” (Hirsch, 1997: 14) Thus, memories often do not validate the actual life 
experiences of people since they can be remodeled and influenced, blurring the boundaries between 
real and imaginary. Victor Burgin discusses the mixture of memories and fantasies with material 
from films and other media sources in The Remembered Film, and refers to a 1977 research project 
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by sociologists at the University of Provence. That was a ten-year oral history research project,  
in which they conducted more than 400 recorded interviews with residents of the Marseille/Aix-en-
Provence area. They asked each interviewee to describe her or his personal memories of the years 1930 to 
1945. They found an almost universal tendency for personal history to be mixed with recollections of 
scenes from films and other media productions. ‘I saw at the cinema’ would become simply ‘I saw.’ 
(Burgin, 2004: 68) 
 
These technologies of reproduction reproduce and represent experienced reality and memories; but in 
mediating present and past experience they remodel and influence it, becoming part of it rather than 
simply its passive medium. As Huyssen argues, “[w]e do know that the media do not transport public 
memory innocently. They shape it in their very structure and form.” (Huyssen, 2000: 30)  
Human memory’s subjectivity and fluidity is further emphasized in contemporary Western 
societies by its mediation and representation, and subsequent creation of artificial memories by 
technical means that are not themselves objective. Photography and cinema are both connected to 
memory preservation and manipulation and belong somewhere between the myth of ideal life and lived 
reality. Although photography is associated with reality because of its indexical properties, as Susan 
Sontag argues, a photograph is still just an interpretation, and cannot be objective, since it is essentially 
a construction like any other representational form. “Instead of just recording reality, photographs have 
become the norm for the way things appear to us, thereby changing the very idea of reality, and of 
realism.” (Sontag, 2001: 87) Every part of the image can be manipulated and even fabricated. 
Especially with the advent of more sophisticated digital technologies, the issue of fabricated reality and 
fictional memories is very much discussed. Digital representations are manipulable, fluid and imitable: 
as a copy with or without a referent they can evade truth and reality, leading possibly to the 
Baudrillardian simulacrum. As Steven Shaviro comments, “[e]ach time we extend ourselves 
technologically, some part of the real gives way to the ‘virtual’.” (Shaviro, 2003: 104) Digital media 
can represent something that does not belong to actual reality and does not bear any traces in the real 
world, not even memory traces. The rupture between signifier and signified can lead to the creation of 
fictional realities and subsequently fabricated memories. “Digital technologies inevitably become 
extensions of our selves - entities through which we re-think our relationship to the world and to our 
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selves.” (Leslie, 2003: 182) They enhance and take advantage of the mediated nature of memories, 
their visuality and fluidity; and along with other recording devices transform the way we perceive 
memory.  
Nevertheless it is worth noting the ironic fact that due to advanced technologies our connection 
to the past and to our memories is severed but, in contrast, without these technologies we would not 
have preserved these extensive personal and collective memories; and many past events would have 
been completely forgotten. Our memories are dependent on electronic records and data and their 
preservation is crucial for the conservation of these memories that are threatened by oblivion in case 
this technology breaks down. Esther Leslie questions these two opposite movements, when she asks: 
“[a]re computer memories a guarantee against forgetting, given their preservation of piles of data...[or] 
in actuality, the endpoint of an ultimate forgetting, because memory - our memory – is here 
externalised, and substituted?” (Leslie, 2003: 183) Jameson also comments, “the informational 
function of the media would thus be to help us forget, to serve as the very agents and mechanisms for 
our historical amnesia.” (Jameson, 2002: 125) These ideas harken back to Plato’s musings in 
Phaedrus, which opened this chapter. Under the conditions I described above, the growing power of 
photography, cinema and digital technologies, along with their subjective, unstable and fragmented 
character constitute the right background for the growth of contemporary theories and ideas around 
artificial memory, its manipulation and ramifications. 
 
 
2.5 Artificial memories: theory and Total Recall  
In Mnemophrenia and its predecessors, different visual technologies contribute to the extension 
of the range of the senses, consciousness and memory, extending inner mental states. As Baudrillard 
argues, “[t]he prostheses of the industrial age are still external, exotechnical, those that we know have 
been subdivided and internalized: esotechnical. We are in the age of soft technologies – genetic and 
mental software.” (Baudrillard, 1994: 100) In these films, the overshadowing of reality by images 
echoes Baudrillard’s notion of the hyperreal, where the real has disappeared and is replaced by 
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representation without referent as the new ‘reality’. Total Recall successfully depicts various opposing 
ideas around artificial memories and for this reason I have chosen it as a representative of the group of 
films that has informed my film and thesis. I use Total Recall to present different theories on artificial 
memories and establish the different meanings and approaches constitutive of this concept as well as 
their ramifications. My analysis of the theories discussed should not be considered exhaustive but are 
nonetheless indicative of the discourse on artificial memories.  
 Total Recall revolves around the character of Douglas Quaid, a construction worker who 
dreams of Mars and longs to move there without understanding why, although he knows he has not 
been there before. In this future world one can buy memories of a trip one has never taken; and also 
memories of a fictional identity, such as those of a secret agent. Quaid decides to buy these memories 
but in doing so finds out that he himself used to be a secret agent on Mars called Hauser. He learns that 
he used to work for Cohaagen, the Governer of Mars, fighting the resistance; and that with his own 
consent his memories were erased and replaced by Quaid’s artificial memories as a way to infiltrate the 
opposition group. From this point on, Quaid lives in a state of confusion, not knowing his real identity 
and not being able to distinguish between reality and fiction which have, for him, become 
interchangeable. Christine Cornea argues,  
[u]nlike those films that create a distinct separation between diegetically real and fantasy worlds... Total 
Recall refuses to clearly signal which of these worlds is intended as real and which as fantasy. Confusion is 
encouraged in following the attempts of the hero, Douglas Quaid/ Hauser... to disentangle fact from fantasy 
in his own mind. (Cornea, 2007: 236) 
 
The company that sells these pre-packaged memories, Rekall, not only offers artificially implanted 
memories of different trips, but also the possibility of acquiring a new identity, using their latest 
product, called ‘Ego Trip’. This product offers the consumer the option of alternate identities during 
the trip, and as one salesman says, “It is like taking a vacation from yourself.” These pre-packaged 
memories are depicted as fictional experiential films that are internalized due to implantation, and thus 
are watched by the mind’s eye, becoming part of the consumer’s memory reserve.  
In the film’s futuristic society, the human activity of memory preservation – through oral or 
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written stories, photographs or family videos – is superseded by memory implantation. Memories are 
not just mediated via different means but can be totally fabricated and consumed, as any other product, 
having a consequential effect on human identity and the ways that people perceive memories and the 
self, whose integrity is in question. The medium here becomes the memory itself: any mediation is 
imperceptible, technology being so sophisticated and the implantation procedure so advanced that the 
medium becomes the message and vice versa. Here we have Baudrillard’s hyperreal, leading to 
...the implosion of the medium and of the real in a sort of hyperreal nebula, in which even the definition and 
distinct action of the medium can no longer be determined... Finally, the medium is the message not only 
signifies the end of the message, but also the end of the medium... the medium and the real are now in a 
single nebula whose truth is undecipherable. (Baudrillard,1994: 82f) 
 
Rekall promotes memory implantation as cheaper, safer and better than the real thing. As the 
salesman assures Quaid, the memories they sell are as real as any memory in his head, and his brain 
will not know the difference. Rekall and its commodified memories echo Huyssen’s ideas about the 
growing commodification and spectacularization of memory, which result in the replication and 
remake of memories and even to the construction of memories that are completely fictional; yet, they 
are advertised as original and authentic. Huyssen also argues that we consume ‘imagined memories’ 
and although he acknowledges that all memories are imagined he believes that these consumerist 
memories are different from lived ones. “After all, many of the mass-marketed memories we consume 
are ‘imagined memories’ to begin with, and thus more easily forgotten than the lived memories.” 
(Huyssen, 2000: 27) However, this is not possible in the society in which Quaid lives. As the film 
progresses, different twists negate the facts that Quaid and the audience have considered to be true and 
real, emphasizing the rootlessness of Quaid’s life. The pre-packaged ‘Ego Trip’ that Quaid buys has all 
the elements and details that he will encounter during the rest of the film, such as: alien artifacts, the 
girl that he falls in love with and even the blue sky on Mars at the end. As he is told, “By the time the 
trip is over, you get the girl, kill the bad guys and save the entire planet”, something that is actually 
fulfilled in his ‘reality’. 
In relation to the idea of commodification, Norman Klein has coined the term ‘consumer 
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memories’ in “Audience Culture and the Video Screen” (1990), referring to movies, TV, shopping, 
driving and touring, which offer narrative vignettes in which consumers are the central characters. He 
argues that due to capitalism, increased consumerism and the intense presence of media in everyday 
life, people’s memories have become a combination of incoherent, displaced fragments of political 
speeches, commercials, dislocated phrases, shows, films and products they have bought. Consumer 
memories are the artificial memories of consumers of images, experiences and material objects, all 
treated as products offered to be bought and consumed.  
Merchandising promotion leaves room for the audience, but little else. It simply presents us with an 
imaginary space, which we, as audience then inhabit. We are reminded of a street, a highway, or a room 
next to ours, because, like TV programming, sound bites register in strands of fractured memories, 
impulses that feel familiar, harmonies snatched from famous operas. (Klein, 1990: 402)  
 
Klein argues that personal memories are influenced and subsequently reconfigured, restructured by the 
images and products that people consume, redefining the memories as just as fabricated as the products 
themselves. In Total Recall the implanted memories are the ultimate ‘consumer memories’, 
commodifying personal memories, promoting them as films that are watched by the mind’s eye and 
where the central character is always the consumer.  
The saturation of everyday life with mediated images and information is used as the backdrop 
in Total Recall. TV screens and computer monitors are everywhere11, almost transparent and very 
much integrated into the futuristic setting. Note the large flat TV screen in Quaid’s apartment, which 
one minute shows the news and the next minute can be switched to resemble a window overlooking 
nature that is nevertheless televised. Landsberg, commenting on the technological permeation in Total 
                                                
11
 Garrett Stewart remarks about science fiction film and its overabundance of  “banks of monitors, 
outsized video intercoms, x-ray display panels, hologram tubes, backlit photoscopes, aerial scanners, 
telescopic mirrors, illuminated computer consoles, overhead projectors, slide screens, radar scopes, whole 
curved walls of transmitted imagery, the retinal registers of unseen electronic eyes.” (Stewart, 1985: 161) 
According to him, “cinema becomes a synecdoche for the entire technics of an imagined society.” (Stewart, 
1985: 161) 
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Recall, writes, “[t]he notion of authenticity-and our desire to privilege it-is constantly undermined by 
Total Recall’s obsessive rendering of mediated images...  In Total Recall the proliferation of mediated 
images – and of video screens – forces us to question the very notion of an authentic or an originary 
presence.” (Landsberg, 2004b: 243) For example, Lori, Quaid’s fictitious ‘wife’, trains with the help of 
a human-sized tennis teacher hologram; and Quaid uses a device that produces a hologram of himself, 
a duplication reflecting visually his real and artificial mixed identity. Hence, technological consumer 
products are shown as trespassing every aspect of life, from the exterior surroundings to the internal 
and personal sphere.  
 Alison Landsberg also discusses the commodification of memory but approaches the subject 
from a different perspective compared to Klein, as examined further below. Landsberg coins the term 
‘prosthetic memories’ and argues that they have emerged in this period because capitalism has enabled 
memories to be commodified and disseminated across different strands of society, and because of the 
development of different mass media of memory. “Through watching films and television, by visiting 
experiential museums, and perhaps by entering virtual worlds on the Internet, people can and do take 
on prosthetic memories.” (Landsberg, 2004a: 48) Quaid’s prosthetic memories of his previous life as 
Hauser are always mediated, and the only proofs of their authenticity are the video recordings of the 
‘real’ self, Hauser, referring to the ‘artificial’ self, Quaid. In the first recording Hauser characteristically 
says, “You are not you, you are me...” Quaid ventures on an Ego Trip of self-re-discovery, where he 
meets his double. Hauser and Quaid are polar opposites: Hauser is selfish and corrupt whilst Quaid is a 
good-natured hero who decides to fight against the forces that have constructed him. Landsberg argues 
that the meeting with Hauser via the video monitor, 
seems to disrupt the Lacanian notion of the ‘mirror stage’... the encounter with the face in the monitor, 
which looks like his face but is not the one he owns, disrupts any sense of a unified, stable and bounded 
subjectivity. Instead of consolidating his identity, the video screen further fragments it. This encounter 
undermined as well the assumption that a particular memory has a rightful owner, a proper body to adhere 
to. (Landsberg, 2004b: 243) 
 
Celia Lury in Prosthetic Culture develops her ideas on a culture in which the notion of 
extension plays a significant role. In this culture the individual is a combination of adjacent and coeval 
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parts, the distance between cause and effect, subject and object disappears: “memories [are] substituted 
for one another, organs transplanted from one body to work alongside those of another’s, hues of cloth 
juxtaposed with colors of skin, hair and eyes. This is no longer a culture of synthesis, but one of 
prosthesis.” (Lury, 1998: 16) Lury argues that the intrusion of media in everyday life, and specifically 
photography and seeing photographically, contributed to the emergence and nourishment of multiple 
personality and false memory syndromes which entail a combination of memories and fantasies with 
material from films and other media sources. Lury is influenced by Baudrillard and his belief that every 
possibility has the potential of being realized in a technological loop, and argues that in prosthetic 
culture people may feel responsible for memories they have not had, and they are comforted that there 
is a machine that can actualize this possibility on behalf of them. In Total Recall this is possible with 
the implanted memories that give Quaid the chance to live the life he always thought he wanted. In his 
case, the Cartesian idea of stable and coherent self belongs to the past: human identity is a sum of real 
and fictional memories and experiences, a combination of different – even contrasting – identities. At 
one point Quaid asks, “Ok, then. If I am not me, who the hell am I?” The video recordings of Hauser 
constitute the only clues in Quaid’s search for truth; but at the same time their mediated nature suggests 
their unreliability, contributing to a kind of multiple personality disorder as suggested by Lury. Quaid 
even needs to kill Lori, the woman that he had thought of as his wife for the last eight years. In this 
sense, nothing can guarantee that a new circle of mutually exclusive memories and experiences will not 
promote a new and contrasting identity for Quaid. Any connection to the past is unstable and 
compromised if not destroyed, since there is no clear assurance of what belongs to reality. The artificial 
identity in Total Recall, a product of consumerist society, is so unstable that as Rekall’s doctor tells 
Quaid, “One minute you’ll be the savior of the rebel cause, then, next thing you know, you’ll be 
Cohaagen’s bosom buddy.” This instability and fluidity emphasizes the mutable aspect of Quaid’s 
identity. 
 At the end, Quaid opts to forsake his assumed previous selfish, corrupted self, represented by 
Hauser; and chooses the fake memories and identity instead. As Landsberg argues in her article 
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“Prosthetic Memory: Total Recall and Blade Runner”, these ‘prosthetic’ memories can prove valid and 
enable the individual to be proactive.  
Surprisingly enough, memories are less about authenticating the past, than about generating possible 
courses of action in the present. The Mutant resistance leader, Quato, tells Quaid that ‘A man is defined by 
his actions, not his memories.’ We might revise his statement to say that a man is defined by his actions, 
but whether those actions are made possible by prosthetic memories or memories based on lived experience 
makes little difference. (Landsberg, 2004b: 244) 
 
Although Cohaagen tells him that he is nothing but a stupid dream, Quaid takes a stance and decides to 
change his future through his actions. Biderman suggests that Quaid “takes an attitude toward his 
facticity by rejecting his past actions as completely defining him and chooses to create a new identity 
through his future actions.” (Biderman, 2008: 52) On a similar note, Quaid experiences everything in a 
personal way and manages to empathize with the mutants on Mars, and thus chooses to take 
responsibility and help the resistance group. Kaja Silverman, like Landsberg, focuses on the 
transferable nature of memories and explores the idea of artificial memories from the perspective of 
their contribution to the development of social empathy. Silverman coins the term ‘heteropathic 
memory’, a kind of memory that permits the subject to participate in the desires and struggles of the 
‘other’, particularly the culturally minor and persecuted. Silverman discusses how the social order is 
based on visual representation, photography, cinema and video,; and she challenges our way of 
looking, suggesting a way of representation that supports an identification process that does not 
interiorize the other but instead accepts the other as oneself. Through heteropathic memory the person 
does not absorb the other, does not cling to images of the other that he/she can incorporate, but gets out 
of his/her own cultural norms. He/she lets the pasts of other people destabilize his/her own, following 
an empathetic and affective approach to ‘difference’. Quaid experiences through the implanted 
memories a reality that is very different from his life on Earth, and lets the struggles of the mutants and 
resistance group on Mars affect him. His previous experiences were completely different, echoing 
Silverman’s ideas about “the designation of the scene of representation as radically discontinuous with 
the world of the spectator” in order to encourage and maintain an heteropathic identification. 
(Silverman, 1996: 86) Quaid decides to go against Hauser’s ideology and his past or “authentic” self, 
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and embraces his new “artificial” self and heteropathic or prosthetic memories by liberating the people 
of Mars. As Christine Cornea writes, “it is significant that the hero chooses to adopt what finally turns 
out to be a fictional persona, leaving both Quaid (and viewer?) immersed in the fantasy world that 
Hauser created, internalised, and now lives.” (Cornea, 2007: 236) His alliance with the resistance is 
built upon memories that might be artificial but which he nevertheless accepts as authentic since they 
are indistinguishable from the real and become part of his present reality. 
 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I introduced the science-fiction films that have influenced Mnemophrenia in the 
ways they establish the idea of artificial memory, emphasizing the link between memory and film. 
Firstly, I offered a brief historical examination of the relationship between memory and film and 
examined how film resembles memory due to its form and techniques, and introduced it as an effective 
memory aid. In addition, I argued that film can represent memory by replicating memory’s visuality 
and malleability and presented examples of science-fiction films that deal with the subject of memory 
and successfully depict these aspects. I also offered a critical analysis of artificial memories as a film 
subject, placing the concept in a contemporary context; and used Total Recall as a representative 
example that effectively illustrates the current discussion around the subject.  
The aim of this chapter was to introduce the idea of film as a memory aid that is able to 
successfully represent and preserve memory and potentially become a memory system itself, which 
consequently produces artificial memories. The visuality and malleability of memory examined in this 
chapter constitute the foundation of how memory is depicted in Mnemophrenia, which builds on the 
ideas around artificial memories discussed earlier and explores this subject even further. In the 
following chapters, I analyze each period of Mnemophrenia separately and examine for each one the 
form and style used to depict memory; and explore the artificial memories produced by the advanced 
films of the time and their subsequent ramifications. I analyze Mnemophrenia in chronological order, 
despite the different periods interacting with each other throughout the film. The reason for this is that 
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it helps me to offer a clear and coherent analysis, since each period affects the next.  
The first period depicts the story of Jeanette, a documentary filmmaker who is making a film 
about mnemophrenia, a new mental condition arising from the merging of real and artificial memories. 
Her interest stems from discovering that she is a mnemophrenic: memories of her first love, Douglas, 
were artificial, created by Virtual Reality (VR) films she consumed when younger. In the following 
period, Nicholas – Jeanette’s grandson – is a neuroscientist and computer scientist who works for 
Memofilm developing Total Cinema (TC), the first generation of all-sensory interactive VR films. 
Nicholas is a mnemophrenic, and his vision is that TC will encourage empathy and eliminate the divide 
between mnemophrenics and non-mnemophrenics. In the last period Robyin – a descendant of 
Nicholas and Jeanette – is a researcher and one of the first people to get a brain-implanted microchip. 
She is interested in empathy and shared consciousness, and has been researching Jeanette’s and 
Nicholas’s videorecordings. 
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How much do we know our pasts? If we discover that our memories are corrupt, how will we effect 
their restoration? How will we know what constitutes a complete memory, let alone memories that 
produce truths? Being low on memory produces a crisis in both the personal and the public sphere. 
(Blackmore, 2004: 38) 
 
Chapter 3: Outbreak of mnemophrenia !
 
 The family tree of the main characters in Mnemophrenia starts with Jeanette Harper, a 
documentary filmmaker who is making a film about the condition. Jeanette aims to research the 
outbreak of this new mental condition, trying to find its possible link with visual technologies and 
specifically Virtual Reality (VR) films. Jeanette’s story signals the beginning of mnemophrenia and the 
fusion of reality and fiction. Her research and personal story are recorded in her documentary, a visual 
autobiography that subsequently becomes (artificial) memory material for future generations, notably 
her descendants Nicholas and Robyin.  
This part of Mnemophrenia combines science fiction and documentary, being in effect a 
futuristic ‘fake’ documentary that builds on documentary conventions. In this chapter, I will briefly 
refer to other documentaries that are placed in the future and have influenced my creative choices for 
Jeanette’s documentary; and will go on to discuss two science fiction films that have documentary 
elements. In my analysis, I use documentary as a metaphor for memory and select the term ‘fake 
documentary’ over ‘mockumentary’ in order to support the metaphorical equation of fake documentary 
with fake memories12. As Jeanette strongly values real memories and strives for truth, it becomes 
increasingly apparent that her fake memories are as important if not more important than her real ones, 
uncovering a different ‘truth’. Thus, the use of fake documentary style reveals the significance of fake 
memories as well as the fragility and uncertainty of Jeanette’s reality; and questions documentary’s and 
memory’s authority. I then explore the effect of mnemophrenia on Jeanette and use the idea of 
postmodern schizophrenia13 as examined by Fredric Jameson and Jean Baudrillard in order to analyze 
                                                
12 In this chapter I use the terms fake and artificial memories interchangeably. 
13 Deleuze and Guattari have also written about ‘postmodern schizophrenia’ and their ideas will be explored 
in the last chapter.
 53 
 
the ramifications of fake memories. I consider Jeanette a postmodern schizophrenic and compare her to 
other science fiction film characters that have artificial memories and that share similar traits and 
experiences. 
 
3.1 Beginning of mnemophrenia !
 
 Although Jeanette’s documentary constitutes one third of the feature film, it sets the foundation 
for the development of the other two stories since Jeanette is the first in the bloodline to experience 
mnemophrenia. Jeanette’s story does not depart much from the classic science fiction film narrative 
that offers a negative perspective with regards to technology. I do not shy away from showing the 
significant consequences of VR film consumption and depict Jeanette becoming increasingly confused 
and emotionally unstable. I also show how the re-experience of the VR films intensifies her longing to 
meet Douglas14 again. Thus, in the end, I present Jeanette quite willfully getting more and more lost in 
fiction, losing touch with the reality for which she has so strongly advocated.  
Jeanette’s documentary introduces the beginning of mnemophrenia as a condition. Bill Nichols 
argues that the documentary addresses the world in which we live rather than the world imagined by 
the filmmaker (Nichols, 2001: xi), and Mnemophrenia attempts to capitalize on this address. This is the 
beginning of the film, at least chronologically, and it constitutes a more conventional grounding in a 
‘reality’ that the audience can understand and relate to, compared with the rest of the film. As Vivian 
Sobchack comments, “[a] great deal of our rising curve of excitation is… to see what we know is 
unreal and impossible made real – authenticated – by its presence in a real and familiar context 
which has been photographed in a manner reserved for actual and real happenings.” (Sobchack, 
2001: 137) Jeanette’s experience is closer to ours than that of the two other main characters, since the 
further we go into the future the less familiar is the ‘reality’ that we encounter – or it would be more 
correct to say that we encounter a different kind of reality. Jeanette is the beginning of our journey into 
                                                
 
14 The name ‘Douglas’ is a reference to Douglas Quaid from Total Recall. 
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mnemophrenia and the world of artificial memories. I use her as our guide, who offers a brief overview 
of a condition that affects the perception of reality and identity for her and future generations.  
As discussed in the introduction, several science fiction films from which my film takes 
inspiration offer a dichotomy between reality and fiction and almost always offer clear visual, textual 
and formal depictions of this battle in order to help the audience follow the story and, by the end, 
reassure them about the victory of reality over artificial and fictional worlds.  
Science fiction films can be seen as an arena in which we can explore exactly what it is to be ‘human’, 
partly through the juxtaposition between the human and a variety of opposites... Many science fiction 
films can be read as offering this kind of imaginary resolution of the opposition between the human and 
science, technology and rationality. They often set up an initial opposition that is eventually reconciled. 
(King & Krzywinska, 2000: 12) 
 
In Mnemophrenia, I use the same device but with a different goal in mind. The audience needs a 
grounding, some kind of foundation in reality, a person to whom they can relate, cling to and 
possibly identify with, in order to follow a story that pushes them to question preconceived notions 
about reality and fiction, real and fake memories. Jeanette’s story offers various cues that help the 
audience to distinguish between her real and fake memories. The main core of her documentary 
represents her real memories; and the various excerpts from the VR films of Douglas depict her 
fake memories. Even though Jeanette and her story offer this grounding in reality, their status as 
authentic, first hand memories is destabilised by the end of the film when it is revealed that they all 
along constituted Robyin’s artificial memories: this stays in keeping with the film’s objective to 
challenge the reality/ fiction binary.  
 
3.2 Visual autobiography!
 
Jeanette’s main motive for making the documentary and wanting to find out the truth about 
mnemophrenia and its possible effects is that she has recently discovered she herself is a 
mnemophrenic. Her first love, Douglas, whom she always remembered with fondness and who had 
made such a strong impression on her, has been proven to be an artificial memory. Mnemophrenia 
makes Jeanette doubt herself and her life choices and as a way to cope she resorts to the only thing she 
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believes can help her find the truth: documentary filmmaking. As a strong advocate of documentary 
and its connection to facts, evidence and objectivity, Jeanette uses what she thinks of as a reliable film 
form.  
 Jeanette’s documentary works like a visual autobiography that aspires to heal her wounds 
caused by mnemophrenia. It is like a “memory work” as defined by Annette Kuhn in her essay “A 
Journey Through Memory.” Kuhn’s description applies: 
[It is] an active practice of remembering which takes an inquiring attitude towards the past and the 
activity of its reconstruction through memory. Memory work... [i]nvolves an active staging of memory... 
[It] [q]uestions the transparency of what is remembered… [and] [t]akes what is remembered as material 
for interpretation. (Kuhn, 2000: 186) 
 
Jeanette starts her documentary questioning all her memories of Douglas as well as their 
reconstruction, which are a result of VR films. The active staging, as Kuhn calls it, of these 
memories is achieved because of the unlocking of the VR films so that Jeanette can re-experience 
them and include parts of them in her documentary. In addition, her interviews with film scholars, 
neuroscientists, VR scientists and the recording of the group therapy sessions that she attends are 
part of her enquiring into the transparency or authenticity of her memories. They also depict her 
efforts to interpret them and look for their meanings and possibilities. It is evident that the revelation 
of Douglas’s artificiality has completely shaken her, and made her not only question the memories 
themselves but also the choices she made since she was 18, which have contributed significantly to 
her present identity. According to Kuhn, for the practitioner of memory work, “it is not merely a 
question of what we choose to keep in our ‘memory boxes’... but of what we do with them... how we 
then make use of the stories they generate to give deeper meaning to, and if necessary to change, our 
lives now.” (Kuhn, 2000: 187) The memory work that Jeanette undertakes has a direct impact on 
every aspect of her life in the present, from the professional to the personal, which eventually leads 
to her breakdown. Throughout this memory work that is the making of her documentary, Jeanette 
negotiates her relationships with her family and with Douglas himself.  
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3.3 Futuristic mockumentary: science fiction and documentary 
 
 Jeanette’s story is depicted as a documentary that is placed in the future and explores the 
blurring between reality and fiction. In this part of Mnemophrenia, documentary and science fiction 
complement each other, the former representing the science and the latter offering the “informed” 
fiction. Documentary has relied on its close link with science for its continued authority, and like 
science it has attempted to offer general truths about the human condition. “Beyond art, beyond drama, 
the documentary is evidential, scientific.” (Winston, 1995: 127) Roger Silverstone argues in his book 
Framing Science: the making of a BBC documentary that in a scientific experiment, the scientist tests 
out a hypothesis by collecting data and submitting them to a variety of tests. Results produced by these 
tests are seen as confirming or denying the original hypothesis. Similarly, the documentarist making an 
expository documentary builds a narrative around a social problem or issue (hypothesis). (Silverstone, 
1985) So, like the project of science, many documentaries have attempted to present general truths 
about the human condition. And documentary is usually, if erroneously, perceived as offering a 
representation of an objective, unmediated view of the world along with factual evidence.  
However, as Jane Roscoe and Craig Hight argue in their book Faking it, “in postmodern 
society, we have become suspicious of science and of general truths about the world. The documentary 
can present a truth, not the Truth.” (Roscoe & Hight, 2001: 28) The union of documentary and science 
fiction in Mnemophrenia leads to a self-referential structure that is represented by mockumentary, 
which can be seen as documentary’s alter ego. Jeanette’s story is depicted as a futuristic 
mockumentary, which showcases the fruitful combination of documentary and science fiction genre. 
The mockumentary style emphasizes the merging of reality and fiction; and offers a critique on the 
film medium itself and the ways documentary and science fiction complement and transform each 
other in this project. Thus, in this way the two genres are integrated and it is the deliberate play 
between factual and fictional modes of engagement that generates reflexive potential. I will now briefly 
refer to the documentary and science fiction films that have become my guide for the development of 
Jeanette’s ‘documentary’. 
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Mnemophrenia places the first time period in a future that has already happened and, since it 
builds upon the current relationship of humans and memory to media, bears the question, “Could 
this actually happen?” This part of the film shares formal and stylistic similarities with 
documentaries that are placed in the future. These are films that orient the viewer to a possible 
world via a representation of events that either have not yet happened or did not happen as the films 
depict. Paul Ward in his article “The Future of Documentary? ‘Conditional Tense’ Documentary 
and the Historical Record” talks about this specific kind of documentary, which he calls the future 
of documentary. “The plausible detail of the production – not to mention that of the events depicted 
– adds another level of complexity: these are events that have not happened at all, told as if they 
have already happened, with the resultant implication to the audience that this could yet happen.” 
(Ward, 2006: 273) There are different examples of documentaries that talk about a possible future 
or depict a “what would have happened if” scenario, from Peter Watkins’s War Game (1965) to 
Smallpox 2002: Silent Weapon (Daniel Percival, 2002), The Day Britain Stopped (Gabriel Range, 
2003) and Death of a President (Gabriel Range, 2006). The conditional or future tense of these 
documentaries differentiates them from most documentaries by attempting to envision a possible 
future, and as Ward comments, their “mode of address is not ‘Is this real’ or ‘Did this really 
happen?’ but ‘Could this actually happen?’” (Ward, 2006: 275)  
Jeanette is like the future archivist in The Age of Stupid (Franny Armstrong, 2009), but 
instead of looking for answers from actual events in the past, which is the viewers’ present, she is 
looking at her own present or recent past, which is fictional and still placed in the future for us, in a 
similar vein to Smallpox 2002 (when it was made and broadcasted)15. The use of documentary 
conventions contributes to the realistic appearance of mnemophrenia as a condition, which is mostly 
enhanced through interviews with different scientists who support the scenario of advanced VR 
                                                
15 This exemplifies what science fiction offers according to Jameson, “the estrangement and renewal of our 
own reading present.” The “multiple mock futures” of science fiction work by “transforming our own present 
into the determinate past of something yet to come.” (Jameson, 1982: 152)
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films leading to such a condition. However, most of the aforementioned future documentaries such 
as War Game, Smallpox 2002, or The Day Britain Stopped depict a potential disaster. These films 
could be seen as a call to action, as Ward suggests, and their aim is to warn and inform the audience 
of impending dangers16. In contrast, Mnemophrenia is more of a personal story: Jeanette’s 
documentary is a much smaller production compared to these documentaries and attempts to inform 
about a recent, not widely known condition, without having enough evidence. Her documentary 
does not showcase something that has already happened, like the terrorist attack in Smallpox 2002 
or the consequences of the failure of UK’s transport system in The Day Britain Stopped. Thus, it 
lacks any (fictional) television newscasts but presents different views on a new condition, and most 
importantly documents Jeanette’s personal experience. 
The focus of my film is on science fiction, which also asks the question “Could this actually 
happen?” but is much more open to a diversity of possible answers and scenarios, and does not need 
any link to reality or evidence. 
As a form whose boundaries are, perhaps more than any other popular genre, always open or blurred, as a 
narrative type that always focuses on the tools of human fabrication, that is, on the science and technology 
that lend science fiction its very distinctive character... the science fiction film inevitably foregrounds as no 
other genre does our attitudes toward the real. Through that interrogation of the real, it asks a number of 
fundamental questions... How do we define ourselves, how do we construct our world, and even more 
broadly, how do we know? (Telotte, 2001: 59) 
 
Mnemophrenia should be seen as a film that on one hand begins from a plausible scientific premise, 
using documentary conventions that are linked to truth and objectivity; but on the other hand, its 
science fictional elements tamper with its suggested ‘realism’ and question its documentary 
credibility, therefore contributing to the subversive goal of my fake documentary. In this respect, 
there are two science fiction film examples that Mnemophrenia resembles: Journey to the Moon 
                                                
16 Ward argues that these films are most certainly documentary in intention and that the filmmakers frame 
the events in such a way in order to emphasize how plausible they think these events are and considers them 
as a call to action. (Ward, 2006: 275) Moreover, Alisa Lebow in her presentation at the Visible Evidence 
Documentary Studies conference in 2008 asks the question “[i]f documentary is already a kind of fiction, 
then why should it relegate its explorations of the world to the past and present?” suggesting that a 
documentary in the future tense could offer different possibilities that are useful to explore. (Lebow, 2008: 1) 
Ward’s and Lebow’s discussion of these future tense documentaries reveals their belief that they could 
constitute a powerful critique or a type of history.
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(Kutlu! Ataman, 2009) and District 9 (Neill Blomkamp, 2009). Journey to the Moon has a loose 
connection to the science fiction genre since it explores the fictional quest of four Turkish villagers 
in 1957 to travel to the moon. It sets up as a fake documentary by using “found” black and white 
photos, the voice-over of a local narrator as well as interviews with established Turkish intellectuals 
who offer their views about what took place in that village. Mnemophrenia uses many similar 
conventions, such as interviews with experts, excerpts of Jeanette’s VR films with Douglas, and the 
testimony of different mnemophrenics about their experience. In addition, Journey to the Moon 
questions, like Mnemophrenia, the status of documentary as an objective source of truth.  
District 9 is a film about aliens stranded in Johannesburg due to the malfunction of their 
mothership, and their subsequent confinement in ghettos. Like Journey to the Moon, it uses 
documentary codes and conventions, such as interviews with experts and video footage of the 
protagonist before his infection and hiding in the alien ghetto, in order to make the story as realistic 
as possible, blurring the lines between reality and fiction. The story is situated in 2010 
Johannesburg, combining current real images of the city with CGI images of aliens and their 
mothership: with its naturalistic style, camerawork and acting it succeeds in the blending of the two 
genres. Like District 9, Mnemophrenia uses fake documentary as a device to enhance its realistic 
effect while at the same time focusing on its science fiction premise. Mnemophrenia works like 
District 9 and other science fiction films that envision a potential future. “[O]ur science fiction 
films, time and again… draw us back from a sheer fascination with what ‘might be’—which is, after all, 
one of the key attractions of the genre—so that we can consider what is truly at stake in all these 
narratives about creation and destruction: our humanness.” (Telotte, 1995: 3)  
 
3.4 Documentary conventions!
 
As a means of representing Jeanette’s documentary, I use the expository and observational 
modes as defined by Bill Nichols, in order to reflexively engage with the subject and subvert the 
realism of documentary representations. I use the expository mode in Jeanette’s interviews, in which 
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the interviewees express their ideas and beliefs about mnemophrenia. Jeanette’s confrontations with 
the condition through the group therapy sessions are contrasted with the cold, scientific stance of the 
interviews. The interviews describe or try to understand the ‘reality’ of mnemophrenia from an 
objective angle, voicing both negative and positive views. It is important that none of the expert 
interviewees claim to be personally affected by the condition, which emphasizes Jeanette’s feeling of 
isolation, making it an even more personal project for her.  
The expert draws credibility from their official position or standing and from their access to 
“discourses of sobriety” as Nichols refers to law, science, medicine and politics in his book 
Introduction to Documentary. (Nichols, 2001) “[The experts] are expected to present us with material 
and knowledge we might otherwise not have access to, provide evidence to back up arguments, and 
help us discover and gain access to the truth.” (Roscoe & Hight, 2001: 16) Since we usually do not 
question the status of the scientist or expert nor the truthfulness of his/her account due to his/her 
official position, I use the device used in Zelig (Woody Allen, 1983) or Journey to the Moon and 
interview actual scholars, researchers and scientists about mnemophrenia. All the interviewees explore 
the idea of mnemophrenia and its possible ramifications by commenting on a hypothetical future and 
playing along, behaving as if they live in that hypothetical future themselves. The documentary aspect 
of the film that expresses the idea of objectivity and reality contrasts with the hyperreality that it 
explores. The expository mode of the interviews offers a reflexive commentary. Many of my ideas are 
supported by these interviews, and some of the interviewees are cited in my written thesis as well, 
increasing the blur between reality and fiction. Thus, the dialogue between the film and the thesis 
comes alive, revealing an organic relationship by using the ideas of some theorists to analyse the film 
and its sociocultural background and at the same time interview them for the same film, creating an 
indeterminate situation where theory and practice vie for primacy, yet neither takes precedence. This 
implication also raises the question about the status of the interviewees, who assume the role of the 
expert and ‘actor’ at the same time. This blend offers a critique on their presumed official and informed 
position as documentary interviewees, since the duality of their role destabilizes their authority.  
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I use the observational mode by giving the audience an unmediated access to the real world of 
the mnemophrenics through the observed mnemophrenic group therapy sessions that Jeanette 
attends17. These scenes are all shown observationally and are linked to Direct Cinema style and 
support the idea of unmediated reality, like Primary (Robert Drew, 1960), Don’t Look Back (D.A. 
Pennebaker, 1967) and Titticut Follies (Frederick Wiseman, 1967). The camera in the group therapy 
sessions tries to capture all interactions between the participants and their analyst, Tessa Fox, imitating 
the fly-on-the-wall documentary film style, which tries to keep a distance and be as unobtrusive as 
possible. Bill Nichols comments on this kind of film, which he calls observational, “[w]e look in on 
life as it is lived. Social actors engage with one another, ignoring the filmmakers. Often the characters 
are caught up in pressing demands or a crisis of their own. This requires their attention and draws it 
away from the presence of filmmakers.” (Nichols, 2001: 174) The camerawork is indicative of this 
particular documentary film style by following the dialogue, including abrupt panning in order to 
capture different reactions. There are also handheld shots as well as zoom-ins that aesthetically 
comment on and emphasize the narrative significance of Jeanette’s emotional reactions. In addition, 
the naturalistic acting contributes to the realism of the documentary. All of the dialogue and characters 
were developed through improvisation workshops with the actors and adds to the story’s realism by 
giving the impression of spontaneity. (I briefly analyze the improvisation process at the Appendix). 
 
3.5 Fake documentary: fake memories!
 
 My decision to use documentary clichés and conventional forms for the representation of 
Jeanette’s story was deliberate in order to emphasize the common but flawed link between 
documentary, objectivity and truth. The use of conventional documentary style helps me to align it 
with the idea of memory and its presumed link to real events. As Susannah Radstone comments, 
                                                
17 I also intended to include other observational scenes, the documentary ‘behind the scenes’, all placed in 
Jeanette’s office depicting her discussions with George, her cameraman. However, during the editing process I 
realized that these scenes did not work well and I had to cut them out. 
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Although it is now recognised that memory’s condensations and displacements are similar to those found in 
dreams, memory work does not reduce memory to fiction, to dream, or to poetry, for instance. Memories, 
that is, continue to be memories, and it is their relation to lived historical experience that constitutes their 
specificity. (Radstone, 2000: 11) 
 
I consider documentary to be the best metaphor for memory, and that is how this term is applied in this 
chapter and formally used in the first part of Mnemophrenia. More than any other film genre it 
resembles memory in that it tries to structure and represent something that has happened though its 
representation does not necessarily reflect actual reality. Documentary, with its different choices in 
framing, editing, use of narrative and voice-overs, dictates what and how it re-presents, offering only a 
version of ‘reality’. Documentary’s reliance on the distinction between truth and falsity no longer 
holds: “[o]ne of the consequences of the critique of ‘truth’ and ‘reality’ has been the blurring of 
traditional boundaries between documentary and drama, and between fact and fiction.” (Roscoe & 
Hight, 2001: 29) Documentary is like memory, which is a re-presentation itself, omitting details or 
filling in the gaps of a past reality. Thus, the use of fake documentary style offers an ironic emphasis 
on the authentic and real aspect of documentary and memory, while at the same time displaying their 
fictional features.  
There are debates around what to call the types of film that deliberately fuse documentary 
conventions with fictional elements for parodic or self-reflexive purposes, or in some cases as pure 
hoax. It is worth noting that in documentary studies, it seems like the term mockumentary or mock 
documentary is widely used, further explored in Roscoe and Hight’s book Faking It. “Mock-
documentaries foreground their fictionality; their intention is to play with, undermine or challenge 
documentary, rather than to seek validity through an association with the genre.” (Roscoe & Hight, 
2001: 47) Gerd Bayer proposes in his essay “Artifice and Artificiality in Mockumentaries” that 
mockumentaries could also be called meta-documentaries since their aim is the questioning of 
documentary. (Bayer, 2006) But other theorists have referred to them as fake documentaries, as 
Alexandra Juhasz explains in F is for Phony, “I use the word ‘fake’ because it registers both the 
copying and its discovery... The fakery of fake docs mirrors and reveals the sustaining lies of all 
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documentary, both real and fake, producing the possibility for the contesting of history, identity, and 
truth.” (Juhasz & Lerner, 2006: 7) I choose to use the name fake documentary18 purely for 
metaphorical and not conceptual reasons as I explain below. 
The reason for using a ‘fake’ documentary is in order to depict through form and not only 
content the exploration of the idea of fake memories. In Mnemophrenia, the idea of documentary 
stands for real memory and fake documentary for fake memory. A fake documentary reveals the 
fragile balance between reality, truth and documentary, and fake memories reveal the fluid 
relationship between reality and memories. As I have established, memories are always an act of 
construction. Like documentary, any attempts to recapture the past are exercises in fiction, revealing 
that there is always a difficulty in distinguishing between reality and fiction when reality is 
mediated and, indeed, more than ever in Jeanette’s time. In Mnemophrenia, the fake documentary 
metaphor implies that fake memories might be truer than real ones and could reveal something 
closer to conscious or even unconscious reality. As Eric Barnouw comments, “[s]ome artists turn 
from documentary to fiction because they feel it lets them come closer to the truth, their truth. 
Some, it would appear, turn to documentary because it can make deception more plausible.” 
(Barnouw, 1993: 349) The fake documentary reveals the deceptive truth of documentary and 
Jeanette’s deluded ideas about the superiority of real memories over fake ones. 
Jeanette resorts to documentary in order to understand mnemophrenia and the way she feels 
because she considers it objective and truthful. For her, the documentary is the only way to 
reestablish her relationship to reality and favour real over fake memories. Her journey is a mixture 
of reality and fiction, which interpenetrate and influence each other; but in the end she finds it very 
hard to reconcile them. The status of real memories is undermined when fake or artificial memories 
                                                
18 In contrast, Lebow has objections to the term fake documentary arguing that it reestablishes the status of 
documentary as authentic, . according According to her, “the term ‘fake doc’ too eagerly accepts and reconfirms 
the binary (fake vs. real) from the outset. Fake doc needlessly concedes that documentary itself is ‘real’ or at 
least authentic.” (Lebow, 2006: 224) Although I understand and agree with Lebow’s argument, however, I prefer 
to use the name fake documentary for a metaphorical purpose.
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of Douglas are becoming, for Jeanette, more real than reality and affecting her relationship to that 
reality and the people involved. Eve Oishi in her essay “Screen Memories: Fakeness in Asian 
American Media Practice” writes, “[i]f documentaries function as the visual record of a story or 
event, then fake documentaries serve as the memory, the flood of things not seen... Fake 
documentaries not only call into question the reliability of all images, but they borrow... this method 
of truth telling to tell another story.” (Oishi, 2006: 197) Paraphrasing Oishi’s ideas, I argue that 
documentaries function as the memory of an event and fake documentaries serve as the fake 
memory, the flood of things not “really” seen that tell another story, which might not be linked to 
actual events but which is still powerful. Juhasz argues that fake documentaries do manage a link to 
actual reality (Juhasz & Lerner, 2006: 2,); and in addition, Lebow proposes that fantasy is necessary 
to have a glimpse of the Real and that mockumentary could be even truer than documentary. 
(Lebow, 2006: 235-6) Thus, the use of fake documentary in this film reveals the importance of 
Jeanette’s fake memories;: it presents an insight into Jeanette’s actuality and at the same time the 
realization of her memories’ fictionality breaks down the meaning of everyday life offered by the 
symbolic and possibly leads to a glimpse of the Real as Lebow suggests. 
 
3.6 VR films as film-souvenirs!
 
After discussing how Jeanette’s present experience and memories are represented in the first 
part of my film, I now turn to Jeanette’s mnemophrenia and her fake memories, caused by the Memory 
Palaces19 VR films. “The body in virtual reality transcends the need for a surrogate character to 
experience the diegesis for him or her... Instead, an illusion of direct, immediate (and seemingly 
                                                
19 The name ‘Memory Palaces’ is a reference to an art of memory invented by the ancient Greeks, which 
became known to Rome and hence part of the European tradition, and depended on visual impressions of 
incredible density. “This art seeks to memorise through a technique of impressing ‘places’ and ‘images’ on 
memory. It has usually been classed as ‘mnemotechnincs’.” (Yates, 1966: xi) The art of memory was like an 
inner writing; those who have learned this art could set their thoughts in places and search for them 
whenever they were needed. In the course of time, in fifteenth and sixteenth century Europe people began to 
imagine memory as a space containing imaginary objects that represented thoughts and ideas organized into 
an imaginary architecture. These architectural loci were sometimes called “Memory Palaces.”
 
 65 
 
nonmediated) engagement is produced.” (Bukatman, 1993: 240) VR films are presented as a new kind 
of medium that attempts to represent the hyperreal world of the future as accurately and truthfully as 
possible, bringing the cinematic experience to the next level. Mary Ann Doane comments on the 
different visual media depicted in science fiction films, writing that: 
Since the guarantee of the real in the classical narrative cinema is generally the visible, the advanced visual 
devices... would seem, at least in part, to ensure the credibility of the ‘hyperreal’ of science fiction. And 
certainly insofar as it is necessary to imagine that the inhabitants of the future will need some means of 
representing to themselves their world (and other worlds), these visual devices serve the purpose... of a kind 
of documentary authentication. (Doane, 2004: 188) 
 
I have chosen VR technology as the main technological cause of mnemophrenia because it stretches 
the possibilities for artificial memory, deeply affecting how memory can be perceived and experienced 
and subsequently impacting on human identity. VR attempts to offer an immediate experience where 
internal functions cannot be distinguished from external events, as Bolter and Grusin propose in their 
book Remediation: it “has become a cultural metaphor for the ideal of perfect mediation.” (Bolter & 
Grusin, 2000: 161) Lev Manovich refers to Jaron Lanier, a VR developer, who comments on the link 
between memory and VR saying: “[y]ou can play back your memory through time and classify your 
memories in various ways. You’d be able to run back through the experiential places you’ve been in 
order to be able to find people, tools.” (Manovich) Thus, VR bears the potential of becoming the 
ultimate way to experience one’s memories: it offers the latent power to live through the memories of 
somebody else, confound the sense of self and identity and promote a different notion of artificial 
memory. VR is the technology that plays an integral role in Mnemophrenia, as well as many of the 
films that influenced it, and is widely examined in the thesis. As Christine Cornea writes,  
It is no surprise… that by the mid-1990s there was a flurry of American science fiction films concerned 
with the social implications of virtual reality/ internet technologies… the depiction of a futuristic form 
of virtual reality provided the perfect plot device with which to explore issues surrounding identity and 
postmodern culture. (Cornea, 2007: 188-9) 
 
In Mnemophrenia, Memofilm is presented as the biggest VR film production company, and it 
develops and promotes the cinema of the future. Memofilm’s Memory Palaces VR films are locked – 
only able to be viewed once – not only to increase company profit by encouraging consumers to buy 
new VR films, but also in order to replicate a true experience as authentically as possible. 
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These VR films perfectly illustrate J. P. Telotte’s views on films, which according to him serve 
the urge “to replicate by crafting images in our own likeness, images not bound by time or space or 
subject to normal human limitations, and images that provide us with a new measure of what we 
might be.” (Telotte, 1995: 190) Through VR films, Jeanette had the opportunity to experience an ideal 
love relationship when she was 18. “[S]ince desires cannot be satisfied by reality, they are satisfied 
through images that function like hallucinations. The result is post-real satisfaction.” (Weibel, 2002: 
210) Jeanette’s fake memories are validated as ‘real’ experiences by the mementos and souvenirs 
offered by Memofilm with every personalized VR film. As George says in his interview, “After the 
experience you have the option to receive memorabilia and souvenirs linked to the experience. You 
can get holiday shots, or if you go to a concert you can get a T-shirt or live recording of the concert.” 
These souvenirs intensified Jeanette’s belief in Douglas’ existence. In particular, the photographic 
souvenirs offer an indexical credibility similar to the photographs in Blade Runner; or to the home 
video in Dark City. In both cases the items are proven to be fake, adding to the illusion of the 
originality of a fictional past.  
In addition, apart from the souvenirs accompanying the Memory Palaces’ films, the VR films 
with Douglas are promoted almost as home movies by Memofilm; and Jeanette approaches them as 
such, as documents of her past. Vivian Sobchack has written in the article “Nonfictional film 
experience”, influenced by Belgian psychologist Jean-Pierre Meunier,  
in the experience of the film-souvenir, consciousness is engaged in a highly constitutive activity, the 
intentional objective of which is less the apprehension of the specific film image than the general recovery 
of the memory of a whole person or event. (Sobchack, 1999: 244) 
 
Sobchack proposes that the images of the film-souvenir or home movie are apprehended as the catalyst 
to a constitutive activity in an attempt to call up and reactivate the “real” and “whole” person or event 
that belongs elsewhere at some other time. “Watching our own home movies, our intentional objective 
is to rejoin... the real event or person or our real selves ‘elsewhere’ and in other times.” (Sobchack, 
1999: 248) Jeanette’s experience of the VR films is mixed: on one hand she treats the fictional VR 
films as film-souvenirs, ignoring their fictionality; yet at the same time she performs the activity of 
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retention in relation to images and scenes as we do in fiction films. Since the VR films themselves are 
fiction films they progress gradually, in contrast with the film-souvenir which is not constructed as a 
narrative but is a chronicle of temporal fragments. The effect of spending time with Douglas again is 
very intense: her intentional object is not the image itself but the whole ensemble that the person or 
event it represents evokes. Sobchack argues this rejoining is impossible with our current films: 
however with VR films Jeanette manages to relive these same events with that same person and at that 
same place, so she does not see specific images but experiences the whole event again. Thus, the VR 
films are for Jeanette as personal as film souvenirs, and at the same time have as clear a narrative as 
those of fiction films.  
The natural look of the on-location and outdoor scenes with Douglas evoke a credibility and 
realism that Jeanette’s surroundings lack, adding to the film-souvenir element. In the scenes with 
Douglas we never see Jeanette, since it is all shot from her perspective: we see only parts of her body, 
such as her hands and legs. One of the main reasons I chose this style was in order to depict Jeanette’s 
experience of the VR films, where the consumer watches everything from the camera’s perspective. 
There is only a moment when we see an image of Jeanette inside the VR film, when Douglas takes a 
picture of her with an “old” digital camera and shows her (and effectively the camera) the picture he 
took. This is an important moment that reaffirms Jeanette’s existence inside the VR film as the 
protagonist and plays with the idea of the instant captured by the photographic camera, commenting as 
well on the power of the digital to present something artificial as a real-life truth.  
 
3.7 VR films as screen memories!
 
  Susannah Radstone, a film theorist – and one of the interviewees in Jeanette’s documentary 
– remarks about the VR films that “there is the question… about whether we are embracing this 
new memory technology so enthusiastically because there’s something missing in our everyday 
lives. And that’s a question that we do need to ponder and think about.” As it becomes apparent 
through the group therapy sessions, there are deeper reasons why the group therapy members have 
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consumed the VR films. These films act almost like screen memories, disguising the real memories 
or actual events that have led all the group members to consume them in the first place. Screen 
memory is a term that was introduced by Sigmund Freud in his 1899 article of the same name. 
Freud described a screen memory as one that stands in for either a prior or a subsequent 
unconscious memory that is unacceptable to the ego. Any memory that presents itself to 
consciousness with great intensity could be a screen memory disguising the original memory, being 
essentially defensive in nature. Freud writes that “[t]here is in general no guarantee of the data 
produced by our memory.” (Freud, 1962: 315) He noted that in the synthesis of an earlier memory 
and a later event, the earlier memory might very well change. He thus acknowledged the difficulty 
in locating something like ‘authentic’ or genuine memory. (Freud, 1962: 318) In this paper Freud 
evoked one of his own memories of childhood, which was screening off a later sexual wish: “there 
was no childhood memory, but only a phantasy put back into childhood…” “[A]s though a 
memory-trace from childhood had here been translated back… at a later date.” (Freud, 1962: 315, 
321)  
In the same way, the VR experiences of the group members screened off prior real events. 
Tessa’s artificial memory of professional success disguises her lack of confidence. Richard uses the 
VR films as a means of sexual experimentation with other women, trying to ignore his 
dysfunctional relationship with his wife. Nina uses her long-term love relationship with James, a 
VR character, to screen off the memory of her husband abandoning her and their child. Jim finds a 
way to express repressed desires through the VR bank robberies in which he participates. Finally, 
Jeanette’s memories of Douglas screen off the traumatic experience of her dad’s adultery.  
Douglas not only represented the ideal lover – loving, caring, adventurous and passionate – 
but he also offered significant emotional support, helping Jeanette through a very difficult period of 
her life and with problems at home. Douglas was a person in whom Jeanette could confide all her 
thoughts and feelings about things that happened in her real life: something that led to a further 
confusion between reality and fiction. Telotte argues that dreams like the cinematic ones might be 
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necessary, “[t]hey may have a power to sustain us, to assert a reality of their own, and thus to liberate us 
from a repressive atmosphere.” (Telotte, 1995: 163) It is revealed in her documentary that Jeanette 
consumed the VR films at a very specific time of her life, when the relationship between her parents 
was falling apart. The ‘dream’ or screen memory of Douglas helped her to go through the difficult 
times of her youth, and although it was too intense to continue, it was too deep to forget. However, the 
advance of her mnemophrenia led to confusion and forgetting that the memory of Douglas was not 
real.  
 
3.8 Mnemophrenia and postmodern schizophrenia!
 
Jeanette and the members of the mnemophrenia therapy group represent the first generation of 
mnemophrenics. The disruption of continuity through time deeply affects Jeanette as an individual. 
The idea of removing Douglas from her past is devastating and makes her angry about not knowing 
how life would have been. I apply different theories on postmodern schizophrenia in order to examine 
the ways mnemophrenia affects Jeanette. Fredric Jameson discusses in Postmodernism (1991) the 
symptom of schizophrenia and the subsequent crisis of history in postmodern society. Jameson’s idea 
of schizophrenia is based on the work of psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, who considered schizophrenia 
to be a language disorder that prohibits the formation of a mature psyche. However, Jameson 
approaches schizophrenia from a sociocultural perspective and not a psychoanalytic one. Jameson 
equates the postmodern with a new depthlessness, a consequent weakening of historicity, both in our 
relationship to public History and in our private temporality. According to him the schizophrenic 
lacks a personal identity, is unable to differentiate between self and the world, and is incapableof 
experiencing continuity through time. He lives in a world of heightened intensity where clear sense of 
reality is lost. Jameson proposes that, 
[i]f we are unable to unify the past, present, and future of the sentence, then we are similarly unable to 
unify the past, present, and future of our own biographical experience or psychic life. With the breakdown 
of the signifying chain, therefore, the schizophrenic is reduced to an experience of pure material signifiers, 
or, in other words, a series of pure and unrelated presents in time. (Jameson, 1991: 27)  
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Jeanette similarly feels unable to think of her life as a chain of events, since some of the experiences 
that she believes fundamentally changed her way of being and thinking never actually happened. She 
cannot unify her past and present, since the fictitious nature of her past recollections makes her 
question all the life choices that led to her present – leaving her in a constant limbo and making it very 
difficult for her to imagine her future. This experience confuses her by reducing her experience to a 
series of pure and unrelated presents that are not necessarily linked to her actual reality. 
On the same note, film theorist Giuliana Bruno comments about the replicants in Blade 
Runner who have neither past nor memory: “[t]here is for them no conceivable future. They are 
denied a personal identity, since they cannot name their ‘I’ as an existence over time... This kind of 
relationship to the present is typical of schizophrenia... Their assurance of a future relies on the 
possibility of acquiring a past.” (Bruno, 1990: 189-190) Likewise in Dark City, aliens control 
people’s memories and their perception of reality; and humans live in a regulated fictional 
environment, incapable of distinguishing the artificiality of not only their lives but of the whole of 
society. All the characters of this city live in a ceaseless darkness that represents their own 
unawareness of their state of being. The residents of Dark City are all schizophrenics oblivious to 
their condition, unable to remember their childhoods or how to return to their favourite places or 
hometowns, not even realizing that the sun never rises in their city. As Sobchack comments, “[t]he 
city’s inhabitants (if, indeed, they still can be called such) are increasingly dislocated in space – and, 
dislocated, their very identities shift and become displaced and ungrounded... never seem to know 
where they are, where they are going, or how to get anywhere.” (Sobchack, 2004: 86) Their memories 
are erased, re-imprinted and swapped between different groups of humans. The city itself is a 
Baudrillardian simulacrum, representing something that does not belong to actuality and does not bear 
any memory traces. The rupture between signifier and signified leads to the creation of fictional 
realities, and subsequently to artificial memories. According to Jameson the schizophrenic 
experiences only moments of present that are disjunct from each other.  
[H]e or she does not have our experience of temporal continuity... but is condemned to live a perpetual 
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present with which the various moments of his or her past have little connection and for which there is no 
conceivable future on the horizon. In other words, schizophrenic experience is an experience of isolated, 
disconnected, discontinuous material signifiers which fail to link up into a coherent sequence. (Jameson, 
2002: 119) 
 
Murdoch, the protagonist of Dark City, cannot remember his name, his wife, or the fact that possibly, 
according to his latest “implanted” memories, he was a killer. “John Murdoch finds himself among 
forgetful deniers who believe they remember. Even when faced by their forgetfulness, they shrug off 
anxiety.” (Blackmore, 2004: 36) He experiences everything as if for the first time, trying to make 
sense of the dispersed clues he finds along the way. Jeanette, as well as Murdoch, cannot have a 
coherent experience: their pasts are mutable and they lack any clear coordinates from which to carve 
their future, which is consequently fluid.  
For Jeanette and the other mnemophrenics the VR film experience “becomes powerfully, 
overwhelmingly vivid and ‘material’: the world comes before the [mnemophrenic]20 with heightened 
intensity, bearing a mysterious and oppressive charge of affect, glowing with hallucinatory energy.” 
(Jameson, 2002: 120) As Jameson further comments, “what might for us seem a desirable experience 
– an increase in our perceptions, a libidinal or hallucinogenic intensification of our normally 
humdrum and familiar surroundings – is here felt as loss, as ‘unreality’” (Jameson, 2002: 120), which 
is exactly how it is experienced by Jeanette. As her documentary research develops, Jeanette gets even 
more lost. The schizophrenic tendencies become more apparent and clear after she decides to re-
watch and re-experience the VR films.  
Telotte argues that cinema is not only a place of human doubles but also a place where “we 
fashion images of what we would like to be and how we would like our world to look, as well as a point 
at which we start internalizing that cultural manufacture, attempting to live up to those images or to 
work our own best variations on or compromises with them.” (Telotte, 1995: 23) The VR films offer 
this kind of mirror vision, through which people can see how they have constructed human images 
                                                
20 I replace here the term ‘mnemophrenic’ for ‘schizophrenic’.
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within their minds,; but at the same time their real-life likeness pushes Telotte’s ideas to the limit 
when people are very much affected by those images and literally live up to them. “The postmodern 
image theory of simulation, as Baudrillard explains, is ‘the desert of the real,’ the agony and the 
repression of the real, precisely because of the fact that the images to which we make reference 
become reality.” (Weibel, 2002: 210) It is interesting that Esther Leslie (one of the film’s 
interviewees) predicts that people could fall in love with the composites, just as Jeanette and Nina 
have. At one point, Douglas tells Jeanette, “Don’t take life so seriously... It’s all a big illusion”, 
ironically commenting on the fictionality of his existence: yet she still cannot admit that this was all 
just that – an illusion. 
 
3.9 Schizophrenia and intrusion of technology !
 
  Jeanette finds out through her research that the VR films’ technology triggers specific parts of 
the brain, which makes the experience even more realistic. As Jim, one of the members of the 
mnemophrenic group, says, “Whatever Memofilm has done to me, maybe something fired in my 
cortex, rewired it in a way, so that the experience doesn’t leave me, like a dream.” Jeanette also 
discovers that Memofilm plans to develop the technology even further and to trigger not only the 
visual cortex but other parts of the brain as well, in order to stimulate different senses while watching 
a film – and thus achieve a multisensory experience. This technological intrusion reminds us, as 
Telotte argues, “of the difficulties and dangers we face as we set about forging not only a truly 
technological culture but also a thoroughly technologized humanity.” (Telotte, 1995: 109) As Mark 
Seltzer has discussed in his book Bodies and Machines, technology produces exhilaration, because it 
enhances human power; but also panic, because technology appears to have a life of its own, 
something that he has identified as the “double logic of prosthesis.” (Seltzer, 1992: 160)  
Baudrillard has commented about a form of schizophrenia that signals the end of interiority 
and intimacy due to the intrusion of technology. According to him the terror for the schizophrenic is 
“too great a proximity of everything, the unclean promiscuity of everything which touches, invests 
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and penetrates without resistance, with no halo of private protection, not even his own body, to 
protect him anymore.” (Baudrillard, 2002a: 132) The VR technology directly penetrates the brain of 
Jeanette and other mnemophrenics, intruding to their inner self and forging a new schizophrenic 
identity as described by Baudrillard. “ Bereft of psychic depth and flattened into two dimensions, any 
distinction between interior and exterior is abolished... Baudrillard’s schizophrenic is characterized 
by a terrifying overexposure to the hyperreal.” (Woods, 2004a) Technology’s invasion and the 
exteriorisation of the internal are visually depicted by the inclusion of scenes with Douglas in 
Jeanette’s documentary. By doing so, Jeanette effectively shares some of her fondest private 
memories with the public, hoping that this can help her document the truth, show their importance 
and thus expose the dangers of Memofilm products.  
In Jeanette’s time period mnemophrenia has a negative connotation, weakening any link to 
reality, just as it does in both Total Recall and Johnny Mnemonic where the schizophrenic identity is 
not presented as liberating but entails exclusively negative ramifications. Johnny’ cybernetic life results 
in the loss of his humanity and in Quaid’s case, even though the artificial memories and identity turn 
him into a hero, we are nevertheless reminded what dangers this malleability might bring if it is used 
for the wrong ends. Paul Verhoeven, the director of Total Recall, explains,  
Total Recall is more to do with whether we are living in a dream. Is the dream life? Is my life real or is the 
dream real?... So I think the power of the movie is not so much the personal emotion, but the confusion of 
the audience, not being able to separate, or to make a choice between two realities. So for me it was like, 
OK, this is, in retrospect, what I would call a postmodern film... Because it states that we cannot know 
things or it states that nothing is absolutely true. (Cornea, 2007: 138) 
 
Moreover, Claudia Springer argues that Johnny, without his personal memories,   
has lost access to a coherent identity, to a sense of self attained through the accumulation of remembered 
experiences. Johnny’s lost identity pushes to an extreme the ideas of historical amnesia, fractured 
subjectivity, and loss of control associated with postmodernism. Its premise is that human interactions 
with electronic technology have abolished conventional notions about individual identity. (Springer, 
1999: 206)  
 
Jeanette’s identity, and those of the other group therapy members, lacks any coherence, as a result of 
mixing reality and fiction by using the virtual reality technology, leading to their fractured 
subjectivity. All the group therapy members, including Jeanette, owe many of their favourite 
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experiences and memories to Memofilm and the VR technology: experiences that have boosted their 
self-esteem, expressed repressed feelings, or supported them psychologically and emotionally. 
“[V]irtuality is often sold as offering an extended form of freedom to the subject that ignores, or 
transcends the limits of human biology and the constraints of normal social subjectivity.” (Springer, 
1999: 232) However, they are wary of the consequences and have negative feelings towards the 
impact it has on their lives. “We are here at the controls of a micro-satellite, in orbit, living no longer 
as an actor or dramaturge but as a terminal of multiple networks.” (Baudrillard, 2002a: 128) 
Mnemophrenics live in Baudrillard’s imploded universe where “human power has itself become a 
simulation. Power now resides in a technology which holds humanity in its thrall. The media are 
invading; there will be no survivors... the media are no longer the extensions of man, man instead 
extends the media.” (Bukatman, 1990: 199-200) 
In Mnemophrenia technology becomes part of the self, as in Total Recall and Johnny 
Mnemonic where the procedure of memory erasure and implantation is painful and very physical. 
Mnemophrenia deals with the collapse and “extroversion of all interiority” that leaves people unsure 
of their “limits,” uncertain just what constitutes the self any more, adrift in a culture of 
schizophrenics. According to cyberpunk author Bruce Sterling, “technology is visceral... Not outside 
us, but next to us. Under our skin; often, inside our minds.” (Sterling, 1986: xi) In Johnny Mnemonic 
the encroachment of power by the new technologies is manifested by the fact that the majority of 
people in the film are victims of a neurological disease called Nerve Attenuation Syndrome (NAS). 
As Tim Blackmore writes “the more we weave machines into our nervous systems, introduce them 
under our skins, and work inside them; the more nervous we become... reenact not so much battles 
we have experienced as ones we fear we will face.” (Blackmore, 2004: 41-2) Spider, a doctor who 
tries to cure people with NAS, believes that the cause of this disease is information overload, 
electronics that poison the airwaves, indeed the technological civilization without which ironically 
they cannot survive. This disease is part of the schizophrenic lifestyle that according to Baudrillard is 
the result of the convergence of public and private space “when everything is exposed to the harsh 
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and inexorable light of information and communication.” (Baudrillard, 2002a: 130) The invasive 
technology existing in all different life strata, from dependence on technological devices to body 
implants, not only affects people’s external life conditions but has an impact on their health and well-
being. NAS deprives the afflicted from having a normal healthy life and eventually leads to their death.  
Mnemophrenia is not as severe as NAS but it affects people’s everyday lives in different ways 
as is shown in the group therapy sessions. Jeanette and other mnemophrenics whose lives are affected 
irreversibly by the VR films have a feeling of defenselessness. In order to finally save himself, Johnny 
needs to hack his own brain and artificial memory; Johnny’s inner self becomes part of the 
technological realm, putting in question his human nature. This is a successful example of the visual 
externalization of the internal as well as an illustration of the existence of Johnny in both the real and 
cybernetic spheres. Jeanette and the other members of her group are similar to Johnny in that they exist 
in both the real and VR spheres that interact and affect each other. Paul Virilio successfully describes 
the coexistence of these two worlds:  
As far as gender is concerned, there are now two men and two women, real and virtual… One day the 
virtual world might win over the real world… Imagine that all of a sudden I am convinced that I am 
Napoleon: I am no longer Virilio, but Napoleon. My reality is wounded. Virtual reality leads to a similar 
de-realization. However, it no longer works only at the scale of individuals, as in madness, but at the scale 
of the world. (Virilio, 1994) 
 
Thus, there are no boundaries to protect the self. In the media-suffused environment any distinction 
between “public space” and “private space” seems to be disappearing: everything becomes 
transparence and immediate visibility. (Baudrillard, 2002a: 132-3) Baudrillard, commenting on Philip 
K. Dick’s stories, writes that in them “one is from the start in total simulation, without origin, 
immanent, without a past, without a future, a diffusion of all coordinates... hyperreal-it is a universe of 
simulation.” (Baudrillard, 1994: 125) This applies also to Total Recall, which is based on Dick’s short 
story “We Can Remember It For You Wholesale”. In a similar way, the public space of VR films 
becomes part of the private life of the mnemophrenics, who live and interact in a world of simulation 
that makes them uncertain of who they are. 
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3.10 Fake memories and Jeanette’s future!
 
  Quaid wants to remember in order to be, as he states, himself again; Johnny wants to reclaim 
his erased childhood memories; and Murdoch has to fight against the artificial memories imposed on 
him by the aliens and rediscover his “real” past. Jeanette wants to get hold of her past and tries to 
understand what was really true in order to be herself again, but unlike the characters from past 
science-fiction films she is ready to indulge in the fictional past that she believed to be true until 
recently. There is no retrieval of lost memories as in Johnny Mnemonic, or a decision of which 
memories and identity she prefers as in Total Recall. She is who she is: she cannot turn back time and 
have alternative memories. Her personal turmoil ensues from the fact that she cannot let go and accept 
that Douglas never existed, because that would mean for her that she was living the last 14 years in a 
lie. However, she realizes towards the end that she has the capacity to build her future as she wants, in 
a way like Murdoch who re-constructs an identity as he wishes and projects it into the future; even 
though in Jeanette’s case her desired future accentuates her schizophrenic condition, and therefore her 
possible demise. 
In order to describe how Jeanette decides to build her future, I apply Laplanche’s concepts of 
“de-translation” and “re-translation” that link temporality and identification. The process of de-
translation is characterized by “the splitting up of signifying sequences” that causes an individual to 
question his or her current identity, which is then followed by a re-translation, a re-construction of 
one’s identity. (Laplanche, 1992: 171) In Dark City, this discontinuity lasts very briefly while the 
humans are not aware, so their imposed re-translation is imperceptible, instilling a schizophrenia that is 
never acknowledged. Murdoch, by waking up during the tuning, stays in a limbo – in a de-translation 
mode, a prolonged discontinuity. He is offered the rare opportunity to recompose a unity that is not 
imposed by the aliens. Jeanette, during the making of her film, also exists in a de-translation mode, a 
constant questioning of her identity. According to Laplanche, “[t]he individual has only too great a 
tendency to recompose a unity, to re-translate, to recast a synthetic vision of himself and his future.” 
(Laplanche, 1992: 171) It is this propensity to “recompose a unity” in conjunction with her resistance 
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to let go of her fictional past that pushes Jeanette to re-construct an identity as she wishes and project it 
into the future. She thus decides to continue her story with Douglas and fall deeper into a fictional 
world. According to Chris Hables Gray and Steven Mentor, “[c]yborg advances in entertainment 
offer the possibility of more ambiguous changes that neither enhance, nor restore, humans but just 
alter them, or perhaps even degrade them into addicts of direct neurostimulation or more virtual 
thrills.” (Hables Gray and Mentor, 2000) Jeanette shows signs of addiction and chooses Douglas by 
continuing the story with him and making him part of her future life.  
The unlocking of the VR films plays a significant part in her future loss of touch with reality: it 
is the unlocking of fond memories that leads to their continuous replay, offering a fictional sense of 
completeness. This kind of memory replay is also successfully depicted in Strange Days, where the 
protagonist Lenny Nero is addicted to recorded memories of his ex-girlfriend – with the difference that 
in Strange Days the replaying of the clips plays back also the feelings that were experienced at that 
moment. In her book Science Fiction Cinema: Between Fantasy and Reality, Christine Cornea 
suggests that Lenny 
is living in a perpetual present fed by his own recent past, which, in turn, becomes his present and 
conceivably his future; past, present and future conflating when he sees/feels the tapes. Like Fredric 
Jameson’s schizophrenic, postmodern subject he is “unable to focus on [his own] present, as though [he 
had] become... incapable of dealing with time and history.” (Cornea, 2007: 192) 
 
Lenny’s use of the Squid technology and the use of VR films by Jeanette allows them to escape their 
lived reality, although Jeanette more than Lenny is resistant to the transformative potential of virtual 
reality and instead lets it destroy her actual life by giving precedence to the virtual one. As a 
consequence, all her relationships with ‘real’ people deteriorate and in contrast her relationship with 
Douglas becomes stronger and more present than ever, which is visually depicted by his increased 
appearance in the film. The memories of Douglas have stopped belonging to the past, and they become 
a sum of isolated and disconnected presents through their repeated replaying, which it is implied in the 
film could impede Jeanette’s relationship with her daughter, Grace. During a group therapy session, 
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Tessa asks Jeanette whom she would choose between Douglas and her daughter, if she really had to: 
this is when Jeanette has an emotional meltdown that betrays her dilemma. 
  The film-souvenir, as Sobchack suggests, creates an affective charge effected by the sense of 
irrevocable loss of an “original experience.” (Sobchack, 1999: 248) In addition, Annette Kuhn argues 
that acts of remembering bring forth feelings and thoughts that are hard to rationalize, giving a sense 
that something has been irretrievably lost. Jeanette feels a double loss because, in her mind, Douglas 
was part of her past that is gone: she always missed him. On top of that, the realization that he never 
actually existed compounds this feeling of loss.  
Perhaps you yearn for the completeness, the security of days and places gone by, while you know you 
cannot retrieve them; know indeed that they might never ever have been, while yet disavowing that 
knowledge. And so memory is tinged with the bittersweet, death-defying sadness of nostalgia. Mourning 
is another kind of remembering, one that involves a repeated recalling to memory of the lost object in a 
reality process that, unlike nostalgia, will end with letting go. (Kuhn, 2000: 188) 
  
However, Jeanette cannot let go: although she goes briefly through the process of mourning, she 
retrieves and repeatedly recalls these loving memories by re-watching the VR films. Amidst this deep 
feeling of loss, Jeanette’s confusion increases when she re-experiences her encounters with Douglas 
and the more she watches them the more they become part of her present not only her past, damaging 
further the linear temporal chain and continuity. This re-experience makes her miss Douglas even more 
and increases her desire to see him again. The ending of the film, with Douglas saying, “Let’s never 
say goodbye,” leaves the story open-ended, implying Jeanette’s possible future preference of Douglas 
over her daughter and any other significant relationship. 
 
3.11 Conclusion!
 
In this chapter, I attempted to demonstrate how the use of fake documentary, as the result of 
science fiction and documentary fusion, visually comments on the relationship between reality and 
fiction, real and fake memories. The fake documentary format reveals the significance of the fake 
memories and their connection to unconscious desires and screened memories. I also analyzed how 
these fake memories and the resultant mnemophrenia contribute to the schizophrenic identity of 
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Jeanette. She is seen from the negative prism of Jameson and Baudrillard as a schizophrenic that 
cannot organize her life’s timeline in a meaningful way, and whose inner self is intruded upon 
irreversibly by technology. Although Jeanette cannot change her past or any memories connected to it, 
she takes control of her future by re-translating and recomposing an artificial unity: she decides to meet 
her VR lover again, without having reconciled her mnemophrenic existence. Jeanette’s story looks into 
the outbreak of mnemophrenia and the negative connotations that it originally had. This leads us to the 
next chapter, which examines the second part of the film, set in an era when mnemophrenia starts 
becoming more socially, culturally and personally acceptable; and is seen through the story of 
Jeanette’s grandson, Nicholas, who acquires a Haraway’esque cyborg identity. 
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[Technology] is always also “incorporated” and “lived” by the human beings who engage it within 
a structure of meanings and metaphors in which subject-object relations are cooperative, co-
constitutive, dynamic, and reversible... In this sense, a qualitatively new techno-logic can begin to 
alter our perceptual orientation in and toward the world, ourselves and others. And as it becomes 
culturally pervasive, it can come to profoundly inform and affect the socio-logic, psycho-logic, and 
even the bio-logic by which we daily live our lives. (Sobchack, 1994: 85) 
 
 
Chapter 4: Mnemophrenia – a variation of social behaviour 
 
 
 Nicholas, Jeanette’s grandson, represents the next stage of mnemophrenia; after its outbreak 
in Jeanette’s time it now becomes more acceptable and a common variation of social behaviour. In 
this chapter, I explore how Nicholas’s present and ‘actual’ experiences are represented in the 
second part of Mnemophrenia. This segment of the film employs the CCTV aesthetic in order to 
depict the constant recording of Nicholas and his interaction with ‘agentless’ cameras that leads to 
his telemorphosis and consequent double existence in actual and Total Cinema (TC) reality (I 
analyse Total Cinema technology further below). The surveillant images replace the documentary 
images of the first part of the film as an attempt to represent ‘reality’ during a period when 
photographic and cinematic images lack any claim to truth. These images constitute Nicholas’s 
Total Cinema chronicle as well as the source for Robyin’s artificial memories in the future, hence 
opening up to different interpretations and raising questions regarding their status as ‘real’. I then, 
examine how the constant surveillance atmosphere contributes to a ‘postdocumentary’ culture, 
where being recorded confirms one’s existence. I argue that the indisputable acceptance of this 
atmosphere bears the danger of the continuous intrusion into the personal sphere of people, letting 
companies such as Memofilm gain control over their employees. As part of this controlling 
environment, Memofilm welcomes Nicholas’s Total Cinema because it offers the potential to 
increase profits as well as the control over its customers.  
Although in this second part I suggest a continuation of the negative and dystopian 
technological elements that were presented at Jeanette’s time, I offer Nicholas’s hybrid identity, 
caused by his mnemophrenia, as a prospect of freedom and emancipation for future generations. 
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This transitional period eventually leads to the ‘creation’ of Robyin. Jeanette’s postmodern 
schizophrenia as analysed in the previous chapter based on Jameson and Baudrillard’s ideas, is 
followed by the cyborg character of Nicholas founded on Donna Haraway’s “Cyborg Manifesto.” 
Haraway suggests ways of resistance to the status quo and as Chela Sandoval comments about 
Haraway’s cyborg in relation to Jameson’s schizophrenic, “the metaphor ‘cyborg’ represents 
profound possibilities... implications of hope... for Jameson’s lost subject which ‘can no longer 
extend its protensions and retensions across the temporal manifold.’” (Sandoval, 200: 375) In 
contrast to Jeanette, Nicholas embraces his mnemophrenia from an early age and manages to 
manipulate it. He, like his grandmother is dedicated to his job and strives to discover human truths. 
His vision is that Total Cinema will one day bring out the true potential in everyone who uses it and 
will eventually lead to the development of greater empathy in each and every person and encourage 
a more understanding and inclusive society.  
 
4.1 Total Cinema 
In Mnemophrenia, VR films offer the spectator the opportunity to experience events to which 
s/he could not have physical access in reality - purely fictional events that exist only inside the film, 
which “need not be measured against an ideal referent that it can never equal but only approximate 
because it is its own referent... [These films] close the gap between index and referent, achieving a 
sublime realism that is the subject of postmodern fantasy.” (Rabinovitz, 2004: 120) Examples of this 
‘postmodern fantasy’ are the VR films of Jeanette that Nicholas had created and experienced in the past, 
making an unfeasible meeting between the two of them possible. These VR films simulated experiences 
between Nicholas and his grandmother who he never actually met in real life but always felt very close 
to. They offered him artificial, though nevertheless precious, memories.  
The technology that Nicholas develops on behalf of Memofilm in the second part of the film is 
called Total Cinema. My choice of the name for this advanced film format is deliberate, a reference to 
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André Bazin and his ideas on the reproduction of reality by cinema, “an integral realism, a recreation 
of the world in its own image.” (Bazin, 1967: 21) Total Cinema apart from adopting the realism of VR 
films, goes one step further and stimulates all the senses, offering a full body experience, and, like the 
immersive cinema of today such as Imax it invades the body rather leaving it behind while experiencing 
the film. “[T]he spectacles of movie simulation... address their spectators as diegetic movie characters, 
who become for the moment unified subjects because they synthesize living inside of movies with the 
locatedness of living inside of their own bodies.” (Rabinovitz, 2004: 121) The idea of the spectators 
becoming movie characters in their own film was part of VR Memory Palaces as explored in Jeanette’s 
documentary and is further advanced with Total Cinema. As Lauren Rabinovitz comments about any 
cutting edge cinema, Memofilm’s products promise to be “more than the movies.” (Rabinovitz, 2004: 
104) Paraphrasing her writing, Total Cinema is not a vision “of cinema’s future because of what [it] 
depict[s] but because of the ways [it] represent[s] an instantiation of the apparatus… the name of the 
apparatus… supercede[s] the name of any particular movie being shown.” (Rabinovitz, 2004: 104) 
With Total Cinema, Nicholas strives to extend VR films and foreground the body itself as a site 
for an all-sensory experience within a three-dimensionally contained space. Like Imax films, Nicholas’s 
Total Cinema “attempt[s] to dematerialize the subject’s body through its visual extension into the 
cinematic field while... emphasize[s] the spectator’s body itself as the center of an environment of action 
and excitement.” (Rabinovitz, 2004: 105-6) Charles Acland notes that in Imax “the filmic representation 
is less central than the effort to create the sensation that the screen has disappeared, that it is truly a 
window and that the spectator sits right in the image.” (Acland, 1997: 290) Total Cinema is even more 
immersive and vivid and offers real, life-like experiences that are more intense than the experience 
that several astronauts shared when attended a special screening of the Imax movie Destiny in 
Space (Ben Burtt, Phyllis Ferguson, James Neihouse and Gail Singer, 1994). This film, as they 
reported, was very close to their own real life experiences of space missions, “in many respects it 
was actually better... They could sort of sit back and experience the gestalt of the entire scene. They said 
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that the Imax experience was replacing their own real memories of what it had been like in space.” 
(Fisher & Rhea, 1994: 66) Total Cinema is a much more advanced version of the Imax and aspires to 
reach the realness of actual lived experiences and even supersede them like Videodrome in David 
Cronenberg’s film. Professor O’Blivion characteristically says in Videodrome (1983) “the television 
screen is the retina of the mind’s eye. Therefore the television screen is part of the physical structure of 
the brain. Therefore whatever appears on the television screen emerges as raw experience for those who 
watch it. Therefore television is reality and reality is less than television.” Likewise Total Cinema’s 
reality competes with actual reality and endeavours to complement or at times substitute it.  
 
4.2 CCTV aesthetic and temporal indexicality 
 During Nicholas’s period the near equation of reality with fiction due to the advanced VR 
films and the development of Total Cinema contribute to the change of perception in relation to the 
idea of surveillance; since being recorded is part of reality and an affirmation of people’s existence. 
Thus, actual experience and recorded experience become one, blurring even further the dividing 
line between reality and fiction. For the first segment of the film with Jeanette, I used documentary 
codes and conventions in order to offer a depiction of reality; I apply here the CCTV aesthetic to 
simulate a truthful representation of Nicholas’s experience. Nicholas approaches mnemophrenia 
and its subsequent effects from a scientific and pragmatic point of view. In order to successfully 
represent his clinical attitude, all his scenes are set in his laboratory, which he treats almost as his 
home. As the border between reality and fiction collapses, so does any separation between personal 
and public, home and work. The lab is equipped with several cameras that record everything 
throughout the day, every day. Their presence represents their natural integration in the physical 
reality and the symbiosis of technology and humans that in turn emphasizes the cyborgian identity 
of Nicholas that is discussed further below.  
All Nicholas’s scenes are seen through these cameras, depicting a CCTV environment of the 
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future. These cameras are not controlled or monitored by anyone and they could be considered 
‘agentless’; they are ‘smart’ cameras with a ‘brain’ of their own that can interact with Nicholas. The 
CCTV cameras demonstrate the lack of any apparent human mediation and their constant recording 
refers to an unobstructed capture of reality. As Jon Dovey suggests, CCTV footage can be seen to be 
‘real’ because, “[t]he CCTV image appears to simply calibrate visual perception; it is operated by a 
machine, and no human mediation is involved in its production of ‘pure’ evidence.” (Dovey, 2001: 
136) Nicholas in his lab always wears a specific head device that records his brain stimulation (the 
activity of the head device will be visually signalled by different superimposed graphics). This head 
device allows the lab cameras to respond to the brain signals they receive from Nicholas and change 
their framing and focus accordingly, for example zooming in on Nicholas when they detect high 
levels of brain stimulation. This aspect will allow his lab activity and experiments to be viewed in 
the future in a Total Cinema (TC) format since the recorded brain stimulation is the foundation for 
achieving an all sensory TC experience.  
The surveillant images offer an ostensible sense of realism although they depict a world that 
finds it hard to distinguish between reality and fiction. They represent the seemingly unhindered 
unfolding of reality, and as Thomas Y. Levin argues in his article “Rhetoric of the Temporal Index: 
Surveillant Narration and the Cinema of ‘Real Time’” that popular understanding perceives 
surveillance images as reliable images of something that has happened in reality since they are 
commonly used as a means of prevention or identification of actual criminal acts. They generally 
appear in contrast to the large amounts of fake or manipulated digital images. 
If the unproblematic referentiality of cinematic photograms is under siege, it makes great sense to start 
appropriating a type of imaging characterized by definition (at least according to a certain popular 
understanding) in terms of its seemingly unproblematic, reliable referentiality. Surveillance images are 
always images of something (even if that something is very boring) and thus the turn to surveillance in 
recent cinema can be understood as a form of semiotic compensation. (Levin, 2002: 585) 
 
Levin further comments that in many films of the 1990s such as Menace II Society (The Hughes 
Brothers, 1993), Sliver (Phillip Noyce, 1993), or Snake Eyes (Brian De Palma, 1998), surveillance 
functions as both mode of production and important narrative subject, creating “a spectatorial 
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position that is in large part identical to that of the surveillance operator.” (Levin, 2002: 590) Levin 
believes that this transition and incorporation of surveillance image as script element and filmic 
structure is a response to the decline of the guaranteed veracity and claim to truth of photographic 
representation. The surveillant image subsequently substitutes the photographic and thus claims a 
non-interventionist approach. Levin is influenced by Mary Ann Doane’s ideas on time as the semiotic 
signature of television compared to the importance of space (pro-filmic space, photographic space, 
narrative space) as the primary category of cinema (Doane, 1990). He claims that: 
[w]hat has happened here is that the spatial indexicality that governed the earlier photographic condition 
has here been replaced by a temporal indexicality, an image whose truth is supposedly guaranteed by the 
fact that it is happening in so-called real time and thus by virtue of its technical conditions of production is 
supposedly not susceptible to post-production manipulation. The fundamentally indexical rhetoric of 
cinema’s pre-digital photo-chemical past thus survives in the digital age, albeit now re-cast in the form of 
the temporal indexicality of the real-time surveillant image. (Levin, 2002: 592) 
 
As André Bazin has suggested about the truth of the long take, the CCTV images of Nicholas 
introduce a form of realism that is based on the time indexicality that Levin discusses. These 
surveillant images replace the documentary images of Jeanette and are closely linked to the specific 
time period that Nicholas lives in when reality and fiction merge and the photographic or spatial 
indexicality of the previous period is almost non-existent.  
 A film that approaches surveillance as a narrative and aesthetic element is the 1998 film The 
Truman Show (Peter Weir, 1998), where the main character is born and raised in a TV studio in order 
to become the main subject of a reality TV show without his knowledge. “[W]hat marks this type of 
surveillance is the foregrounded diegetic recasting of cinematic narration as a live and thoroughly 
televisual multi-camera production.” (Levin, 2002: 591) In The Truman Show the audience is 
aligned with the television spectators, “[t]he particular format of the film lends itself to an ambitious 
experiment: the entire film is shot almost completely free of classic point-of-view sequences (shot 
of character looking, eyeline match of what they are looking at, shot of character looking which 
registers emotional reaction).” (McMahan, 1999)  
In Mnemophrenia Nicholas, like Truman, is constantly being recorded while he is in the lab 
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although, in contrast with Truman, this happens with his consent. Nicholas is recorded with the aid 
of multi-cameras and the lack of traditional over-the-shoulder or reaction shots contributes to the 
intended depiction of unmediated reality. Alison McMahan argues in relation to The Truman Show 
“the subjective stance here is one of agentless perception: though the show is run by its creator, 
Christof, and watched by millions, it could also be said to be controlled by none. The gaze of those 
cameras has grown into an institution unto itself.” (McMahan, 1999) In a similar vein, the cameras 
in Nicholas’s lab are not controlled by anyone, and their sensitivity to Nicholas’s brainwaves gives 
them the ability to interact with their environment without, meaning that they can be controlled by 
Nicholas or any other human being that interacts with them through the head device. They, instead, 
become intelligent mechanical observers, and as in Jeanette’s case where the camera was always 
present and played an active role, these cameras are even more active and dynamic. I use surveillant 
images in order to depict the transition from Jeanette’s time, when the camera was controlled by 
George, to the cameras in Nicholas’s lab that, as McMahan comments, constitute an institution 
themselves. I intend to show the advancement of the technology that records lived experience, a 
technology that gets closer to its human subjects and in this case creates an intimate relationship 
with Nicholas through the connection with his brain. This technological innovation leads to a 
further change of perception around actuality and memories, since it brings recorded experience one 
step closer to reality, hence minimising the differences between reality and fiction.  
 
4.3 Total Cinema chronicle 
The constant telepresence in The Truman Show and Truman’s unintentional submission to 
an omnipresent surveillance create an infosphere, as detailed by Timothy Druckrey. The Truman 
Show could be seen as “the ‘Truman’ Test, a social Turing Test21 developed to problematize the 
                                                
21 The Turing Test was introduced by Alan Turing in his 1950 paper “Computing Machinery and 
Intelligence.” Turing’s main question was “Can machines think?” and he proposed a test of a machine’s 
ability to exhibit intelligent behaviour.  
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boundaries not just between the machine and person, but to test the increasingly technical 
derealization of the relationship between subjectivity and subjection.” (Druckrey, 2002: 153) The 
important difference between Truman and Nicholas is that Nicholas is well aware of and welcomes 
this surveillant atmosphere, without this eliminating his possible subjection, as analysed further 
below. This infosphere is integrally linked to the development of TC, a technology that can simulate 
actual life as truthfully as ever. The presence of the CCTV cameras and Nicholas’s 
acknowledgement of their existence visualize Paul Virilio’s ideas about “Vision Machines,” a 
system where machines watch us, and where we watch them as they watch us, ad infinitum, 
mimicking the endless gaze of two mirrors side-by-side reflecting each other’s reflection: an 
undecipherable world of mise-en-abyme. (Virilio, 2002) This reflection that Virilio talks about is 
accentuated by the connection between the cameras and Nicholas’s brain. Nicholas’s acceptance of 
this interaction demonstrates his mnemophrenia, since he is someone who cannot distinguish 
between real and artificial memories, experiencing and appreciating actual and fictional or recorded 
events with the same intensity. 
Nicholas as a mnemophrenic and inventor of Total Cinema supports the idea of recording 
his experiments that could become a potential TC experience for others. He embraces the VR 
technology that has ‘created’ him and the connection of the surveillance cameras with his brain is 
part of its further development that will revolutionize the film production and consumption. Hence 
Nicholas welcomes the constant recording of himself and becomes an active part of his 
experiments, since these recordings are part of the process. Not only do they have scientific and 
archival importance, but are also the first few TC examples that one can revisit in the future and 
have an all-sensory (re)experience of them. The recorded surveillance images function as a kind of 
TC chronicle that Nicholas can go back to, if necessary, either for information or quality check of 
the TC results. This TC chronicle can also be accessed by anyone who is authorised and interested 
in the progress of his experiments.  
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As Levin wrote about Thelma and Louise (Ridley Scott, 1991) and the surveillance tape that 
recorded Thelma’s robbery, “[t]he surveillant image is here functioning as a memory that is both 
personal (it is introduced as Thelma’s narrated flashback) and, qua tape, as public (since as a tape it 
can also be seen by others here the police and at different times and places)” therefore the 
surveillance images can work as enacted recounting and enacted flashback respectively. (Levin, 
2002: 587) According to Levin “[w]hen one sees what one takes to be a surveillance image, one 
does not usually ask if it is real (this is simply assumed) but instead attempts to establish whether 
the real that is being captured by the camera is being recorded or is simply a closed-circuit real time 
feed.” (2002: 585) Thus, it is not the reality of the surveillant image that might be questioned, but 
whether what we are watching is taking place in real time or is just a replay of something recorded 
in the past and thus invested with possibly different meanings. My aim is to use this questioning in 
conjunction with the audience’s realisation that Nicholas’s footage has been chosen and re-
assembled by Robyin, in order to emphasise the investment of different meanings to his recorded 
images and therefore encourage the questioning of their assumed ‘realness.’ 
 
 
4.4 Postdocumentary culture 
The role of the CCTV cameras in Mnemophrenia is twofold, on one hand they help Nicholas 
record his experiments and assist the development of his invention and on the other they represent 
the surveillant and controlling environment that Memofilm supports. Nicholas’s acceptance of his 
constant videorecording effectively leads to the reversal of Bentham’s panopticon-society where the 
subject almost needs the camera’s gaze as proof of his/her existence. The recorded images of 
Nicholas become as important and as real as the actual ones, as in Strange Days, where the recorded 
images of Lenny’s ex-girlfriend, Faith, substitute for reality. This re-visioning of surveillance 
exemplifies what Slavoj Zizek commented on in his article “Big Brother, or, the Triumph of the 
Gaze over the Eye”, 
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[w]hat we obtain here is the tragi-comic reversal of the Bentham-Orwellian notion of the Panopticon-
society in which we are (potentially) ‘observed always’ and have no place to hide from the omnipotent 
gaze of the Power: today, anxiety seems to arise from the prospect of NOT being exposed to the Other’s 
gaze all the time, so that the subject needs the camera’s gaze as a kind of ontological guarantee of 
his/her being. (2002: 225)  
 
Nicholas and his contemporaries are part of a “postdocumentary” culture in which, according to 
John Corner’s article “Performing the Real: Documentary Diversions,” there is a shift in the range 
of cognitive and affective investments in relation to “seeing others” and “seeing things” on the 
screen. This shift “involves changes in the nature of public and private life... and the complex ways 
in which both the contours of social knowledge and emotional experience have been reconfigured.” 
(Corner, 2002: 265) Seeing others on the screen or in VR is equated with actually seeing them in 
person, and thus being recorded means to exist; a two-way progression from image to reality and 
vice versa. Corner believes that in audio-visual culture the aesthetics of performance will play an 
increasingly important role even in images of the real. (Corner, 2002: 267)  
The idea of performance is also discussed by Zizek with regard to the subjects of Big 
Brother and as he says,  
[they] act their roles in an artificially secluded space, they act them “for real,” so that, literally, fiction 
becomes indistinguishable from reality... The distinction between real life and acted life is thus 
“deconstructed”: in a way, the two coincide, since people act their “real life” itself, i.e., they literally 
play themselves in their screen-roles. (Zizek, 2002: 226)  
 
Zizek then takes this idea even further and poses the question “what if Big Brother was already 
here... In other words, what if, in our ‘real lives,’ we already play a certain role - we are not what 
we are, we play ourselves? The welcome achievement of ‘Big Brother’ is to remind us of this 
uncanny fact.” (Zizek, 2002: 226) Nicholas lives in a future period when the idea of recording 
experiences and the re-experience of real or fictional events has become an extension of real life, if 
not part of real life itself. These circumstances contribute to the aforementioned tendency of playing 
a role to be internalized to such extent that it becomes the norm, leading to the stage where Nicholas 
and his colleagues take for granted their recording, without challenging it, simply, continuously 
‘playing’ themselves. Hence Nicholas assumes a simultaneous double existence; an actual one and a 
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video recorded one in Total Cinema. Baudrillard comments that Truman in The Truman Show is 
telemorphosed suggesting that reality itself transfuses into the screen, for Nicholas as well 
“[n]othing any longer separates the screen and the world. The osmosis, the telemorphosis is 
absolute... the screen is no longer that of the [VR], it is that of reality itself - one could call this 
complete reality.” (Baudrillard, 2002b: 484-5)  
 However, apart from the telemorphosis that Nicholas embraces, the existence of the CCTV 
cameras and their constant surveillance bears an additional meaning. As McMahan comments in 
reference to The Truman Show “[h]ere the technology that terrifies is that of telepresence, those 
twenty-four hour cameras that film a beach scene or a young woman’s bedroom and broadcast it 
live on the Internet.” (McMahan, 1999) Nicholas is effectively the descendant of peep culture, a 
cultural movement made possible by technological change and is defined by Hal Niedzviecki in his 
2009 book The Peep Diaries: “[p]eep culture is reality TV, YouTube, Twitter, Flickr, MySpace and 
Facebook. It’s blogs, chat rooms, amateur porn sites, virally spread digital movies… cell phone 
photos—posted online... and citizen surveillance.” (Niedzviecki, 2009: 1-2) Apart from the use of 
the CCTV images as a scientific tool, this surveillance culture that Nicholas and his colleagues have 
accepted produces a “readiness to give up one of the fundamental principles of civilization—that of 
the legally protected private sphere and personal intimacy.” (Frohne, 2002: 260) Brett Mills argues 
in “Peep Show”, “the surveillance society functions to control without an explicit display of 
authoritative power.” (Mills, 2008: 59) The smart cameras and constant surveillance that Memofilm 
endorses is a way of ensuring control, and depict the informatics of domination that Haraway 
analyses in her “Cyborg Manifesto.” According to Haraway, the informatics of domination is the 
merger of communication technologies and modern biotechnologies toward a single purpose: “the 
translation of the world into a problem of coding, a search for a common language in which all 
resistance to instrumental control disappears and all heterogeneity can be submitted to disassembly, 
reassembly, investment, and exchange.” (Haraway, 1991: 164)  
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4.5 Mnemophrenia as a means of control 
Memofilm is a company that merges communication technologies and biotechnologies, by 
creating VR films that stimulate different parts of the brain in order to achieve an all-sensory 
experience. As part of the controlling environment that Memofilm supports, and as a big 
corporation that merely wants to increase its profits, it welcomes the potential permanent effect that 
TC will have on the brain’s hippocampus, transforming everyone into a mnemophrenic. By doing 
that, the number of potential customers is projected to increase radically and Memofilm, as the 
major player in this business, will have instrumental control over the TC films they consume. 
Memofilm wants to use Nicholas’s TC technology for its own benefit. TC promises to make 
possible communication across different people and mnemophrenics by the sharing of similar 
underlying protocols and codes. Once everything becomes codeable, all life will share a structural 
similarity that can be controlled by Memofilm. Thus, heterogeneity can be reassembled, as Haraway 
writes, and the one code that Memofilm wants to promote through TC will translate all meaning 
perfectly and reinforce the hierarchical dualisms that I refer to below, and which Nicholas strives to 
subvert in the first place.  
The plurality that Memofilm promises is illusory. Scott Bukatman argues in a similar vein, 
that  
[t]he plurality of channel selections serves as a kind of guarantee of the freedom of the subject to 
choose, to position one’s self within the culture, while the constant flow of images, sounds and 
narratives seemingly demonstrates a cultural abundance and promise. Yet the choice is illusory: to view 
is to surrender. (Bukatman, 1990: 197) 
 
Memofilm, as the TC image-maker, will be the ultimate decision maker of what films the customers can 
consume whilst offering the deception of free will. The impact that VR films and the even more 
powerful TC has on the human brain and subsequently memories and identity reminds us of 
Videodrome and Spectacular Optical, a company that specializes in defence contracts. Spectacular 
Optical has developed a signal that induces a tumour in the viewer, leading to hallucinations which are 
then televised, blurring any dividing line between reality and fiction. “This tumour causes hallucinations 
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which can be recorded, then revised, then fed back to the viewer: in effect, the individual is 
reprogrammed to serve the controller’s ends.” (Bukatman, 1990: 204) Like Spectacular Optical, 
Memofilm welcomes the permanent impact on the brain’s hippocampus in order to increase the control 
over its consumers. Similarly in Robocop (1987) people are manipulated by a cold, corporate capitalism 
and are treated almost like automatons and economic counters. Murphy/Robocop is the product of this 
ruthless capitalist system and, after the pre-planned death of Murphy, Robocop is bound by his 
programming. “Like the replicants of Blade Runner, Robocop seems unable to ‘realize’ the body, to 
operate free of his programming—or corporate planning. He is, after all, the unwitting subject of a 
corporate experiment, the real aim of which is his death.” (Telotte, 1995: 154) 
Nicholas is also the product of greedy corporations, since he is a mnemophrenic due to the VR 
films made by Memofilm that his grandmother, Jeanette, had consumed when she was young. He is 
being used to develop a technology that would potentially turn everyone into a mnemophrenic and 
eventually a consumer that can in theory be more easily manipulated. In a similar way to Robocop, who 
is guided by four prime directives which do not allow him to go against or arrest any of the OCP senior 
officers, Nicholas is bound by the various confidentiality agreements that he has signed with Memofilm 
that prevent him from exposing any wrongdoings on the part of the company. As President Dick Jones 
in Robocop, “who, in keeping with this film’s schizophrenic pattern, is behind both OCP’s robotic law 
enforcement program and much of the crime in Detroit, puts it, ‘We can’t very well have our products 
turn against us, can we?’ Freedom of action is simply not permitted.” (Telotte, 1995: 156) It becomes 
evident then that the dystopian elements of technological intrusion presented in Jeanette’s period 
are still present in this second era. However, there is a big difference between the first and second 
eras since I use Nicholas as a metaphor for a transitional period, when dystopian aspects are being 
transformed into elements that could possibly lead to a positive and emancipatory change in the 
future. In order to show this transition I present Nicholas’s mnemophrenia as something that has 
negative as well as positive connotations, since the condition can repress while at the same time 
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enabling him. On one hand, mnemophrenia and the blurring between reality and fiction foster a 
controlling, surveillant environment but on the other hand, if approached differently, mnemoprehnia 
bears the potential for empathy and an awakening that can lead to resistance against any official control. 
I will now examine Nicholas’s relationship to his mnemophrenia and the shift that is explored in this 
second film segment that signals the transition from a dystopian past and present to a more positive and 
optimistic future. 
 
4.6 Nicholas: a mnemophrenic cyborg 
 Nicholas’s mnemophrenic character shares similar traits with the cyborg as defined by Haraway 
in her seminal “A Cyborg Manifesto.” (1991) He is “a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of 
social reality as well as a creature of fiction.” (Haraway, 1991: 149) “High-tech culture challenges these 
dualisms in intriguing ways. It is not clear who makes and who is made in the relation between human 
and machine.” (Haraway, 1991: 177) The idea of machine is extended here to the soft technology of VR 
that has a direct effect on the human brain and creates mnemophrenia that equates to both reality and 
fiction at once. Nicholas as part of his cyborgization has developed a terminal identity, which according 
to Bukatman is “an unmistakably doubled articulation in which we find both the end of the subject and a 
new subjectivity constructed at the computer station or television screen.” (Bukatman, 1990: 201) In 
Nicholas’s case the new subjectivity is constructed by the VR films and as Bukatman comments “[w]hat 
is at stake... is no longer the fusion of beings and the immortality of the soul, but the fusion of being and 
electronic technology in a new… subjectivity.” (Bukatman, 1993: 244) Haraway also writes “[t]he 
machine is not an it to be animated, worshipped, and dominated. The machine is us, our processes, an 
aspect of our embodiment. We can be responsible for machines; they do not dominate or threaten us. 
We are responsible for boundaries; we are they.” (Haraway, 1991: 180) Likewise, Nicholas welcomes 
his integration with the technology and thus is not wary of Total Cinema or the presence of the CCTV 
cameras that contribute to his project.  
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 The cyborg according to Haraway is a collective entity whose multifaceted parts work 
successfully together and is no longer structured by the polarity of private and public. Nicholas is a 
collective entity since many of his memories are not linked to his actual experiences, thus neutralizing 
any difference between private and public and, like the cyborg, he does not accept the existence of one 
Truth or absolute knowledge. In “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the 
Privilege of Partial Perspective,” Haraway insists that partial perspectives must be used to build situated 
knowledge, which is reflective of her construction of the hybrid-cyborg. “The knowing self is partial in 
all its guises, never finished, whole, simply there and original; it is always constructed and stitched 
together imperfectly, and therefore able to join with another, to see together without claiming to be 
another.” (Haraway, 1988: 586) Nicholas has the ability, by controlling his mnemophrenia, to join 
together, as Haraway’s cyborg does, different bits of knowledge that he acquires through actual and VR 
experiences; these change him as a person and enhances his empathy to other people.  
However, Nicholas’s fluidity and mnemophrenia has not always been seen in a positive light. It 
is made clear from his dialogues with his colleague Bill that Nicholas faced quite a lot of negative 
prejudice as he was growing up and even his parents who were non-mnemophrenics never completely 
understood him. John Morton, a neuroscientist, had predicted in his interview in Jeanette’s documentary 
that mnemophrenia could lead to a fragmentation of society. Morton commented, “[i]n the future I can 
see a fragmentation of society along certain lines, there are going to be those people who for reasons 
of their… personality traits…[and] predispositions [are] either susceptible to mnemophrenia or 
welcome it, seek it out. They are going to become increasingly different from the ordinary 
population, they may start forming societies themselves.” As Morton predicted, the essential Truths 
that were accepted by the majority of non-mnemophrenic people were oppressive for Nicholas and 
many other mnemophrenics, forcing them to find/ create their own codes of behaviour.  
So, the cyborg is a perfect metaphor for Nicholas whose identity cannot be bound by singular 
definitions grounded in claims to unmediated and self-evident truths. Nicholas truly believes that 
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mnemophrenia offers the ability to understand different perspectives, intensifying all experiences. As a 
cyborg, Nicholas is “not afraid of permanently partial identities and contradictory standpoints. The 
political struggle is to see from both perspectives at once because each reveals both dominations 
and possibilities unimaginable from the other vantage point.” (Haraway, 1991: 154) Although he 
might appear naive at first glance, Nicholas comprehends and manages to accept opposite views, on one 
hand, he understands Memofilm’s capitalist, corporate perspective and on the other he adheres to the 
ideas of open sourcing and individual empowerment which he believes can bring people closer; thus he 
is not as pessimistic about the technology’s potentials as his grandmother Jeanette.  
 
4.7 Regeneration of self through artificial memories  
In Mnemophrenia, although Nicholas, due to his fluid identity, knows and understands the 
corporate attitude of Memofilm, he believes that he can still work around it and contribute to the 
empowerment of individuals. He nonetheless does not seem to realise the extent of his conditioning, he 
is reinforced by the ostensible acceptance of his cyborgian identity from Memofilm, making him always 
feel accepted and comfortable in his own skin, whilst at the same time, restraint is imposed on him by 
the bureaucracy that secures Memofilm’s benefits. His mnemophrenia, apart from promoting his 
collective and partial identity that is open to different views, has also led him to unquestioningly accept 
his subjugation by Memofilm and the surveillant environment that it promotes. This attitude has been 
taken advantage of by Memofilm in order to control him and treat him as a means to their ends. As Bob 
Morton asserts about his creation, Robocop, he “doesn’t have a name; he’s got a program. He’s 
product.”  
The VR films with Jeanette that Nicholas had created in the past offer a good example of the 
ambiguous consequences that artificial memories can have22. On one hand, these artificial memories 
                                                
22 The fictional VR film with Jeanette is shown here in ambiguous light. It was something positive when 
Nicholas was young but started becoming negative when it affected what he remembered about her. 
However, that does not suggest that all VR films eventually have negative effects. 
    96 
had helped him to deal with the condition by creating an artificial ally and to get through the difficult 
moments of exclusion caused by his mnemophrenia but, on the other hand they offered him a 
‘constructed’ image of Jeanette that did not reflect the real Jeanette. Haraway argues that the “cyborg is 
a condensed image of both imagination and material reality, the two joined centres structuring any 
possibility of historical transformation.” (Haraway, 1991: 150) However, the imagination part of the 
cyborg identity could potentially have detrimental consequences, since it could lead to the unintentional 
confusion of the person, and even to his/her manipulation, as in the case of Nicholas and his controlling 
by Memofilm. The VR films with Jeanette were Nicholas’s ticket in to this big corporation and his false 
impression of Jeanette benefited Memofilm, since he always thought of her as a person that had come to 
terms with her mnemophrenia and who simply chose to live her life with Douglas through the VR films 
made by Memofilm, enjoying her unconventional life thereafter. However, Jeanette was never actually 
happy with her condition and instead it drove her to reclusion. Nicholas’s self-mislead offers an 
example that shows that Haraway’s cyborg, hybrid identity does not always lead to freedom and should 
not uncritically be thought of as utopian. Thus it becomes clear that the regeneration welcomed by the 
cyborg can have either negative or positive impacts and one needs to be watchful and critical, always 
questioning his/her living situation. 
In Nicholas’s case, a certain chain of events helps him realize his conditioning and restraint and 
leads him to question Memofilm’s agenda, encouraging his resistance. These events are triggered by the 
discovery of the results about the permanent effect of TC on the brain and the irreversible effect it will 
have on each consumer and Michael’s (his boss) refusal to make this information public. Michael’s 
attitude then leads to Bill’s resignation, which coincides with the company’s final decline of Nicholas’s 
requests to open source part of the TC code after its launch. Nicholas,  in all this confusion and struggle, 
resorts to the only source that he believes can help him make a decision, Jeanette. However, this time he 
does not choose to re-experience the VR films that he has himself created but goes to the last ‘real’ 
source that Jeanette had left behind, her documentary on mnemophrenia. By revisiting her film and 
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incorporating her memories as his own Nicholas realises that the idea he had of her was not accurate. 
The documentary reminded him that his version of Jeanette was what he wanted to remember and the 
‘reality’ he himself constructed in order to deal with the difficulties of adapting and accepting his own 
mnemophrenia. Douglas develops an ‘heteropathic memory’ that according to Kaja Silverman, as 
examined in the first chapter, permits the subject to participate in the desires and struggles of the ‘other’, 
supporting an identification process that does not absorb the other but what the person, instead, gets out 
of his/her own cultural norms. (Silverman, 1996) Hence, Nicholas manages to re-remember and 
experience Jeanette’s traumatic agony while she was making the documentary as his own, implanting 
and incorporating it into his own history and in this way feeling more strongly connected with her than 
ever before.  
After a search into Memofilm’s archives about the first launch of VR Memory Palaces, part of 
which were the VR films that Jeanette consumed, Nicholas discovers that Memofilm knew all along 
about the potential dangers of the technology on the human brain but nevertheless decided to keep it 
secret and never publicized these findings. This discovery in conjunction with the artificial memories he 
acquired through Jeanette’s documentary make Nicholas think that Memofilm needs to take 
responsibility this time and feel that he cannot be part of this project under the current conditions. When 
Nicholas tells Michael about the way he feels, Michael assumes that Nicholas is only looking for a 
promotion in the same way his colleague Bill had and treats him as a person who cannot have a mind of 
his own, being under the constant control of Memofilm and always ready to submit for some extra 
money. In contrast, after Nicholas finds out that Bill’s resignation was only a kind of power play in 
order to achieve a promotion, his awakening is completed and while he rediscovers Jeanette through her 
documentary, he at the same time reconstructs and regenerates himself and rediscovers his interest in a 
non-unified self. Jeanette’s memories and real life experiences affect how Nicholas feels about 
Memofilm, making him reassess his relationship to the corporation and what he can actually achieve by 
working with them.  
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4.8 Cyborg writing for an all-inclusive society 
Nicholas as a true cyborg rejects the anti-science metaphysics and the demonising of technology 
and instead embraces the task of reconstructing the boundaries of daily life through science, developing 
a technology that gives him the opportunity to be in partial connection with others and as well in 
communication with all the different parts that constitute himself. “Cyborg imagery can suggest a way 
out of the maze of dualisms in which we have explained our bodies and our tools to ourselves. This is a 
dream not of a common language, but of a powerful infidel heteroglossia.” (Haraway, 1991: 181) 
Nicholas is interested in this fusion of different voices, events, experiences. “To be One is to be 
autonomous, to be powerful, to be God; but to be One is to be an illusion... Yet to be other is to be 
multiple, without clear boundary, frayed, insubstantial.” (Haraway, 1991: 177) Nicholas can understand 
different viewpoints and embraces the other without ever becoming the other, but always is regenerated 
and reconstituted through his interaction and incorporation of different voices. Thus, he understands that 
TC can allow the pasts or the realities of other people, such as Jeanette’s past has affected him, to 
destabilize the lives of TC users, who will then follow an empathetic and affective approach to 
‘difference’.  
As a cyborg that has been repressed in the past due to his mnemophrenia, Nicholas uses his 
knowledge and scientific expertise in order to produce cyborg writing, which is “about the power to 
survive, not on the basis of original innocence, but on the basis of seizing the tools to mark the world 
that marked [him] as other.” (Haraway, 1991: 175) Thus, Nicholas’s main tool is to retell origin stories 
that subvert hierarchical dualisms of naturalized identities, of stories that differentiated mnemophrenics 
from non-mnemophrenics and his main task is that of “recoding communication and intelligence to 
subvert command and control.” (Haraway, 1991: 175) According to Judith Butler, the power 
simultaneously acts on and activates the subject by naming it and although the terms by which we are 
hailed are rarely the ones we choose they might lead to some kind of an agency. She argues that the “’I’ 
who would oppose its construction is always in some sense drawing from that construction to articulate 
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its opposition; further, the ‘I’ draws what is called its ‘agency’ in part through being implicated in the 
very relations of power that it seeks to oppose.” (Butler, 1993: 122) I argue that Nicholas self-
interpellates himself paraphrasing Althusser’s idea about the process by which ideology addresses 
and confers subject positions. Thus, Nicholas chooses for himself the ideology that is attached to him 
and distances himself from Memofilm after revisiting Jeanette’s documentary, experiencing the 
‘betrayal’ by Bill and realising the extent of Memofilm’s opportunistic and profit-based decision 
making. “[C]yborgs offer a new map, a new way to conceive of power and identity, one potentially 
more effective in understanding, confronting, and reshaping the actual networks of power in late 
capitalism and its mutations... The cyborg metaphor offers a unique validation of different identities.” 
(Hables Gray & Mentor, 2000) Nicholas as a cyborg chooses an ideology that adheres to the creation of 
a society where almost everyone is a mnemophrenic, but the reasons behind this are different from 
Memofilm’s. He hopes for everyone to become mnemophrenic so prejudice can be minimized but does 
not want to promote one code, in contrast he longs for a heteroglossia, which ensures that all differences 
are respected and welcomed.  
Telotte argues that Robocop holds out the potential for the human that “even when transformed 
into a subject body, to ‘take control’ of itself and act independently of the subjecting forces of culture.” 
(Telotte, 1995: 156) Nicholas similarly realises that he can act independently and decides that he does 
not want to be part of Memofilm and its ideology anymore. He comes to grasp that what he considered 
as a desirable situation till now, is really a threat, a possible nightmare that he does not want to live in. 
As Haraway comments in an interview about her ‘Manifesto’ 
inhabiting the nightmare is not to give in to it as if that is all there is, but as a way of getting that that’s not 
what has to be... it’s about trying to live on these edges – not giving in to nightmares of apocalypse, staying 
with the urgencies and getting that everyday life is always much more than its deformations – getting that 
even while experience is commodified and turned against us and given back to us as our enemy, it’s never 
just that. A whole lot is going on that is never named by any systems theory, including the informatics of 
domination. (Gane, 2006: 150-1) 
 
Nicholas always lived on the edges (of society) because of his mnemophrenia, and as Haraway argues 
cyborgs are the illegitimate offspring of patriarchal capitalism, and Nicholas himself is the offspring of 
    100 
Memofilm’s technology gone wrong. He is the result of a greedy corporation that is mostly interested in 
increasing its profits. “But illegitimate offspring are often exceedingly unfaithful to their origins. Their 
fathers, after all, are inessential.” (Haraway, 1991: 151) Hence, Nicholas decides to leave the place that 
has illegitimately ‘created’ him. His character, as the offspring of capitalism, exemplifies what Jameson 
has written about capitalism as “at one and the same time the best thing that has ever happened to the 
human race, and the worst.” (Jameson, 1991: 47) 
Memofilm depicts the ruthlessness and negative side of capitalism but the development of VR 
films and the new technology of Total Cinema inadvertently ‘creates’ people like Nicholas that offer a 
hope for a potentially better future. Haraway argues, 
I suppose there is a kind of fantastic hope that runs through a manifesto. There’s some kind of without 
warrant insistence that the fantasy of an elsewhere is not escapism but it’s a powerful tool... It’s about here 
and now if we could only learn that we are more powerful than we think we are... You don’t have any 
ground for that, it’s a kind of act of faith. (Gane, 2006: 152)  
 
According to Sue Short in Cyborg Cinema “the ideas raised by cyborg narratives may... help to shape 
awareness and understanding, on both a personal and political basis, of both the world and our place in 
it. It is in this questioning ability that the cyborg’s most progressive potential lies, posing fundamental 
questions about identity and existence.” (Short, 2005: 52) Nicholas understands that he can use his 
position on the edges,  to challenge the structures of the informatics of domination and his last actions 
can be seen as acts of faith.  
… the cinematic cyborg powerfully addresses neglected issues of exploitation and alienation, usefully 
symbolising Marx’s concept of the alienated worker through being programmed and rebuilt in the interests 
of Capitalism. While such narratives do not suggest an alternative economic system, they make the 
important point that technology can be used to both repress and enable the cyborg worker, with such figures 
invariably relying upon a modified humanism to exist within a techno-logised world, which is shown to 
equip them with the means for resistance and survival. (Short, 2005: 48) 
 
Haraway argues that cyborg politics insist on noise and advocate pollution, subverting the given 
structure and modes of reproduction of ‘Western’ identity. She argues that “[t]he networks aren’t all-
powerful, they’re interrupted in a million ways. You can get flicker feelings: one minute they look like 
they control the entire planet, the next minute they look like a house of cards. It’s because they are 
both.” (Gane, 2006: 151) Nicholas acknowledges the fact that he cannot fight Memofilm as a whole 
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especially since he is bound by the numerous confidentiality agreements he has signed with them, 
however, he adheres to the cyborg politics and plays out his resistance through the technology and 
noise, or the breakdown of communication. Before he leaves Memofilm, he indirectly prompts the 
researcher interviewing him about Total Cinema to look deeper into the potential dangers of TC. He 
also leaks a small part of the source code of TC, knowing that one day this small part will help others, 
such as Robyin, to figure out the code and reformulate it, leading to its potential opensourcing that he 
always dreamed of and thus, subverting Memofilm’s monopoly. The breakdown or noise that Haraway 
talks about is used as a metaphor for Nicholas’s actions that disrupt the smooth domination of the one 
code as planned by Memofilm. “Noise is only one figure, one trope that I’m interested in. Tropes are 
about stutterings, trippings. They are about breakdowns and that’s why they are creative. That is why 
you get somewhere you weren’t before, because something didn’t work.” (Gane, 2006: 152) Nicholas 
knows that after his departure he will leave the forces of the informatics of domination largely intact, but 
hopes that the small hole in the system he himself created will help future generations. He does not 
represent a radical positive change but offers the hope for such change. 
 
 
4.9 Conclusion 
 To summarise, the idea of the cyborg follows Jeanette as a schizophrenic and is used as a 
metaphor to convey the complexities of Nicholas’s existence and character. “When the ‘privileged 
pathology’ of postmodernity is communications breakdown, how can we differentiate cyborg 
heteroglossia from the schizophrenic’s ‘rubble of distinct and unrelated signifiers?’” (Woods, 2004a) At 
a first glance, the schizophrenic and the cyborg appear opposed, representing binary positions: 
“fragmentation and synthesis; isolation and collectivity; disembodied (non)subject and cybernetic 
organism; political dysfunctionality and oppositional agency.” (Woods, 2004a) However, as Angela 
Woods discusses in “Schizophrenics, Cyborgs and the Pitfalls of Posthumanism,” “the intimacy of their 
relationship complicates such neat binary coding. As schizophrenia can be seen as a distinctively 
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cyborgian fear of communication breakdown and subjective fragmentation, and the cyborg a 
schizophrenic delusion of unity, no simple delineation between them is possible.” (Woods, 2004b) 
There is a strong connection between the schizophrenic Jeanette and cyborg Nicholas, apart from their 
blood relationship, they are connected by the lack of any clear boundaries in their life, boundaries 
between reality and fiction. The schizophrenic and cyborg are used as symbols or metaphors that 
represent the response to this new way of living due to mnemophrenia, approaching it from different 
perspectives while at the same time their paths are crossed, essentially being different points on the 
same continuum. “The ‘privileged pathology’ of Haraway’s cyborg is communications breakdown, 
isolation in a schizophrenic chaos of disassociated signifiers, but the integrity and agency of the cyborg 
body could equally be a delusion of Jameson’s depthless and disoriented schizophrenic.” (Woods, 
2004b) Jeanette’s approach to the condition is pessimistic and negative and Nicholas’s is hopeful and 
positive. Mnemophrenia connects them on a deeper level, letting Jeanette’s memories and experiences 
affect Nicholas’s life and choices.  
Nicholas is an optimist who believes in the power of mnemophrenia to bring people together 
and aspires to help in this with his own invention, Total Cinema. Nicholas’s identity is an amalgam of 
different events and experiences that are either actual or fictional and uses his own fluidity and cyborg 
existence to guide him in his life. The CCTV surveillance in his lab is welcomed by him as part of his 
experiments and in support of his invention but, at the same time is a reminder of the controlling 
environment that is fostered by Memofilm. Memofilm as a capitalist corporation nurtured and took 
advantage of the fluid and cyborgian identity of Nicholas for its own profit. It used him to build its most 
advanced technology, Total Cinema that would work on the foundation of the one code. However, 
Memofilm did not take into account that Nicholas as a cyborg is not truthful to his origins but welcomes 
regeneration and is free from dependence, a “man in space” as Haraway argues. “In a sense, the cyborg 
has no origin story in the Western sense - a ‘final’ irony since the cyborg is also the awful apocalyptic 
telos of the ‘West’s’ escalating dominations of abstract individuation, an ultimate self untied at last from 
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all dependency, a man in space.” (Haraway, 1991: 150-1) Thus, Nicholas manages to create some 
“noise” and nurtures the potential for a future breaking and reworking of the one code, indirectly 
supporting the creation of his envisioned empathetic and all-inclusive society. Nicholas’s acts of faith 
successfully contribute to the development of the conditions that lead to the ‘creation’ of Robyin, the 
third link within this familial chain and mnemophrenic continuum, a descendant of both Jeanette and 
Nicholas who lives in the far future. Robyin, as explored in the film, represents the next and final stage 
of mnemophrenia and is presented as a Deleuzian and Guattarian schizophrenic that almost reaches 
transcendence and introduces a new kind of human species, ‘homo mnemonicus’.  
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We used to dream of flying carpets and magic castles; now we dream of tiny video recorders 
implanted in our retinas and computer RAM inside our sculls supplementing our own short-term 
memory. In short, we dream of becoming neuro-cyborgs. We used to flock to movie houses where 
our mental mechanisms were projected on a huge screen. Soon each of us will be able to put back 
this screen inside her or his head. (Manovich, 2007) 
 
Chapter 5: Mnemophrenia and a new humanity!
 
 
Roboticist Hans Moravec, has discussed the idea of human consciousness being uploaded 
into computer software, a step that would free us from mortality. He envisions a future where a 
distinction between human and artificial intelligence will be impossible. Goodman and Parisi argue 
that memory has become prosthetic, it can be archived via uploading and can be easily accessed via 
downloading. “General memory capacity appears therefore to have been increased like computer 
memory; it can be moved, erased, recombined, and upgraded.” (Goodman and Parisi, 2010: 343) 
Katherine Hayles also writes about the cybernetic possibility of immortality and refers to Marvin 
Minsky’s idea of extracting human memories from the brain and importing them to computer disks 
similarly to Moravec and Goodman and Parisi. “The clear implication is that if we can become the 
information we have constructed, we can achieve effective immortality.” (Hayles, 1999: 13) The 
main character of the last period of Mnemophrenia, Robyin, represents the potential of all the above 
ideas, especially the fusion of human and machine by belonging to the first generation of humans 
who have a brain implant, the latest breakthrough in computer and neuroscience. Robyin not only 
embraces her mnemophrenia but also reaches a stage that, as Moravec suggests, can set her free 
from mortality and signals the birth of a new humanity.  
Robyin’s character has an important significance since she expresses my ideas as the 
director and author of Mnemophrenia. She is the conduit of the optimism23 I hope to suggest in the 
film and that distinguishes my approach from previous science fiction films that deal with similar 
                                                
23 I identify with Katherine Hayles who writes, “[w]hat about the pleasures? For some people, including me, 
the posthuman evokes the exhilarating prospect of getting out of some of the old boxes and opening up new 
ways of thinking about what being human means.” (Hayles, 1999: 285) 
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subjects. Robyin is an amalgam, I created her based on characters from previous science fiction 
films, as I did with Jeanette and Nicholas, but with the main difference that Robyin’s hybridity 
offers a hopeful message for the future. Therefore, throughout this chapter I refer to Robyin’s 
common traits with other science fiction film characters but, also indicate her differentiation, 
especially when I examine her mnemophrenia. 
Robyin’s main research goal is to find the ways her brain implant develops prosthetic 
memories24 and empathy and their ramifications. The main materials she uses in her research are 
Jeanettte’s documentary on mnemophrenia and Nicholas’s Total Cinema chronicle. As part of her 
research Robyin realizes that her re-experience of their films, which document their experiences and 
memories, has a direct effect on her. In order to depict this effect she decides to make a film, which 
essentially constitutes my film, Mnemophrenia; she combines different parts of each one’s life, 
including hers. Pierre Janet has stated that memory is essentially “the action of telling a story” about 
the past. (Janet, 1919: 273) Robyin tells a story, a filmic one in order to demonstrate the impact of 
the implants and share her memories, including the prosthetic ones she has acquired through it. I use 
her film in order to show the continuous dialogue and interaction between past, present and future, 
an amalgamation of different memories and how this film can create new prosthetic memories to its 
potential viewers. Through Robyin’s film, I manage to offer a familial “video diary” that depicts all 
three stages of mnemophrenia and the memories that are linked to them and reveals the ways that 
they influence each other, opening up the potential of an optimistic and possibly utopian future. 
Robyin is presented as the director and editor of the resultant film, effectively representing 
my own creative choices. Robyin’s implant acts like an internal camera that records every living 
moment of her life and plays them back on request in her mind’s screen as well as any other films 
that she “digests” and saves on this advanced microchip. Her story is depicted with the use of point 
of view shots and we never really see her face, apart from a few reflections. This choice has several 
                                                
24 I use the terms prosthetic and artificial memories interchangeably in this chapter.
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effects: it allows the viewer to identify with Robyin and see everything from her perspective, it 
permits the personification of my authorial voice and visualizes the empathetic engagement with 
her experiences and memories. The idea of constant recording is a further step, after the CCTV 
mentality welcomed by Nicholas and the interaction between the lab cameras and his brain has 
unsurprisingly led to the complete fusion of Robyin’s brain with the camera; thus she becomes the 
camera herself in the film’s final era. In this chapter, I examine Robyin’s character, a postmodern 
schizophrenic based on Deleuze and Guattari’s writing; but in contrast to Jeanette’s debilitating 
schizophrenia, Robyin’s condition offers her the potential of freedom and emancipation. Robyin’s 
schizophrenia25 is the natural progression from Jeanette’s schizophrenia and Nicholas’s 
cyborgisation and its analysis is based on Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas as explored in their book 
Anti-Oedipus.  
 
5.1 Transparent medium!
 
The fusion of the human brain with the implanted microchip that records and plays back life 
indicates the ‘disappearance’ of the medium and the beginning of mediated experience that is 
indistinguishable from actual life. This fusion is part of what Paul Virilio calls microtechnologies. 
“Now that the most powerful technologies are becoming tiny - microtechnologies, all technologies 
can invade the body... Research is being conducted in order to create additional memory for 
instance... technology is invading our body because of miniaturisation.” (Virilio, 1996) This kind of 
invasion and transparency is explored by Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin who argue that the 
goal of such a medium is immediacy, a style of visual representation that aims “to make the viewer 
forget [its] presence (canvas, photographic film, cinema, and so on) and believe that he is in the 
presence of the objects of representation.” (Bolter & Grusin, 2000: 272-3) According to Julianne 
Newton, “human visual behavior can be external or internal, meaning that people can… act on the 
                                                
25 Robyin’s mnemophrenia is seen from the perspective of postmodern schizophrenia, as analyzed by 
Deleuze and Guattari;, hence the two terms are used interchangeably. 
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basis of something outside of themselves, such as someone else or a photograph, or on the basis of 
interior visual activity, such as imagining or dreaming, that may not be observable to others unless 
acted on externally.” (Newton, 2001: 133) In Robyin’s case, part of the external visual behavior has 
been internalized due to the implant and the interior visual activity is no longer limited to 
imagination and dreams but now includes all kinds of downloaded visual material. What Bolter and 
Grusin write about the SQUID technology in Strange Days, also rings true for Robyin’s implant, 
both serving as examples of media transparency utilizing a technology that “bypasses all forms of 
mediation and transmits directly from one consciousness to another.” (Bolter & Grusin, 2000: 3) As 
Lenny, the main character of Strange Days successfully describes it “[t]his isn’t like TV only 
better. This is life. It’s a piece of somebody’s life. Pure and uncut, straight from the cerebral cortex. 
You’re there. You’re doing it, seeing it, hearing it…feeling it… I’m your priest, your shrink, your 
main connection to the switchboard of souls. I’m the Magic Man, the Santa Claus of the 
subconscious.”  
In a similar way, a precursor to Strange Days, Futureworld (Richard T. Heffron, 1976) depicts 
a machine that turns one’s dreams into a film that can be recorded and screened for everyone to see. 
“So all that we normally internalize, repress, keep to the self can here be turned outward and 
monitored, or be replayed for others as a kind of ultimate home movie.” (Telotte, 1995: 141) Moreover 
in Brainstorm (Douglas Trumbull, 1983) when a researcher discovers that his invention can also 
record memories, he prepares a “tape” for his estranged wife, a kind of home movie as Telotte says. 
And when she asks him what it is, he simply says, “Me.” In all these examples, including 
Mnemophrenia, cinema has become the medium of visual memory, which records pieces of life and 
gives the opportunity to different people, not only the ‘producer’ to relive them.  
In Robyin’s period, there is no longer any distinction between reality and fiction. The 
antagonism between real and virtual reality ceases and both constitute one single reality, or it would 
be more appropriate to say they create many different, dispersed, nomadic realities - as I will 
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analyze below based on Deleuze’s and Guattari’s writings. According to Paul Virilio the fusion of 
actual and virtual reality can have very profound consequences for everyone’s life: 
[T]his might sound like drama, but it is not the end of the world: it is both sad and happy, nasty and kind. It 
is a lot of contradictory things at the same time. And it is complex... We are far away from simulation, we 
have reached substitution! I believe this is, all in the same time, a fantastic, a very scary and an 
extraordinary world. (Virilio, 1994) 
 
This is the new world that Mnemophrenia explores through Robyin focussing on the potentials that 
could arise. In contrast to the films that I mention above and all the science fiction films that I discuss 
throughout my thesis, the third period of Mnemophrenia offers an optimistic perspective. This 
optimism is diffused throughout the film due to the fragmented editing that interweaves all three 
periods together. I use Robyin as the trigger of the whole story and also finish it with her, offering an 
open ending. Robyin’s character effectively encompasses Jeanettte and Nicholas, blending different 
aspects of their experiences together. I do not present Robyin’s symbiosis with technology as 
something negative as Mnemophrenia’s predecessors do, but suggest instead a positive vision about 
the fusion of human and technology and the advancement of this transparent medium.  
 
5.2 Prosthetic memories!
 
In this new world Robyin cannot distinguish between her own ‘real,’ experienced memories 
and the ‘prosthetic’ memories of Jeanette and Nicholas that she acquired through her implant. The idea 
of ‘prosthetic’ memory is linked to Alison Landsberg’s suggestion that prosthetic memories have the 
progressive ability to produce empathy and social responsibility. Her concept of prosthetic memory 
emerges between a person, and a narrative about the past and is mediated through a mass medium like 
the cinema. Thus, the person does not only comprehend a past event but experiences it in a more 
personal, physical way and assimilates it as a personal experience which himself/herself did not 
actually experience, so there can be identification with people and experiences far from one’s own. 
Prosthetic memories are transportable and challenge traditional forms of memory, offering the 
               109 
potential for increased responsibility and alliances that transcend cultural, racial and any other kind of 
social differences.  
Prosthetic memories originate outside a person’s lived experience and yet are taken on and worn by that 
person through mass cultural technologies of memory… Prosthetic memories are not “socially constructed” 
in that they do not emerge as the result of living and being raised in particular social frameworks. At the 
same time, prosthetic memories are transportable and hence not susceptible to biological or ethnic claims of 
ownership. (Landsberg, 2004a: 19) 
 
Landsberg believes that cinema is a medium that transports people into lives that they have not lived 
in the traditional sense, but that they are nevertheless invited to briefly experience and even inhabit; it 
has the capacity to carry viewers to faraway places and alternative temporalities. “The cinema, then, 
might be imagined as a site in which people experience a bodily, mimetic encounter with a past that 
was not actually theirs.” (Landsberg, 2004a: 14) Robyin similarly has, due to her implant, full bodily 
and all-sensory experiences that are indistinguishable from ‘real’ life. The implant brings Landsberg’s 
idea to its full potential and not only leads Robyin to re-remember the past, either hers or others’, but 
acts as a means of re-experiencing it and of sensually re-remembering it, consequently affecting her 
identity. Robyin’s implant dissolves the distinction between representation and event and creates an 
equivalence between spectating a cinematic experience and living through an experience. 
Mnemophrenia demonstrates mediatized memory as an experiential form of memory, depicting 
“spectatorial ‘experiences’ that shape and inform the subjectivity of the individual viewer.” 
(Burgoyne, 2003: 225) Robyin’s experience is similar to Joel’s in Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless 
Mind, a kind of experiential spectatorship as Carolyn Jess-Cooke writes. “Joel not only ‘spectates’ his 
memories, but re-experiences their various sensual processes and emotional contexts.” (Jess-Cooke, 
2007) Robyin’s experiential memories include her own as well as those prosthetic ones that originally 
belonged to Jeanette and Nicholas. The experience of these prosthetic memories helps Robyin create 
different alliances with Jeanette and Nicholas and develops her empathy, which is visualized in her 
film. 
However, the idea of prosthetic memory as developed by Landsberg offers a one-way 
account of the relationship between film and memory, presenting cinema as a medium with 
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remarkable powers that implants memories into passive spectators without reflecting on the 
spectator’s internal digestion of these images. Radstone argues that Landsberg’s vision builds on 
“the ways in which cinema audiences may feel emotionally ‘possessed’ by a character long after a 
film has ended… [and] promulgate[s] the view that cinema can implant memories of the 
unexperienced, or reprogram existing memories.” (Radstone, 2010: 335) As Radstone argues, these 
theories, do not offer “full explanations of the processes by which cinematic prosthetic memories 
come to be integrated into the memories of spectators.” (Radstone, 2010: 335) Radstone suggests a 
different approach that she calls ‘cinema/memory’ in answer to this oversight. In theories of 
“cinema/memory, the relations between cinema, film, and memory emerge as more porous and 
more deeply interpenetrating.” (Radstone, 2010: 326) Cinema/memory offers a different 
understanding of film spectatorship, taking into account the inner worlds of spectators to 
demonstrate that personal memories are informed by cinema. “One-way theorizations that conceive 
of cinema as that which programs, substitutes for, or supplements memory become transformed into 
a fully two-way exchange.” (Radstone, 2010: 336) Radstone offers the work of Annette Kuhn and 
Victor Burgin as examples of theorists who have explored the transitional or hybrid world of 
‘cinema/memory.’ Kuhn’s memory work was examined earlier in this thesis in relation to Jeanette’s 
approach towards her memories through her documentary and Victor Burgin’s The Remembered 
Film addresses the fragments of films that cross our minds in our everyday life and reflects on the 
association between these fragments and memory. Radstone describes the concept of 
cinema/memory as a world “constituted of images, sequences, and their associated affects. Situated 
within the mind, yet positioned between the personal and the cultural, cinema/memory melds 
images remembered from the cinema with the inner world’s constitutive ‘scenes’ or scenarios.” 
(Radstone, 2010: 336) In cinema/memory, the boundaries between memory and cinema are 
dissolved, which suggests their inseparability and that “the process that binds together the personal 
and the collective constitutes the inner world’s psychical mediation of cinema.” (Radstone, 2010: 
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336) The cinema/memory expands and revises Landsberg’s idea of the prosthetic memory by 
focusing on the often overlooked mutual and two way relationship between film and memory and 
illuminates the intimate and ‘micro’ processes and subjective meanings that “an image might have 
for this or that individual.” (Burgin, 2004: 70) The idea of cinema/memory successfully describes 
the process that Robyin goes through due to her implant and her condition, binding her subjectivity 
and experiences with cinematic images that, in this case, are part of the memories of her ancestors, 
Jeanette and Nicholas.  
…cinema/memories prove to be composites and condensations, belonging wholly neither to the public 
world of the cinema nor to the personal and interior realm of fantasy. In this sense, cinema/memory, 
with its binding together of images assimilated from cinema with the psyche’s currency of ‘scenes,’ 
serves to highlight the fact that memory is never straightforwardly or irreducibly subjective. (Radstone, 
2010: 338) 
 
Robyin negotiates and integrates these cinematic images into her inner world and they become 
cinema/memories that she does not passively absorb. It is this negotiation that leads her to a better 
understanding of Jeanette and Nicholas and develops her empathy towards them. Her identity is 
therefore transformed by the prosthetic cinema/memories that are the result of the interplay between 
cinematic images and her as the spectator. 
 
 
5.3 Mindscreen: eye = camera; brain = screen!
 
I present Robyin’s film as a first-person film since it is arranged by her, the director or 
organizer of the images. Her film includes parts from Jeanette’s and Nicholas’s films as well as parts 
from her own life. Bruce Kawin examines the fictitious presenters of first person films in Mindscreen: 
Bergman, Godard, and first-person film and their self-consciousness. “[A]lthough a camera does not 
have consciousness, and cannot therefore literally be an I, it is possible to encode the image in such a 
way that it gives the impression of being perceived or generated by a consciousness.” (Kawin, 2006: 
xi) Kawin argues that there are two ways of using the concept of ‘subjective camera’, in order to show 
what the character sees, which is linked to the physical eye or to show what he thinks, that is, the 
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mind’s eye. He introduces the term ‘mindscreen’ as the visual (or aural) field that presents itself as the 
product of a mind. “The term I propose… is mindscreen, by which I mean simply the field of the 
mind’s eye.” (Kawin, 2006: 10) Mnemophrenia equates Robyin’s mind’s eye or mindscreen with her 
physical eyes due to her use of the implant. All the images that are part of Jeanette’s or Nicholas’s 
stories or Robyin’s own experience of the current period are incorporated in Robyin’s brain and 
become part of her consciousness. What Robyin sees is integrally linked to what she thinks since 
her thoughts take the form of images associated with Jeanette’s, Nicholas’s and her experiences or 
memories and vice versa; this is conveyed by her film. Robyin experiences the images of Jeanette and 
Nicholas in her mind’s eye as well as the recorded experiences of her everyday life, and she combines 
them all together in her mind’s eye. The film is ultimately the end result of Robyin’s thought process, 
and a manifestation of her mindscreen; her mind narrates this filmic story and the screen is the retina of 
her consciousness.  
Deleuze (2003) has written about the internalization of the film camera in the human mind and 
described memories as filmic projections of the present. In The Time-Image (2003), he discusses the 
close relationship between memory and cinema – between moving images in the mind and moving 
images on the screen. He stresses the interdependency of the brain/mind and the 
technology/materiality of the camera in the act of memory. Deleuze has suggested “the brain is the 
screen”, meaning that recollection is defined by the input of actual moving images which are 
always partly constructions of the brain. (Deleuze, 2000) As a literalisation of Deleuze’s theory, the 
camera in Mnemophrenia coincides with Robyin’s physical and mind’s eye and the screen with her 
brain suggesting the connection between thought and the technology that facilitates its 
manifestation. For Robyin, the eye is the camera and the home movie is shot straight from the 
visual cortex, which resembles The Final Cut, a film that explores real-life memory as film in a 
future world where implanted microchips can record all moments of an individual’s life. As José 
van Dijck comments on The Final Cut in his article “Future Memories: The Construction of 
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Cinematic Hindsight” it takes Deleuze’s idea of the brain as screen very literally. (van Dijck, 2008: 
83)  
The idea of the mindscreen helps describe Robyin’s experience of real and prosthetic 
memories. By introducing Robyin into the film, the audience slowly realizes that the images from 
all three periods do not simply appear, but they have been chosen by her and they call attention to 
their subjectivity. This selection visualizes Robyin’s mindscreen and constitutes its final product26. 
Robyin chooses which sections to include and she cuts them together in a similar way to the cutters 
in The Final Cut. Maria Poulaki in “Implanted Time: The Final Cut and the reflexive loops of complex 
narratives” suggests that The Final Cut prompts the spectators to become aware of its own making.  
The narrative is intentionally self-referential about issues such as the reality that films conceal, the 
selections that they make, the ‘cuts’ through which they proceed. The Final Cut… attempts rather 
consciously to reflect on the procedure of filmmaking as ‘cutting’ of recorded footage that used to be 
live, and making out of it coherent –but inevitably distorted – stories. (Poulaki, 2011: 431) 
Robyin’s film, like The Final Cut, is self-referential, it could be seen as the result of Robyin’s 
subjective relationship with the material and the medium as the filmmaker and emphasizes the 
overarching theme of Mnemophrenia around the connection between film and prosthetic memories. 
The revelation of the filmmaking process also reflects my own practice by extension, commenting 
on the deliberate ‘cutting’ choices I made as the director. This self-reflexivity is linked to Kawin’s 
idea of self-consciousness, which according to him demonstrates the awareness of the film or the 
fictitious narrator of the act of presentation. 
It must be emphasized… that mindscreens belong to, or manifest the workings of, specific minds. A 
mindscreen sequence is narrated in the first person… All three modes of first-person discourse… can be 
presented as if they were fictitious in origin… All three present their origins as outside the image field; 
the audience is led to imagine an offscreen speaker, seer, or image-maker. (Kawin, 2006: 12)  
 
As Kawin argues, the organizer can be a character that includes an image of himself/herself or an 
indicator of his/her ‘offscreen’ presence in the filmed field without compromising his/her status as 
narrator. I present Robyin as the speaker, seer and image-maker and her ‘offscreen’ presence as the 
                                                
26 I do not attempt to represent Robyin’s visual experience of other people’s films and recorded memories on 
her mindscreen, but I, focus on the recorded footage from Jeanette’s documentary and from Nicholas’s Total 
Cinema lab chronicle. 
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‘director’ successfully manifests my own views as the author of the film. Her presence is visualized 
with the use of point of view (POV) shots. “[I]t will simplify matters to identify the camera as the 
narrator’s vehicle, his principal means of guiding the audiences’ attention.” (Kawin, 2006: 13) The 
experience of Robyin’s everyday life is depicted from her personal point of view throughout the film 
with the use of subjective, first person camera style, which attempts to visualize the immediacy of her 
experience.  
 
 
5.4 Point of view (POV) and its link to immediacy, directorial agency and empathy 
 
Carolyn Jess-Cooke writes that “memory narratives are specifically point-of-view based” (Jess-
Cooke, 2007) and particularly in Robyin’s case, when the medium has disappeared, we see everything 
through her eyes, which have become the camera; a representation of the transparent medium and 
immediacy that Bolter and Grusin have written about. Laura Rascaroli echoes the idea of transparency 
and the way it is visually depicted in Strange Days in her article on Kathryn Bigelow’s cinema.  
Bigelow works towards a reduction of the distance between the human eye and the camera’s eye, towards a 
more and more ‘transparent’ cinema, towards a transcendental vision... a very conscious use of the 
subjective... camera... whose mechanical eye becomes the medium of the enunciation so strongly that, in a 
sense, it takes the place of the human medium - the director’s eyes. (Rascaroli, 1997: 237) 
 
In Mnemophrenia, the POV style depicts visually how the implant works and its potential for empathy. 
Robyin is never visible apart from when seen through few reflections in order to establish her as the 
main agent of perception and action during this period. The use of POV is linked to the idea of 
‘imagining from the inside’ that Murray Smith has explored. Smith argues that POV plays an 
important role in prompting ‘imaging seeing’ and is linked to central imagining as explored by Richard 
Wollheim in Painting as an Art (1987). “What the POV shot itself does - and does in a way that no 
other shot can - is to render certain aspects of visual experience. By so rendering the visual experience 
of a character, the POV shot is apt to prompt us to imagine seeing as the character does.” (Smith, 1997: 
417) Smith combines his idea that POV shots provide information about a character’s visual 
experience with Gregory Currie’s concept of secondary personal imagining in order to emphasize the 
               115 
importance of POV for ‘imagining seeing’. (Smith, 1997: 422) According to Currie, secondary 
imagining occurs when we are able, in imagination, to feel as the character feels. “This process of 
empathetic reenactment of the character’s situation is what I call secondary imagining. As a result of 
putting myself, in imagination, in the character’s position, I come to have imaginary versions of the 
thoughts, feelings and attitudes I would have were I in that situation.” (Currie, 1995: 153) Smith argues 
that the POV shots trigger the viewer’s perceptual imagination because they depict the perceptual 
states of the characters, but also imagining what the character’s experience is like, what the character 
thinks and feels. Thus, the spectator is given access to the subjective state of the character.  
Edward Branigan in Point of View in the Cinema labels the POV as subjective narration or 
focalization where the information is given through a character. It is “a specific instance or level of 
narration where the telling is attributed to a character in the narrative and received by us as if we were 
in the situation of a character.” (Branigan, 1984: 73) Thus the subjective shot replicates human 
experience of perception and the potential viewers of Robyin’s film are encouraged to imagine what 
she sees and how she experiences different events in her everyday life.  
Clearly, in the subjective shot the ‘real’ viewer is not the character, but the film’s body - with the camera as 
its perceptive organ. Nevertheless, the eye of the camera, those of the character and even those of the 
spectator are superimposed in the POV to produce an intentional gaze which is actually charged with a 
triple presence: that of the film’s body, that of the character’s body, and finally that of the spectator’s body. 
(Rascaroli, 1997: 234)  
 
The idea is to make the viewer feel like they are watching the events with their own eyes rather than 
through the lens of a camera, thus, directly depicting Robyin’s experience. Similar to The Blair Witch 
Project (Daniel Myrick and Eduardo Sánchez, 1999) or the more recent science fiction film Cloverfield 
(Matt Reeves, 2008), the POV suggests a direct link to real events. This immediacy is also helpful to 
convey my own directorial perspective, since there is no distance between Robyin’s eye and the 
camera’s eye, creating a ‘transparent’ cinema as Rascaroli writes about Strange Days. I believe that the 
POV structure successfully expresses my authorial voice. I, as the director, am represented by Robyin 
and I see and act through her; this is why I choose to use the first person camera style that can visually 
imply my agency.  
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According to Smith, the POV shots work in a two-part structure, pairing a POV shot with a 
reaction shot. The POV shows us what the character is looking at and the reaction shot tells us how the 
character reacts to the object of attention, the facial expression suggests the psychological state of the 
character. (Smith, 1997: 417) Although there are no reaction shots in Robyin’s period, this nevertheless 
does not prohibit the depiction of Robyin’s psychological state. The lack of reaction shots is 
compensated by the selected images of Jeanette and Nicholas. Robyin’s way of demonstrating her own 
experience of empathy and her way of encouraging the same in any future viewer of her film is to 
show her own psychological state through the assemblage of Jeanette and Nicholas. This technique 
refers to Robyin’s encounter with Jeanette’s and Nicholas’s films, since she is able to experience their 
emotions and feelings, which consequently leads to the empathy towards them. Robyin identifies with 
Jeanette and Nicholas at different points and she uses their own emotional states, as expressed by their 
facial expressions, actions and words, in order to depict her own psychological state; - what she thinks 
and feels. For example, Robyin feels at times hopeless and confused like Jeanette and other times 
optimistic and positive like Nicholas. In sum, the selected parts of Jeanette’s and Nicholas’s 
experiences and memories depict Robyin’s reaction to her own situation through the combination of all 
three characters into one. This creative choice uses the POV to visually represent the empathy that can 
be achieved by future viewers of Robyin’s film, echoing Landsberg’s idea of prosthetic memories and 
their ability to produce empathy. 
I present Robyin’s film as a motivator of affect, a medium of sharing other people’s feelings 
and emotions. To return to Smith, central imagining offers an imagined, self-directed emotion, rather 
than an imagined, other-directed emotion; imagining being in one’s position: “Such emotions are 
crucial to the larger psychological and social value of fictions: we come to a better understanding of 
both ourselves, and others, through such central imagining.” (Smith, 1997: 426) Moreover, Margrethe 
Bruun Vaage in her article “Fiction Film and the Varieties of Empathic Engagement” argues that the 
POV structure mimics our natural perceptual behaviour when we are interested in someone and this 
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could lead to empathetic engagement. “[T]he POV structure does perhaps signal to the spectator that 
the character is now experiencing something of relative importance; that it is worthwhile to engage 
empathically in his state of mind in order to maximize narrative engagement.” (Bruun Vaage, 2010: 
161) The use of POV acquires an added importance and indicates the empathetic engagement linked to 
it by the end of the film when the audience realizes that Charlie, Robyin’s partner, has been watching 
the film all along. Charlie represents the ultimate viewer of this construction. He manages to achieve 
an empathetic engagement with Robyin’s ‘identities’ that enriches his experience of her film and offers 
a deeper understanding of her as a person. Robyin’s film, apart from being a story about the past is a 
message to Charlie, as well as to any other potential viewer. And if one asked what this construction, 
this film is about, Robyin could answer like Michael Brace in Brainstorm, “Me”.  
 
 
5.5 Spatialized memories and coexistence of time planes 
 The implant helps organize real and prosthetic memories and allows Robyin to identify, arrange 
and re-arrange them as she wishes, as well as giving her the ability to create her memory-film. Bergson 
argued that our obsession with space has led us to ask where memories are stored up. In Robyin’s case 
her brain implant offers her a receptacle for all memories to be stored there, to be accessed and 
manipulated at will. Jess-Cooke comments about Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind a film that has 
influenced Mnemophrenia that it “suggests memory as a malleable narrative that can be retold, remade, 
and re-edited over and over again.” (Jess Cooke, 2007) The manipulability of memory in both films 
emphasizes the way we perceive time, which directly influences how we think about our memories and 
our past.  
Bergson discusses our spatialized treatment of time, time as a set of items laid out end to end as 
divisible into separate parts. “Now, let us notice that when we speak of time, we generally think of a 
homogeneous medium in which our conscious states are ranged alongside one another as in space, so 
as to form a discrete multiplicity.” (Bergson, 2001: 90) Bergson believed that “our life unfolds in space 
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rather than in time” (Bergson, 2001: 231) and we use space to represent time. When something is 
considered malleable that means it can be controlled, influenced, adapted which presupposes that we 
apprehend it as an entity that can be distinctively identified, arranged and re-arranged. Thus, 
visualizing time in spatial terms affects the way we think of events that happened in the past, such as 
our memories that are perceived as entities placed in space and sorted accordingly. The idea of 
spatialized memories brings forward the belief that memories can be manipulated since they are 
thought of as distinct entities that can be rearranged, as happens in Mnemophrenia.  
 Robyin had a wide range of material to select from and Bergson’s writings resonate the process 
that she used in her search for the right ones for her film. The technology at Robyin’s time brings these 
theories to the fore, since the implant actualizes them. Bergson’s ideas successfully describe Robyin’s 
perception and experience; the spatialization of time is consciously perceived and manipulated by 
Robyin due to her implant. Robyin had to detach herself from the present in order to re-place herself in 
a certain region of the past, either hers, Jeanette’s or Nicholas’s. The selection of the past experiences 
and memories that she includes in her film are all triggered by her experience and situation in the 
present. “[I]t is from the present that the appeal to which memory responds comes, and it is from the 
sensori-motor elements of present action that a memory borrows the warmth which gives it life.” 
(Bergson, 1991: 153) Robyin selected the parts that she was interested in and added to the film story 
she wanted to tell, encompassing the other two segments, working simultaneously in different time 
planes. The past is preserved in itself and, at the same time, contracted in various states by the needs of 
action that are always set in an actual present. This repetition of memory-images through action not 
only involves the conservation of past images, but it also prolongs their utility into a present moment, 
enabling a useful combination to emerge between past and present images. It is in the present that 
Robyin makes memories as part of the future, as Deleuze writes, in order to make use of them in the 
future when the present will be past. (Deleuze, 2003: 50) Robyin, in her present searches into the past 
for the right film material, which then becomes part of the present and, at the same time, the future 
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since they are intended for future viewing, by Charlie for example; without however, losing their 
‘pastness.’  
The temporal layering found in Mnemophrenia is similar to the layering in The Final Cut. 
Towards the end of The Final Cut there is a juxtaposition of a subjective POV from the character’s 
present and ‘digital’ POV shots of the same event that has already become past and watched by 
someone else in the future due to the implant. We see the main character, Alan, and his death, and then 
we see Fletcher watching the footage of Alan’s implant, a scene that juxtaposes past, present and 
future. Likewise, in Mnemophrenia, different past events run concurrently. Bergson has discussed the 
coexistence of different time planes in Matter and Memory.  
Quite evidently, it is both on this side and on that, and what I call “my present” has one foot in my past and 
another in my future. In my past, first, because “the moment in which I am speaking is already far from 
me”; in my future, next, because this moment is impending over the future… The psychical state, then, that 
I call “my present,” must be both a perception of the immediate past and a determination of the immediate 
future. (Bergson, 1991: 138) 
 
Gilles Deleuze, influenced by Bergson, refers to the present as the actual image and the past as the 
virtual image. All the past images that Robyin deals with are virtual images, and they become actual 
because she dwells upon them and makes them part of her present. According to Deleuze, past and 
present coexist: “the image has to be present and past, still present and already past, at once and at the 
same time… The past does not follow the present that it is no longer, it coexists with the present it 
was.” (Deleuze, 2003: 76) Deleuze’s idea is depicted through Robyin’s story, since the material of her 
film is already past and becomes present; this coexistence plays a central role in the whole film. “We 
are in the situation of an actual image and its own virtual image, to the extent that there is no longer 
any linkage of the real with the imaginary, but indiscernibility of the two, a perpetual exchange.” 
(Deleuze, 2003: 262) Thus the interchange between actual and virtual image results in the dissolution 
of any distinction between reality and fiction as well as past and present that becomes literalised in 
Robyin’s film and in Mnemophrenia as a whole. 
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5.6 Robyin and schizophrenia!
 
The blend of different time planes and experiences demonstrates the re-construction of 
Robyin’s identity, which is effectively a fusion of identities. It is therefore evident that Robyin does not 
have one single identity, but multiple identities that reveal her schizophrenic persona linked to Deleuze 
and Guattari’s ideas. Their description of the schizophrenic’s journey is very similar to Robyin’s 
experience. According to them, the journey of the schizophrenic is stationary and in place, s/he refers 
to another world even when s/he does not displace herself/himself in space, rather her/his journey is in 
intensity. “Such a voyage does not necessarily imply great movements in extension; it becomes 
immobile, in a room and on a body without organs-an intensive voyage that undoes all the lands for the 
benefit of the one it is creating.” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 350-1) Robyin likewise displaces herself 
in space without even leaving her house, and her experience that is very intense leads to the creation of 
her film. Using Deleuze and Guattari’s words, I argue that Robyin 
produces [herself] as a free [person], irresponsible, solitary, and joyous, finally able to say and do 
something simple in [her] own name, without asking permission; a desire lacking nothing, a flux that 
overcomes barriers and codes, a name that no longer designates any ego whatever. [She] has simply ceased 
being afraid of becoming mad. (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 142) 
 
For Deleuze and Guattari schizophrenia can be an emancipatory process of ego-loss that 
liberates desire and leads to permanent revolution. They believe that schizophrenia is produced and 
repressed at the same time by the capitalist economy. Deleuze and Guattari argue that capitalism 
fosters schizophrenia because it replaces meaning and belief-systems as the foundation of society.  
Yet it would be a serious error to consider the capitalist flows and the schizophrenic flows as identical, 
under the general theme of a decoding of the flows of desire… Our society produces schizos the same way 
it produces Prell shampoo or Ford cars, the only difference being that the schizos are not salable. (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 2004: 266) 
 
As capitalism decodes and deterritorializes it reaches a point that it needs to re-territorialize in order to 
secure its development and the accumulation of surplus-value. However, the schizophrenic resists that 
reterritorialization and only accepts a constant decoding and de-territorialization; s/he makes and 
breaks connections, appropriates and redirects flows. Robyin is a product of capitalism herself, her 
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mnemophrenia that originated at Jeanette’s time as the result of VR films. Robyin is the descendant of 
the schizophrenic Jeanette, but their experience of schizophrenia is very different, if not the opposite. 
The condition of mnemophrenia is experienced very positively by Robyin, in contrast to Jeannete’s 
pessimism.  
Deleuze and Guattari disagree with Jameson’s argument that schizophrenia reinforces and 
contributes to the hegemony of capitalism. For them the schizophrenic is a revolutionary, nomadic 
wanderer who resists oppressive power and has the radical potential to bring down capitalism. There 
are two cases in relation to schizophrenia according to Deleuze and Guattari, in the worst cases 
capitalism cannot tolerate the process of schizophrenia it has produced, treats it as ‘madness’ and 
attempts to repress it. The idea of the schizophrenic as a sick person is represented by Jeanette in the 
first period. However, Robyin belongs to the best cases where schizophrenia can lead to free-form 
human interaction and, as Deleuze and Guattari argue, referring to R. D. Laing, madness need not be 
all breakdown but can be a breakthrough. (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 143) Robyin uses her 
schizophrenia as a tool for emancipation and freedom and lets her desire be the productive force 
behind the film she makes. Robyin is also the descendant of cyborgian Nicholas with whom she shares 
specific traits such as the fragmentation and dissolution of subjectivity; “both ‘schizo’ and cyborg are 
effective insofar as they remain partial and “deterritorialized.” (Woods, 2004a) Schizophrenics in a 
similar way to cyborgs “escape coding, scramble the codes, and flee in all directions [they are]: 
orphans (no daddy-mommy-me), atheists (no beliefs), and nomads (no habits, no territories).” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: xxiii)  
Deleuze and Guattari believe that capitalism and Freudian psychoanalysis lead to the same 
oppression based on lack. We cannot be forced “to choose between production and acquisition. From 
the moment we place desire on the side of the acquisition, we make desire an idealistic… conception, 
which causes us to look upon it as primarily a lack: a lack of an object, a lack of a real object.” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 26) According to them, desire is not for something we lack, instead it is 
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integrally linked to production.  
Lack is created, planned and organized in and through social production. . . This involves deliberately 
organizing wants and needs amid an abundance of production; making all of desire teeter and fall victim to 
the great fear of not having one’s needs satisfied; and making the object dependent upon a real production 
that is supposedly exterior to desire (the demands of rationality), while at the same time the production of 
desire is categorized as fantasy and nothing but fantasy. (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 29-30)  
 
Deleuze and Guattari insist that desire does not lack anything and it is not linked to a fantasy 
world that is apart from the real world. In contrast, desire is a productive force that produces the real 
world. “If desire produces, its product is real. If desire is productive, it can be productive only in the 
real world and can produce only reality… Desire does not lack anything; it does not lack its object.” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 28) Robyin uses her implant for desire production, as a means to reinvent 
herself and explore the implant’s wider potentials, outside its pre-given objectives of capitalism. 
Robyin, as a schizophrenic, “is the universal producer.” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 7) Robyin’s 
desire produces reality since her film constitutes a real part of her life and has the potential to make and 
break connections and redirect flows and experiences in other people’s lives as well. Nicholas planted 
the first seeds for this process by leaking a small part of the Total Cinema code, giving Robyin several 
generations later, the chance to begin a schizophrenic decoding through her film. Robyin’s film is a 
desiring machine that promotes free-form schizophrenia and is connected to other machines, other 
recorded experiences and memories, functioning “as a break in the flow in relation to the machine to 
which it is connected, but at the same time is also a flow itself, or the production of a flow.” (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 2004: 39)  
 
 
5.7 Schizophrenic multiplicity vs. I!
 
Eugene Holland in his analysis of Anti-Oedipus uses improvisational jazz as a metaphor for 
schizophrenia,  
where the past enables rather than constrains the present: the improvised performance always exceeds the 
pre-existing musical composition or structure in complexity, nuance, and originality… [it suggests] the use 
of accumulated wealth as a basis for the shared production and enjoyment of life in the present rather than 
the reproduction and reinforcement of power-structures from the past. (Holland, 1999: xi) 
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Robyin combines the wealth and knowledge of her ancestors (Jeanette and Nicholas) with her film and 
creates something new that is life affirming and potentially liberating. Deleuze and Guattari believe 
that desire is multi-variable and poly-vocal instead of succumbing to univocity and belief. They 
celebrate schizoid, nomadic dispersions of desire and subjectivity. According to them, the 
schizophrenic does not believe in the ego. “There are those who will maintain that the schizo is 
incapable of uttering the word I, and that we must restore his ability to pronounce this hallowed 
word… And if he does chance to utter the word I again, that won’t make any difference either. He is 
too far removed from these problems, too far past them.” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 24-25) Robyin 
likewise does not believe in the I, although I have argued that she can say that the film is about “Me.” 
It is important to note that her self is not unitary but forms a multiplicity that is depicted in her film, an 
ever-changing creation of the desiring-machine. Her film is not the one single “Me” but one of the 
possible “Me”s. Furthermore as Deleuze and Guattari argue, this leads to a transsexuality, and so the 
woman contains the man and vice versa. “Schizoanalysis is the variable analysis of the n sexes in a 
subject, beyond the anthropomorphic representation that society imposes on this subject, and with 
which it represents its own sexuality. The schizoanalytic slogan of the desiring revolution will be first 
of all: to each its own sexes.” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 325)  
Ilaria Serra in her article regarding female spectatorship, where she uses different ideas from 
Anti-Oedipus, she suggests that cinema is “dream making” and invites complete identification “with all 
the protagonists (not only men), with the camera as the means of our gaze. This can be seen as… a 
triumph of a thousand new identities, in a joyful, schizophrenic breaking of all schemes.” (Serra, 2003: 
101) Although there is a big difference between how we currently watch a film and the way Robyin 
experiences films, Serra’s writing helps me describe the idea of spectatorship at Robyin’s time since 
the implant develops Serra’s ideas to their full potential. I hence argue that when Robyin watched 
Jeanette’s and Nicholas’s films, there was a continuous process of production of identities at work, 
including female and male. When Robyin watches and re-experiences the films she is ready to become 
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n people, and live n lives according to schizoanalysis. “Watching a movie is a state of hallucination or 
delirium… where the subject produces itself through new identities… This ‘becoming’ the character, 
not only identifying with him, is a production of the desiring-machine that is the spectator.” (Serra, 
2003: 113, 118) I have argued earlier that Robyin’s film is a desiring machine, as Serra suggests the 
spectator is. In relation to these ideas, I intend to show below how Robyin realizes that her film is her, 
even though only one version of her self.  
At first glance there is an inherent contradiction since Robyin represents free will and 
decides to re-create herself, but, at the same time, her artificial memories reveal her fragmented 
subjectivity. Since there is not a single subjectivity that influences the ‘film’, the question arises, 
who decides for each edit and connection between the three stories? But by applying schizoanalysis 
as described by Deleuze and Guattari the potential for many different outcomes arises. 
Mnemophrenia is only one of the many potential films that could be created by the multifaceted 
Robyin. Each time the combinations can be different, blending various elements in different ways. 
Therefore the resultant film is one of the different possible combinations and not the only version, 
demonstrating Robyin’s schizophrenic multiplicity.  
I have stated before that Robyin represents me as the auteur of this film. However, her 
fragmented subjectivity is in contrast to my singular voice. Therefore I decided to represent and 
reflect this fragmented identity with the aid of improvisations, a practical experiment used to 
develop Jeanette’s (and to be used to develop Nicholas’s and Robyin’s) character. Robyin is an 
amalgam of different characters. This fusion is successfully represented through the practical 
involvement of different actors in the creation of these characters; an organic process that involves 
different voices and points of view. Thus, the singularity of my role as the director and main writer, 
who dictates the main storyline, is broken and enhanced by the actors who offer their own 
sensibilities and views and contribute to the creation of a multiplicity that is celebrated in the film. 
The characteristics and attributes of all three characters are the result of my collaboration with the 
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actors, allowing the fusion of different perspectives. The improvisation technique is part of the 
experimentation and participation in practice that I incorporate in my research, which then leads to 
the interpretation of this practice by analyzing Robyin’s multifarious identity. Thus, as Henk 
Borgorff suggests in The Debate on Research in the Arts, I employ experimental methods that 
reveal and articulate the tacit knowledge that is situated and embodied in the artwork and artistic 
process. (Borgforff, 2006: 18) It is the one area in my project where practice actively leads the 
research (rather than research leading the practice), and this reveals a reflexivity in relation to the 
methodology used and the relationship between theory and practice. “As a result of this reflexive 
process, methodologies in artistic research are necessarily emergent and subject to repeated 
adjustment, rather than remaining fixed throughout the process of enquiry.” (Barrett, 2007: 6) It is 
the experimental method that contributes to the representation of a fragmented identity created by 
‘artificial’ memories as explored in the theory. The schizophrenic identity that I examine in my 
exegesis, informed by the work of Deleuze and Guattari, comes to life through the improvisation 
practice that generates a combined and reflexive praxis.   
 
 
5.8 Robyin’s film: a 3-stage schizophrenic process!
 
Deleuze and Guattari argue that schizophrenia is a three-stage process. The desiring machines 
operate according to three syntheses: the connective synthesis of production, the disjunctive synthesis 
of recording and the conjunctive synthesis of consumption-consummation. I will now examine 
Robyin’s three-stage process towards her film project. The first stage includes the research and 
collation of her material, the second stage deals with the editing process and the last stage concerns 
Robyin’s realization about her film as the final product, which represents only one version of her 
multifarious identity. These three stages relate to the three syntheses suggested by Deleuze and 
Guattari. They write that, in the first stage, the productive desire makes connections between part-
objects that do not belong to whole persons. These connections are multiple, heterogeneous and 
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continual. Robyin, in the first stage of her project had to view and choose various memories and 
experiences from Jeanette’s and Nicholas’s films and connect them to the different recorded parts of 
her own life. These partial fragments of memories do not belong to any whole person as the connective 
synthesis of production dictates. This phase includes the research and collation of relevant real-life film 
‘footage’.  
However, according to Deleuze and Guattari the connective synthesis needs a counter-force in 
order to avoid any mechanical repetition that would lock the person into instinctual or habitual patterns 
of connection. In relation to Robyin, this counter-force means that the collation of her material and 
their connections should always be challenged and reconfigured, in order for Robyin’s identity to be 
continuously flexible and mutable. This counter-force called anti-production allows connections to be 
broken, allowing others to be made in their place and so on in an open-ended series. “Desiring-
machines make us an organism; but at the very heart of this production, within the very production of 
this production, the body suffers from being organized in this way, from not having some other sort of 
organization, or no organization at all.” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 8) This idea focuses on how the 
body is organized and how it might be actively disorganized in order to enable the production of other 
forms of organization. Thus, the desiring machines, and in this case Robyin’s film, needs to break 
down, so production is coupled with anti-production which is achieved due to the body without organs, 
which is non-productive. The body without organs is part of the second synthesis, the disjunctive 
synthesis of recording, and constitutes the surface that records networks of relations among 
connections instead of producing connections themselves. The body without organs forms a system of 
relations, comparing one thing in relation to another not linearly but synchronically, operating in a 
mode of free association. “[A] multiplicity so complex that we can scarcely speak of one chain or even 
of one code of desire…. The code resembles not so much a language as a jargon, an open-ended, 
polyvocal formation.” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 41) For Robyin’s film, this second stage can be 
seen as the film editing phase, where no more productive connections are made in the form of new 
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footage, but many different, multiple relations are recorded and compared synchronically. As Eugene 
Holland comments the 
body-without-organs can be compared to a kind of tabula rasa, freeing the organism from the purely 
mechanical repetition of instinctual determination… What is essential is that even while anti-production 
interrupts or suspends existing productive connections on the body-without-organs, it at the same time 
registers their diverse possibilities, and ends up multiplying the relations among them to infinity. (Holland, 
1999: 31) 
 
Robyin uses part of her brain as a body without organs, a tabula rasa where different combinations and 
possibilities between her actual memories and the artificial memories acquired by Jeanette and 
Nicholas’s films are registered. 
The last stage is the conjunctive synthesis or the production of consumption, where the subject 
emerges. The subject is not the agent but the result of desire and the various disjunctive and connective 
syntheses. Although many subjects indulge in the illusion of sovereign subjectivity, thinking they 
chose their pleasures and desires, Deleuze and Guattari dismiss this illusion and insist that the 
productions and anti-productions come before the appearance of the subject. 
This is tantamount to saying that the subject is produced as a mere residuum alongside the desiring-
machines, or that he confuses himself with this third productive machine and with the residual 
reconciliation that it brings about: a conjunctive synthesis of consummation in the form of a wonderstruck 
“So that's what it was!” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 19) 
 
The resulting subject mistakenly considers itself as an autonomous entity and claims possession of 
products that actually created it. “The subject as product claims as its own the very process that 
constitutes it as subject.” (Holland, 1999: 34) Thus, the subject recognizes its desire as well as itself as 
subject retrospectively. Although that was Robyin’s original thinking, that she was the agent behind the 
film, she realizes before she dies that the film itself was what actually created her as a subject or more 
accurately produced and depicted one of the many possible identity configurations linked to her. 
Robyin therefore understands something profound, the most important aspect in relation to her 
schizophrenia and the desire production, that she as the subject has actually no fixed identity and that, 
in order for her condition to reach its true potential, no specific goal or aims should be assigned.  
This subject itself is not at the center, which is occupied by the machine, but on the periphery, with no fixed 
identity, forever decentered, defined by the states through which it passes… the subject is born of each state 
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in the series, is continually reborn of the following state that determines him at a given moment, 
consuming-consummating all these states that cause him to be born and reborn. (Deleuze and Guattari, 
2004: 21-22) 
 
Robyin’s film constitutes an open-ended project that can create and break connections with 
other people’s experiences and memories and combine and redirect various flows. Schizophrenia as 
free-form desire does not have any assigned goal or end, it is polyvocal, multiple, inclusive, non-
specific, and nomadic. The result of desire cannot be established once and forever because submitting 
desire to pre-conceived goals and ends would make it reactive rather than productive and creative. 
Thus, the whole process produces a perpetually different, dispersed subject, a part made up of parts “or 
rather ‘some’ subjectivity: series of lived subject-states – but without necessarily culminating in a fixed 
subject possessed of a specific identity.” (Holland, 1999: 36) Therefore, the film itself actually presents 
only a small part of Robyin, merely one possible combination of different parts that after her death can 
continue to be combined incessantly with other memories (hers or other people’s) and thus be 
restructured with no assigned goal. 
 
 
5.9 Schizophrenia as the road to revolution and immortality!
 
 The path that has been paved by Robyin with the help of Jeanette and Nicholas creates the 
potential for a revolution; a revolution of multiple, dispersed subjectivities. Deleuze and Guattari 
advise revolutionaries to follow the schizo process because the schizophrenic threatens the social order. 
“Desire is what the established power fears; that is why ‘the leadership has a tendency rather to reply: 
when I hear the word ‘desire’, I pull out my gun.’” (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 279) Deleuze and 
Guattari argue that capitalism wants to inhibit schizophrenia’s tendencies, “for capitalism it is a 
question of binding the schizophrenic charges and energies into a world axiomatic that always opposes 
the revolutionary potential of decoded flows with new interior limits... Hence schizophrenia is not the 
identity of capitalism, but on the contrary its difference, its divergence, and its death.” (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 2004: 267) And what is the revolutionary path?  
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To go still further, that is, in the movement of the market, of decoding and deterritorialization? For perhaps 
the flows are not yet deterritorialized enough, not decoded enough, from the viewpoint of a theory and a 
practice of a highly schizophrenic character. Not to withdraw from the process, but to go further, to 
‘accelerate the process’. (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 260) 
 
I have deliberately created Robyin’s character based on Deleuze and Guattari’s schizophrenic who 
does not believe in any univocal meaning or representation. Robyin embraces the schizophrenia that is 
enhanced by her implant and represents the prime mover of the revolutionary path that sets her apart 
from other science fiction film characters and their ambiguous relationship to technology. Robyin 
welcomes the idea of constant decoding and her film has the potential to contain multiple meanings 
and be endlessly decodable by the different viewers that essentially share her schizophrenia.  
Pier Paolo Pasolini refers to life as one long take that only cuts at the moment of death. 
(Pasolini, 1980: 5) He also argues that it is necessary to die, because while living we lack meaning, and 
the language of our lives is untranslatable since it is “a chaos of possibilities and a search for relations 
among discontinuous meanings.” (Pasolini, 1980: 6) He believes that death performs a montage of a 
life’s significant moments that are seen from a single subjective perspective and converts our infinite 
and uncertain present into a clear and stable past. Mnemophrenia could be read as a hyper-long take of 
Robyin’s death montage, but if we take a closer look at it we understand, along with Charlie, her 
partner, that this chaos of possibilities that Pasolini talks about does not disappear with Robyin’s death 
but, due to her schizophrenia and the implant, it continues to exist into infinity. Robyin’s past can 
always become the present and create discontinuous relations for someone who watches her film or 
any other of her memories.  
Maria Poulaki writes that in The Final Cut, agency is expressed “through the reflection upon 
the passage of time, which cannot be recuperated, but only a posteriori observed through another.” 
(Poulaki, 2011: 432) In Mnemophrenia, the past is also observed and retrieved a posteriori, but cannot 
be changed, only re-arranged, bringing out new meanings. The past can be put to a different use and 
influence the present and future of the viewer. As Aylish Wood argues regarding Strange Days, each 
time the recorded memories are experienced they accumulate new sets of meanings from their different 
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users and contexts. “Experiences commodified through the SQUID become incorporated into the realm 
of simulation and information exchange. Once there, they are no longer located in relation to any 
originating act, and as they shed meanings they accrue others.” (Wood, 2002: 99-100) So, Jeanette and 
Nicholas’s memories mean one thing for them, and they acquire different meanings for Robyin, and 
the same memories can mean something entirely different for Charlie. The various interpretations and 
creation of different meanings highlight Mnemophrenia’s main theme of artificial memories acquired 
by advanced visual media and question further the ‘reality’ of all experiences and memories depicted 
in the film. 
 
 
5.10 Conclusion!
 
Robyin uses the past in order to understand and represent her present and reconstruct her 
subjectivity, but she also manages to foresee the future. She realizes that her film is only a fraction of 
her multiple self and different parts of her will still manage to exist even after she has died when her 
memories or parts of her memories are re-experienced by other people, as she did with the memories of 
Jeanette and Nicholas. This realization that her memories can be part of the future and lead to 
something different echoes the idea of postcybernetic conception of memory by Steve Goodman and 
Luciana Parisi. 
[R]ather than imagine a cybernetic archive of the past, we argue by way of an engagement with the 
nonlinear temporalities of media that new technologies have realigned the archive away from merely 
storing or reconstructing the past of human experience, so that it becomes something that anticipates 
change, anticipates the not yet experienced. From the archive of the past, then, to a conception of 
memory or an archive of the future: This, we argue, takes us toward a postcybernetic conception of 
memory. (Goodman and Parisi, 2010: 344) 
 
This conception of memory is similar to Robyin’s experience of past, present and future. Bergson 
holds that perception and memory interlace and all memories must become actual in order to become 
effectively real. He notes, that memory begets sensations as it materializes, but when it does, so it 
ceases to be a memory and becomes something actually lived by passing into the condition of a present 
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thing. (Bergson, 1991: 139) Similarly Robyin’s memories transform from mere memories into 
something actual and present by being experienced by people in the future; they cease then to be 
memories and become something actually lived. Robyin realizes that by bringing memories to the 
present and making them live and actual, these memories and the people linked to them become ‘alive’ 
again and become part of the present tense, so fragments of their selves actually never die. This is 
something that she understands that can also happen with her through her film and all her recorded 
memories, a realization that she comes to before she dies. “Memories are therefore material relations. 
They are not confined to individual subjects. Neither are they specifically human. Memories no longer 
relate purely to a trace of the past but, more importantly… hint at the activity of the future in the 
present. Every actual body is shadowed by its virtual double.” (Goodman and Parisi, 2010: 358) 
Robyin’s film, a combination of different memories, in effect becomes ‘actual’ by being watched by 
Charlie. This idea of immortality through multiple, dispersed subjectivities due to schizophrenia is 
directly linked to the potential of revolution suggested by Deleuze and Guattari. However, it is 
important to note that this whole process has revolutionary potential, but it is not the revolution itself.  
There is a whole world of difference between the schizo and the revolutionary: the difference between the 
one who escapes, and the one who knows how to make what he is escaping escape… The schizo is not 
revolutionary, but the schizophrenic process-in terms of which the schizo is merely the interruption, or the 
continuation in the void-is the potential for revolution. (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004: 374) 
 
In the last scene of The Final Cut, as Fletcher edits the footage of Alan’s implant, he watches 
the reflection of Alan in the mirror, to what appears to be a POV shot through Fletcher’s eyes. Then the 
reflection of Alan leaves the frame suggesting that it is not Alan now looking at his reflection, nor is it 
Fletcher looking through Alan’s eyes. “At the point that the narrative ends, the mirror/screen waits for 
us, the viewers, to fill it not with our reflection but with our own mnemonic records. This ‘mind-
game’… has rather been The Final Cut’s communicative condition all along, if we consider the false 
memories of the character.” (Poulaki, 2011: 432) In a similar way with Robyin’s death and Charlie’s 
final speech regarding her film and its true potential, any future viewers are invited to ‘continue’ this 
revolutionary potential, identify with any or all of the characters, “become” mnemophrenics and 
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combine what they have watched or experienced with their own personal memories. “This is not linear 
continuity, where the past determines the present or the present constructs the past. Each present 
perception stirs what lies in potential, the futurity of the past, emerging again yet anew.” (Goodman 
and Parisi, 2010: 354) As with The Final Cut, by the end of Mnemophrenia the viewer is directly 
invited to take part and as Poulaki very successfully writes in relation to The Final Cut “[s]elf-
reflexivity thus takes us into the loop, where (narrative) closure is no longer possible. As the German 
DVD title of the film suggests, ‘Dein Tod ist erst der Anfang’ (the end is only the beginning).” 
(Poulaki, 2011: 432) At the end of Mnemophrenia, I imply that the real journey starts after Robyin’s 
death, as Charlie concludes. I regard Robyin as the first of a new kind of human species that I call 
“homo mnemonicus” signalling the beginning of a new society that could lead to ground-breaking 
changes and human transcendence. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion!
 
Robyin’s character and her assemblage of different experiences, memories and approaches 
to mnemophrenia exemplify my method towards different theories and previous science fiction 
films that have inspired Mnemophrenia. Robyin represents the main core of my project, my/her 
film, a fusion of different memories, actual and artificial, embodies the combination of different 
theories and filmic elements that subsequently generate new ideas and meanings. Mnemophrenia is 
a homage to many other science fiction films and a visualisation of various theories that revolve 
around the themes of memory, identity and technology. In contrast to the films that have influenced 
it, Mnemophrenia is based on pre-existing theories. These theories gave birth to the film but then, 
the film contributed to their expansion and showcased how their ideas can be brought to life. 
Mnemophrenia and the thesis constitute part of an ongoing dialogue between sociocultural theories 
and cultural artefacts, specifically science fiction film. My project delineates the dialogue between 
film products and film studies contributing to the discipline by showcasing how practice and theory 
can coexist and organically develop together.  
Mnemophrenia shows how form and content, practice and theory can collaborate and offer a 
wider and more complete picture of the link between film and artificial memories. It discusses this 
link from two perspectives: narratively and formally. The thesis analyzes the narrative of each 
period that is influenced by different theories and is enhanced by the distinct visual form used for 
each segment, displaying their organic relationship. My main objective was to bring theory alive in 
practice and in particular take different theoretical positions vis-a-vis virtual reality and artificial 
memories and explore their ramifications firstly for the person, then the society and finally discuss 
the possible transcendence. My project revolves around the development of mnemophrenia and 
applies theories by Jameson, Baudrillard, Haraway, Deleuze and Guattari to explore the transition 
of mnemophrenia from a negative and disorienting mental condition to a socially acceptable trait, 
offering hints of hope for the future and finally shown as the beginning of a possible revolutionary 
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path that promises freedom and immortality. The ideas of these theorists pave the way for the 
narrative development of the film and help me to show how mnemophrenia can lead from Jeanette’s 
nervous breakdown and disorientation, to a transitional period with Nicholas who critically 
questions his condition and finally to emancipation as it is suggested with Robyin. Their ideas 
around schizophrenia and cyborgization get fleshed out through these three characters and get tested 
in a creative and dynamic way, contributing to my experiment on the interactive relationship 
between theory and practice.  
This relationship is further enhanced by applying different visual styles to depict the various 
effects of mnemophrenia on each one of the main characters. Mnemophrenia is self-reflexive and 
creatively comments on the filmmaking process. The film forms used are: mockumentary, CCTV 
and POV consecutively, all of which are commonly used to depict or comment on reality. I use 
these forms in a subversive way to suggest that the reality of these images can be appropriated and 
become another person’s reality even if it does not belong to that person, so in effect be transformed 
to an artificial memory. Mnemophrenia depicts the development of a different kind of reality, 
identity and existence that is based on artificial memories. The ‘reality’ represented by these three 
distinct film forms visually supports the aforementioned theories and the consequent ramifications 
for the characters.  
This different reality is not shown through the use of special effects as previous films have 
done, since the main objective is not to be able to differentiate between reality and fiction. I do 
agree with Sobchack who writes, “the major visual impulse of all SF films is to pictorialize the 
unfamiliar, the nonexistent, the strange and the totally alien—and to do so with a verisimilitude 
which is, at times, documentary in flavor and style. While we are invited to wonder at what we see, the 
films strive primarily for our belief.” (Sobchack, 2001: 88) I welcome the audience’s belief, but not 
in order to celebrate the established reality, but to present another reality that is nevertheless so 
similar to ours that does not need any effects to be created. As Telotte comments “the science 
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fiction film seems a form that continues to explore the potential for rendering our world in all its 
promise and frustration ever more available for our inspection and instruction.” (Telotte, 2001: 30) 
It is the familiarity of Mnemophrenia that makes us question our ideas and beliefs around the 
notions of reality and memory and opens up Mnemophrenia’s hypothetical but probable world for 
our inspection and possible instruction. 
Mnemophrenia talks about artificial memories and works as memory itself, it connects the 
three protagonists through their memories that in combination create one artificial memory that 
belongs to Robyin. The important factor that is played out in the film is not how actual or real the 
memories are, since a different kind of reality, as I mentioned above, is being produced that tampers 
with the audience’s established and preconceived ideas around the subject, but what these memories 
can lead to, and the actions they put in motion. Quato, the mutant resistance leader in Total Recall 
says, “A man is defined by his actions, not his memories” and it is worth repeating Landsberg’s 
insightful argument in relation to this, she writes: “[w]e might revise his statement to say that a man 
is defined by his actions, but whether those actions are made possible by prosthetic memories or 
memories based on lived experience makes little difference.” (Landsberg, 2004b: 244) Robyin realizes 
by the end that she has actively recreated part of herself through the assimilation of artificial 
memories. This action can lead to significant changes since it offers people the ability to empathize, 
reconstruct themselves, and hence be born and reborn and live forever integrating seamlessly into 
other people’s memories and identity. Therefore, the “reality” of the memories is not considered as 
important, an approach that depicts a different approach in relation to technology and how it affects 
our reality and human identity compared to previous science fiction films. Mnemophrenia is a 
critical dystopia that leaves a trace of hope for a possible utopia. It offers an alternative viewpoint to 
the usual anti-technology attitude and suggests a symbiosis with technology that leads to a different 
kind of humanity without lamenting the loss of reality, as we know it today. It, thus, challenges the 
conventional dystopic view that seems to be the common trait of most science fiction films. My 
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project combines a range of theoretical and filmic elements to suggest a different ending that does 
not ultimately confirm and affirm the supremacy of established reality. 
As part of this unconventional ending, the audience is invited to the world of mnemophrenia 
and encouraged like Charlie, Robyin’s partner, to continue the story assembled by Robyin. All 
spectators of Mnemophrenia are considered potential ‘mnemophrenics’ that might take on board 
some of the memories they have ‘experienced’ through the film and thus keep parts of the 
characters alive, since their experiences become part of the spectators’ memory reserve. This 
conclusion reaffirms the self-reflexivity of my project and brings to the fore the significance of the 
audience’s interaction with the film, an important element for the production of artificial memories. 
Mnemophrenia, Robyin’s film, can be seen as a guide to how to develop empathy and successfully 
create artificial memories from the experience of a film and at the same time presents the possible 
negative and positive ramifications of this process, ending with a hopeful note for the future.  
I believe that my project creates the ground for the development of further new research, 
offering a case study that opens new questions. One interesting avenue of research could be based 
on the characters becoming actors in their own films, revealing their affinity to film actors and the 
empathy process that actors have to go through in order to bring a character to life. This idea is also 
linked to the improvisation process that I followed, a method commonly used to produce 
naturalistic dialogue and acting, which could prompt an in-depth examination of its application for 
the development of a science fiction screenplay. Another possible avenue of research could be 
linked to the idea of spectatorship, and how the audience might remember parts of specific scenes 
and identify with different characters and what the implications would be if these characters were 
‘actual’ people and the films depicted ‘actual’ experiences. These are only a few of possible 
research questions that could stem from my project and further some of the ideas that have been 
explored in my film and thesis. Finally, and most importantly, I believe that Mnemophrenia 
showcases that a film essay can be the core of a creative research project and that theory can trigger 
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the production of original practice, therefore, broaden the horizons of the discipline and suggest 
new approaches toward the study of theory and practice relationship.  
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Filmography !
 
Alphaville (Jean-Luc Godard, 1965) 
Blade Runner (Ridley Scott, 1982) 
Brainstorm (Douglas Trumbull, 1983) 
Brother from Another Planet (John Sayles, 1984) 
Cloverfield (Matt Reeves, 2008) 
Cypher (Vincenzo Natali, 2002) 
Dark City (Alex Proyas, 1998) 
Death of a President (Gabriel Range, 2006) 
Destiny in Space (Ben Burtt, Phyllis Ferguson, James Neihouse and Gail Singer, 1994) 
District 9 (Neill Blomkamp, 2009) 
Don’t Look Back (D.A. Pennebaker, 1967) 
Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind (Michel Gondry, 2004) 
eXistenZ (David Cronenberg, 1999)  
Forrest Gump (Robert Zemeckis, 1994) 
Futureworld (Richard T. Heffron, 1976) 
Inception (Christopher Nolan, 2010) 
Johnny Mnemonic (Robert Longo, 1995) 
Journey to the Moon (Kutlu! Ataman, 2009) 
La Jetée (Chris Marker, 1962) 
Manchurian Candidate (Jonathan Demme, 2004) 
Menace II Society (The Hughes Brothers, 1993) 
Minority Report (Steven Spielberg, 2002) 
Mission to Mars (Brian de Palma, 2000) 
Primary (Robert Drew, 1960) 
Repo Man (Alex Cox, 1984) 
Robocop (Paul Verhoeven, 1987) 
Sans Soleil (Chris Marker, 1983) 
Sliver (Phillip Noyce, 1993) 
Smallpox 2002: Silent Weapon (Daniel Percival, 2002) 
Snake Eyes (Brian De Palma, 1998) 
Solaris (Steven Soderbergh, 2002)  
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Strange Days (Kathryn Bigelow, 1995) 
Teknolust (Lynn Hershman-Leeson, 2002) 
The Age of Stupid (Franny Armstrong, 2009) 
The Blair Witch Project (Daniel Myrick and Eduardo Sánchez, 1999)  
The Day Britain Stopped (Gabriel Range, 2003) 
The Final Cut (Omar Naim, 2004) 
The Lawnmower Man (Brett Leonard, 1992) 
The Matrix (The Wachowski Brothers, 1999) 
The Thirteenth Floor (Josef Rusnak, 1999) 
Thelma and Louise (Ridley Scott, 1991) 
Titticut Follies (Frederick Wiseman, 1967) 
Total Recall (Paul Verhoeven, 1990) 
The Truman Show (Peter Weir, 1998) 
Videodrome (David Cronenberg, 1983) 
Virtuosity (Brett Leonard, 1995) 
The War Game (Peter Watkins, 1965) 
Zelig (Woody Allen, 1983) 
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Appendix I: Improvisation process 
 
I used improvisation in order to build the characters and the shooting script for the first 
period of Mnemophrenia. I believe that the improvisation process helped with the development of 
more realistic dialogue and performances that match the mockumentary style of the first period. 
However, my aim is to use improvisation for the other periods as well, since each period questions 
the distinction between reality and fiction and I believe that realistic dialogue and acting contribute 
to the blurring of this distinction. I will ask actors to watch footage from previous periods and take 
influence in the development of their character accordingly. Each period will be made in sequence 
so actors of the next period can watch the previous one/s and build their characters’ experiences 
(Nicholas and Robyin) from what they have watched, since according to the premise of the film 
these videorecordings become part of their memories and identity. That is the reason why there is 
no final script at this stage. I use the improvisation as part of an organic approach that I want to 
apply to the whole filmmaking process from script development to execution. 
When I decided that I want to develop the script and dialogue through improvisation it 
became apparent that I had to look for actors with experience in improvisation. Therefore, I 
auditioned several actors in December 2010 and January 2011 to choose the best for my film. The 
auditions were in two stages, in the first stage each actor had a 30-minute audition on their own, and 
they were put through three different improvisation exercises. After the first round, I selected the 
most appropriate actors and invited them for the second round for a group improvisation workshop 
that acted as their second audition. In this workshop, they had to work either individually or 
together in various group improvisation exercises. After the second round, I decided on which 
actors would play each role.  
The improvisation workshops began in February 2011 and lasted until mid-April 2011. For 
the aims of the script three different groups were created. The first group was comprised of the 
actors who played Jeanette and George (her cameraman); the second group included Jeanette and 
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Douglas; and the third group included Jeanette, the therapist Tessa and the rest of the 
mnemophrenics that were part of the group therapy sessions. Each group met each week for at least 
one hour-long improvisation workshops that were at least an hour long.. The aim of the workshops 
was for the actors to understand who their characters were and develop their background stories and 
dialogues based on a given storyline. All workshops were video-recorded and - I have submitted an 
example from each kind of workshop as part of the supporting materials for my project. Each group 
worked in different ways. Freya (Jeanette) and Tai (George), for example, had to watch all the 
interviews of real scientists and theorists that I had taken in the past in order to familiarise 
themselves with the ideas explored in the film, so they could incorporate them in their own 
dialogues. Freya (Jeanette) and Tim (Douglas) had to find what Jeanette was looking for in the VR 
films and all their encounters explored different ways that Douglas could make Jeanette feel happy 
and excited whilst winning her trust. Finally, the mnemophrenic group was meeting each week at 
the same time, replicating the format of real group therapy sessions. They were led by Cally (Tessa/ 
therapist). These sessions did not include Jeanette from the beginning but began with only the other 
three mnemophrenics who along with the therapist, created the rules of their group and built 
different relationships among themselves. Jeanette became part of the group much later, in line with 
the story, where an outsider intrudes and asks the group to film these sessions as part of a 
documentary. Jeanette had to go through several group sessions until she was trusted by the other 
members and accepted as part of the group.  
I barely talked during the improvisation workshops, and the only way I was directing or 
influencing the conversation or character development was by giving written notes to individuals 
throughout the workshops. This technique allowed for an organic development of the characters and 
dialogue, which was a result of the creative collaboration between the actors and myself as a writer 
and director. I consider all my actors as co-writers of the film, and they all have a writing as well as 
an acting credit. Finally, when all the improvisation workshops came to a conclusion I had to watch 
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all the footage and choose the best parts in order to write the shooting script. All the actors then had 
to learn the script that was based on dialogue that they had created. As part of the supporting 
materials for the project, I have included the interviews with a few of the actors from after the film 
shoot. In these interviews, they discuss the process they went through in order to develop their 
characters and script.  
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Appendix II: Storyline for the second period (Nicholas) !
 
Background 
 
Nicholas is Jeanette’s grandson, but has never met her, she died when he was still a baby. 
His mother, Grace grew up with her father and saw Jeanette only on weekends and holidays. 
Jeanette became gradually a recluse, and eccentric and Grace did not have much contact with her 
from her teenage years until Jeanette’s death. Both Nicholas’s parents are non-mnemophrenics and 
especially Grace has always been against VR films and believed that they mostly have a negative 
impact and can be addictive like in her mother’s case. Nicholas is a mnemophrenic, and although at 
his time, mnemophrenia started becoming more widely acceptable, he encountered discrimination 
and social exclusion while he was growing up. In contrast to his mother, Nicholas was always a big 
fan of VR films, especially since as he was a mnemophrenic and his experience of them was intense 
and exciting.  
Nicholas was very interested in Jeanette because she was a mnemophrenic like him and also 
due to her documentary, which was a seminal film since it was the first to talk about 
mnemophrenia. Jeanette’s film inspired Nicholas to become a scientist and look more into the 
condition. Although Grace never approved of the technology, Nicholas went against her will and 
decided to study neuroscience and computer science. Part of his PhD thesis was the development of 
VR films with a virtual Jeanette that was based on audiovisual data and information about her that 
he collected through her documentary films and from his mother. Although Jeanette died when he 
was a baby, he acquired many artificial memories of her due to these films and he always thought of 
her as a content mnemophrenic, which made him feel good about his mnemophrenia. His PhD 
thesis was well acclaimed and contributed a lot to the VR research, since the VR film companies 
never offered VR films based on real people. During the last year of his PhD, he also started 
developing his ideas for Total Cinema and published a few articles on the subject. His thesis and 
publications attracted Memofilm’s attention, and he was offered a long-term contract with them 
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after the completion of his studies.  
Nicholas has been working for Memofilm for 13 years and the last 9 years on Total Cinema 
project (TC). With TC the VR experience is all-sensory, synesthesia is purposely induced and 
manipulated in order to achieve the controlled stimulation of all 5 senses. The consumer, in order to 
experience TC, s/he is wired at the head and can interact with the TC environment by ‘playing’ one 
of the characters at a pre-determined storyline. Nicholas believes that TC can connect people and 
develop an empathy that will make differences disappear and help everyone understand each other 
better. His mnemophrenia has developed throughout the years and he is capable of more or less 
controlling it. However, there are many moments when he cannot distinguish between real and 
fictional memories, for example, he often forgets that he never actually met Jeanette.  
Nicholas feels very much at home in his Memofilm lab where he spends most of his time 
and occasionally stays over. His connection to Jeanette, his scientific expertise, as well as his 
mnemophrenia, place him into a privileged position, and Memofilm is one of the few places he 
knows that being mnemophrenic is something very positive. He started working on TC hoping that 
the basic source code would eventually be open sourced and that the software will be available to 
everyone. At the beginning of the project he submitted a draft report of the advantages of open 
sourcing TC to Michael, his manager and the executive director of his specific department. He 
argued that it could increase the company’s profits by Memofilm having the monopoly on the 
hardware and the expertise in making the best quality films. Michael had showed some interest in 
this report, but never committed to anything. However, Nicholas, always hoped that due to the fact 
that he was a privileged scientist his ideas would come to pass after the completion of the project. 
Nicholas has worked closely for the last seven years with Bill (non mnemophrenic), and this 
collaboration has helped him understand more the ‘other’ side. Bill always wanted to become 
mnemophrenic (he is not due to specific brain function), but also cherishes the moments that he can 
differentiate between real and artificial memories. 
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Film plot 
All Nicholas’s scenes are located at the Memofilm lab and filmed from the Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) ‘CCTV’ cameras’ perspective. These cameras film from different angles and frames based on 
Nicholas’s brain waves. Nicholas always wears a headset while he is in the lab that allows the AI 
cameras to process and ‘read’ his brain signals. 
  
During the last few years, Nicholas has been approached by a group of hardcore mnemophrenics 
called FLM (Future of the Liberated Mind) that desire an all mnemophrenic society. FLM sees 
Nicholas as one of the key people that could make this happen. Nicholas distances himself from this 
group, but shares several of their beliefs.  
 Few months before the launch of Total Cinema (TC) Nicholas and Will discover that the 
technology will most probably have a permanent direct impact on the brain’s hippocampus, which 
would eventually develop mnemophrenia to every TC user. They both have a meeting about these 
findings with Michael and he asks them to look further into it. 
 At the same period, Keri, an old friend of Nicholas and a researcher working at an international 
health organization, meets Nicholas at his lab and interviews him about TC and its possible 
consequences. During the interview she implies that Memofilm knew about the possible 
consequences of the first generation VR Memory Palaces films, but did not inform the public; 
questioning whether Memofilm will do the same with TC. Nicholas avoids commenting on this and 
merely states that all this is based on unfounded rumours. 
 In the meantime, Nicholas starts having an interest in one of TC’s test subjects, Anna. Anna is a 
mnemophrenic who is quite happy with her mnemophrenia and shares the same views with 
Nicholas. Nicholas shows to Anna one of his main side projects, an advanced version of TC that 
allows him to share his own recorded experiences with her. This version of TC is what he always 
envisioned for this technology, however, Memofilm isn’t interested in developing it further. 
 At Nicholas and Will’s meeting with Michael, their manager, and David, the executive director, 
they are informed that Memofilm won’t announce anything publicly about the possible 
consequences of TC. Will and Nicholas show their objection and frustration at these news.  
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 Few days after this meeting and only few weeks before the launch of TC, Will announces to 
Nicholas that he wants to resign. He tells Nicholas that he will take few days off in order to think 
about it.  
 At the same day it is Nicholas’s last meeting with Anna. She confides in him that she is a 
member of FLM and asks him to share the technology with them and become part of their group. 
Nicholas is dumbfounded and knows that this revelation can put both of them in trouble. 
 The following day Nicholas confronts Michael about the constant recording of the lab that was 
authorized by Michael behind Nicholas’s back. Michael reveals that this was requested because 
Will blackmailed him for a promotion in the light of the latest findings. Michael also suspects that 
Will deleted some lab recordings from previous day. Finally, Michael announces to Nicholas that 
they are moving their lab to the main building, a sign that shows his growing mistrust. 
 Completely demoralized, just after his meeting with Michael, Nicholas gives Keri a part of the 
findings about the effects of TC, knowing that this could be very dangerous for his career. 
 At his last day in the office, Nicholas meets Will who reveals his personal reasons in relation to 
his unborn child for asking a promotion by using the findings too add pressure. Nicholas is 
surprised by the revelation but at the same time expresses his disappointment and informs Will 
about his resignation. Nicholas leaves the office by carrying a bag with him that possibly contains 
important documents regarding TC along with the TC headset that he has stopped wearing since he 
found out about the constant recording of the lab. 
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Appendix III: Storyline for the third period (Robyin)  
“There is no past, present or future. There is no beginning nor end.”  
 
Background 
Robyin is a descendant of Jeanette and Nicholas and lives further in the future. At Robyin’s 
time, there is a new technology, a brain implanted microchip that is used to make phone calls, send 
emails and watch films without the need for any external devices. In addition, everything that you 
experience is recorded on this microchip; thus, it constitutes the ultimate internalized VR camera 
and player. There is a big market and database of VR videorecordings that you can ‘experience’ 
with the use of this microchip. This database becomes larger with time, including commercial films 
as well as personal videorecordings that are freely available (like today’s Youtube). You can 
‘experience’ any VR film that has been made since Jeanette’s time, which is when the VR films 
became widely accessible. You can watch a film by closing your eyes and with a simple thought-
command automatically download it in your brain and experience it with your mind’s eye. The 
experience can either last only few seconds by imprinting the film in your brain through the 
microchip, a process that works like ‘photographic memory’ or you can experience the film in real 
time, which makes the experience more intense. You can also experience other people’s personal 
videorecordings, but there are specific regulations for this; they should have died more than 50 
years ago. So, Robyin is allowed to experience Nicholas’s videorecordings.  
Robyin is a researcher, and is one of the first people to get this implant. She is interested in 
empathy and shared consciousness and she has been researching for a while now on Jeanette’s and 
Nicholas’s videorecordings. She is one of the first to experiment on herself as part of her research 
around the effects of the new implant and its links to empathy. Robyin does not approach artificial 
memories as artificial but as a real experience and incorporates Jeanette’s and Nicholas’s 
films/videorecordings as part of her memories and identity. Robyin is in a relationship with Charlie, 
and they have a very strong bonding. 
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Film plot 
All Robyin’s scenes are shot as POV since she is effectively the camera due to the brain implanted  
microchip. 
 
 
Robyin is a researcher, and is one of the first people to get the brain implant in order to research on 
empathy and shared consciousness. Robyin finds out that she has a rare blood disease. Charlie is 
always by her side and tries to comfort her. Her sickness prompts her to reflect on her mortality and 
makes her feel unstable and unbalanced. She feels helpless and without any control over her life. In 
the beginning she cannot accept the fact that she is sick and identifies with Jeanette and her 
difficulty to come to terms with her mnemophrenia and also identifies with Nicholas and how he 
felt out of control in relation to Memofilm just before he resigned.  
 Robyin realizes that her research has been affecting herself, the way she thinks and behaves 
more than she thought. She decides to push herself and experiment even further with Jeanette and 
Nicholas’s memories, which possibly has a direct effect on her health. She wants to find out the 
things that affect her most and tries to focus on how she feels as a result. During this process she 
slowly reinvents herself through Jeanette and Nicholas. Although Charlie is worried more and more 
about her health, he is happy that she has found something to keep her going and in the meantime 
he researches on her condition and tries to find the right doctors and treatments.  
 As time goes by, and while Robyin's health deteriorates, Robyin decides to make a film that will 
depict how the research/experiment has affected her. She slowly accepts her condition in contrast to 
Jeanette and is inspired to continue with the research/film because of Nicholas who strived to stick 
to his principles and strongly believed in his invention, Total Cinema. Charlie gets worried with 
Robyin's decision and is against of the making of this film, because it will consume much of her 
energy. In addition, he becomes frustrated that he cannot find the information he needs for Robyin's 
disease. Regardless of Charlie's objections Robyin continues with the film. She gradually believes 
more and more that the implant can bring true harmony and emancipation through empathy, leading 
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to a successful fusion of community and autonomy. Before she finishes the film, Robyin asks 
Charlie to present it on her behalf at an upcoming conference that she will probably not be able to 
attend due to her disease. She tells him that he should experience it only after she has finished it and 
that he will be able to present it better than her since he will be a neutral outsider. 
 Just before the conference Robyin dies. Charlie experiences her film after her death and realizes 
that Robyin had really found out something very profound; a transcendental way to live 'forever', 
which was her secret true goal since she learnt about her disease. Robyin had discovered that 
Jeanette and Nicholas became 'alive' through her because she experienced and incorporated part of 
their memories as her own. This made her realize that her own experiences/memories can stay alive 
if experienced by others and thus parts of herself will live 'forever'. Robyin's own 'film' is the film 
that we have been watching all along, she has been the 'director-editor' who decided how the 
memories of the three of them will be fused together in order to produce meaningful 'guidelines' to 
immortality. At the end of the film we realize that we have been watching this film through the eyes 
of Charlie who was the first to experience it and Mnemophrenia finishes with his presentation of 
Robyin's film at the conference.  
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! Appendix IV: Script for first period/ Jeanette 
The shooting script is different from the actual film due to the fact that many scenes were cut during 
the editing process. 
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